CWE-805 Detail

CWE-805

Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
Hoog
Incomplete
2010-02-16
00h00 +00:00
2025-12-11
00h00 +00:00
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Naam: Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value

The product uses a sequential operation to read or write a buffer, but it uses an incorrect length value that causes it to access memory that is outside of the bounds of the buffer.

CWE-beschrijving

When the length value exceeds the size of the destination, a buffer overflow could occur.

Algemene informatie

Introductiemodi

Implementation

Toepasselijke platforms

Taal

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined)
Name: C (Often)
Name: C++ (Often)
Class: Assembly (Undetermined)

Veelvoorkomende gevolgen

Bereik Impact Waarschijnlijkheid
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Read Memory, Modify Memory, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Note: Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. This can often be used to subvert any other security service.
AvailabilityModify Memory, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart, DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Note: Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Waargenomen voorbeelden

Referenties Beschrijving

CVE-2011-1959

Chain: large length value causes buffer over-read (CWE-126)

CVE-2011-1848

Use of packet length field to make a calculation, then copy into a fixed-size buffer

CVE-2011-0105

Chain: retrieval of length value from an uninitialized memory location

CVE-2011-0606

Crafted length value in document reader leads to buffer overflow

CVE-2011-0651

SSL server overflow when the sum of multiple length fields exceeds a given value

CVE-2010-4156

Language interpreter API function doesn't validate length argument, leading to information exposure

Mogelijke risicobeperkingen

Phases : Requirements
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation
Phases : Implementation
Phases : Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation
Phases : Operation
Phases : Architecture and Design // Operation
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the product or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Phases : Architecture and Design // Operation

Detectiemethoden

Automated Static Analysis

Effectiviteit : High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
Effectiviteit : Moderate

Manual Analysis

Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].
Effectiviteit : Moderate

Notities kwetsbaarheidsmapping

Rechtvaardiging : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Opmerking : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Gerelateerde aanvalspatronen

CAPEC-ID Naam aanvalspatroon
CAPEC-100 Overflow Buffers
Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an adversary. As a consequence, an adversary is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the adversaries' choice.
CAPEC-256 SOAP Array Overflow
An attacker sends a SOAP request with an array whose actual length exceeds the length indicated in the request. If the server processing the transmission naively trusts the specified size, then an attacker can intentionally understate the size of the array, possibly resulting in a buffer overflow if the server attempts to read the entire data set into the memory it allocated for a smaller array.

Referenties

REF-7

Writing Secure Code
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc.
https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223

REF-58

Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista
Michael Howard.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista

REF-59

Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield
Arjan van de Ven.
https://archive.is/saAFo

REF-60

PaX
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX

REF-741

Top 25 Series - Rank 12 - Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
Jason Lam.
https://web.archive.org/web/20100316043717/http://blogs.sans.org:80/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/11/top-25-series-rank-12-buffer-access-with-incorrect-length-value/

REF-57

Safe C String Library v1.0.3
Matt Messier, John Viega.
http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html

REF-56

Using the Strsafe.h Functions
Microsoft.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN

REF-61

Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1
Microsoft.
https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/

REF-76

Least Privilege
Sean Barnum, Michael Gegick.
https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege

REF-64

Position Independent Executables (PIE)
Grant Murphy.
https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie

REF-1332

Prelink and address space randomization
John Richard Moser.
https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/

REF-1333

Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh.
http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf

REF-1334

Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/

REF-1335

Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/

REF-1336

Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/

REF-1337

Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years
Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd.
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf

REF-1518

AddressSanitizer
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html

Indiening

Naam Organisatie Datum Releasedatum Version
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-01-15 +00:00 2010-02-16 +00:00 1.8

Wijzigingen

Naam Organisatie Datum Opmerking
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-04-05 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-06-21 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-09-27 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-12-13 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-27 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-09-13 +00:00 updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-10-30 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-02-18 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-06-23 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2018-03-27 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-01-03 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2019-06-20 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-06-25 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-08-20 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-12-10 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-10-13 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-09-09 +00:00 updated Functional_Areas
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-12-11 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References