CAPEC-92
Forced Integer Overflow
HIGH
HIGH
Draft
2014-06-23 00:00 +00:00
2022-09-29 00:00 +00:00
Alerte pour un CAPEC
Stay informed of any changes for a specific CAPEC.
Description
This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.
Informations
Execution Flow
1) Explore
The first step is exploratory meaning the attacker looks for an integer variable that they can control.
2) Experiment
The attacker finds an integer variable that they can write into or manipulate and try to get the value of the integer out of the possible range.
3) Exploit
The integer variable is forced to have a value out of range which set its final value to an unexpected value.
4) Exploit
The target host acts on the data and unexpected behavior may happen.
Prerequisites
The attacker can manipulate the value of an integer variable utilized by the target host.The target host does not do proper range checking on the variable before utilizing it.
When the integer variable is incremented or decremented to an out of range value, it gets a very different value (e.g. very small or negative number)
Skills Required
An attacker can simply overflow an integer by inserting an out of range value.Exploiting a buffer overflow by injecting malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level.
Mitigations
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as integer overflow.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.
Always do bound checking before consuming user input data.
Related Weaknesses
| Weakness Name | |
|---|---|
| Integer Overflow or Wraparound The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number. |
|
| Wrap-around Error Wrap around errors occur whenever a value is incremented past the maximum value for its type and therefore "wraps around" to a very small, negative, or undefined value. |
|
| Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow. |
|
| Heap-based Buffer Overflow A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc(). |
|
| Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error The product uses an unsigned primitive and performs a cast to a signed primitive, which can produce an unexpected value if the value of the unsigned primitive can not be represented using a signed primitive. |
|
| Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow The product performs a calculation to determine how much memory to allocate, but an integer overflow can occur that causes less memory to be allocated than expected, leading to a buffer overflow. |
|
| Incorrect Comparison The product compares two entities in a security-relevant context, but the comparison is incorrect, which may lead to resultant weaknesses. |
References
REF-131
Building Secure SoftwareJ. Viega, G. McGraw.
REF-547
SAMATE - Software Assurance Metrics And Tool EvaluationRobert C. Seacord.
http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/view_testcase.php?tID=1511
REF-548
Secure Coding in C and C++Robert C. Seacord.
Submission
| Name | Organization | Date | Date Release |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation |
Modifications
| Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated References | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Example_Instances |
2024©
tesweb SA
