Bytecode Alliance cranelift-codegen 0.51.0 for Rust

CPE Details

Bytecode Alliance cranelift-codegen 0.51.0 for Rust
0.51.0
2021-06-02
14h03 +00:00
2021-06-02
14h19 +00:00
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CPE Name: cpe:2.3:a:bytecodealliance:cranelift-codegen:0.51.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*

Informations

Vendor

bytecodealliance

Product

cranelift-codegen

Version

0.51.0

Target Software

rust

Related CVE

Open and find in CVE List

CVE ID Published Description Score Severity
CVE-2022-31169 2022-07-21 13h50 +00:00 Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. There is a bug in Wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, for AArch64 targets where constant divisors can result in incorrect division results at runtime. This affects Wasmtime prior to version 0.38.2 and Cranelift prior to 0.85.2. This issue only affects the AArch64 platform. Other platforms are not affected. The translation rules for constants did not take into account whether sign or zero-extension should happen which resulted in an incorrect value being placed into a register when a division was encountered. The impact of this bug is that programs executing within the WebAssembly sandbox would not behave according to the WebAssembly specification. This means that it is hypothetically possible for execution within the sandbox to go awry and WebAssembly programs could produce unexpected results. This should not impact hosts executing WebAssembly but does affect the correctness of guest programs. This bug has been patched in Wasmtime version 0.38.2 and cranelift-codegen 0.85.2. There are no known workarounds.
7.5
High
CVE-2022-31104 2022-06-27 23h20 +00:00 Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. In affected versions wasmtime's implementation of the SIMD proposal for WebAssembly on x86_64 contained two distinct bugs in the instruction lowerings implemented in Cranelift. The aarch64 implementation of the simd proposal is not affected. The bugs were presented in the `i8x16.swizzle` and `select` WebAssembly instructions. The `select` instruction is only affected when the inputs are of `v128` type. The correspondingly affected Cranelift instructions were `swizzle` and `select`. The `swizzle` instruction lowering in Cranelift erroneously overwrote the mask input register which could corrupt a constant value, for example. This means that future uses of the same constant may see a different value than the constant itself. The `select` instruction lowering in Cranelift wasn't correctly implemented for vector types that are 128-bits wide. When the condition was 0 the wrong instruction was used to move the correct input to the output of the instruction meaning that only the low 32 bits were moved and the upper 96 bits of the result were left as whatever the register previously contained (instead of the input being moved from). The `select` instruction worked correctly if the condition was nonzero, however. This bug in Wasmtime's implementation of these instructions on x86_64 represents an incorrect implementation of the specified semantics of these instructions according to the WebAssembly specification. The impact of this is benign for hosts running WebAssembly but represents possible vulnerabilities within the execution of a guest program. For example a WebAssembly program could take unintended branches or materialize incorrect values internally which runs the risk of exposing the program itself to other related vulnerabilities which can occur from miscompilations. We have released Wasmtime 0.38.1 and cranelift-codegen (and other associated cranelift crates) 0.85.1 which contain the corrected implementations of these two instructions in Cranelift. If upgrading is not an option for you at this time, you can avoid the vulnerability by disabling the Wasm simd proposal. Additionally the bug is only present on x86_64 hosts. Other aarch64 hosts are not affected. Note that s390x hosts don't yet implement the simd proposal and are not affected.
5.6
Medium
CVE-2021-32629 2021-05-24 13h35 +00:00 Cranelift is an open-source code generator maintained by Bytecode Alliance. It translates a target-independent intermediate representation into executable machine code. There is a bug in 0.73 of the Cranelift x64 backend that can create a scenario that could result in a potential sandbox escape in a Wasm program. This bug was introduced in the new backend on 2020-09-08 and first included in a release on 2020-09-30, but the new backend was not the default prior to 0.73. The recently-released version 0.73 with default settings, and prior versions with an explicit build flag to select the new backend, are vulnerable. The bug in question performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, under a specific set of circumstances. If those circumstances occur, the bug could allow access to memory addresses upto 2GiB before the start of the Wasm program heap. If the heap bound is larger than 2GiB, then it would be possible to read memory from a computable range dependent on the size of the heaps bound. The impact of this bug is highly dependent on heap implementation, specifically: * if the heap has bounds checks, and * does not rely exclusively on guard pages, and * the heap bound is 2GiB or smaller * then this bug cannot be used to reach memory from another Wasm program heap. The impact of the vulnerability is mitigated if there is no memory mapped in the range accessible using this bug, for example, if there is a 2 GiB guard region before the Wasm program heap. The bug in question performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, when the register allocator reloads a spilled integer value narrower than 64 bits. This interacts poorly with another optimization: the instruction selector elides a 32-to-64-bit zero-extend operator when we know that an instruction producing a 32-bit value actually zeros the upper 32 bits of its destination register. Hence, we rely on these zeroed bits, but the type of the value is still i32, and the spill/reload reconstitutes those bits as the sign extension of the i32’s MSB. The issue would thus occur when: * An i32 value in a Wasm program is greater than or equal to 0x8000_0000; * The value is spilled and reloaded by the register allocator due to high register pressure in the program between the value’s definition and its use; * The value is produced by an instruction that we know to be “special” in that it zeroes the upper 32 bits of its destination: add, sub, mul, and, or; * The value is then zero-extended to 64 bits in the Wasm program; * The resulting 64-bit value is used. Under these circumstances there is a potential sandbox escape when the i32 value is a pointer. The usual code emitted for heap accesses zero-extends the Wasm heap address, adds it to a 64-bit heap base, and accesses the resulting address. If the zero-extend becomes a sign-extend, the program could reach backward and access memory up to 2GiB before the start of its heap. In addition to assessing the nature of the code generation bug in Cranelift, we have also determined that under specific circumstances, both Lucet and Wasmtime using this version of Cranelift may be exploitable. See referenced GitHub Advisory for more details.
8.8
High