CVE-2025-38010
CVE Descriptions
phy: tegra: xusb: Use a bitmask for UTMI pad power state tracking
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: tegra: xusb: Use a bitmask for UTMI pad power state tracking The current implementation uses bias_pad_enable as a reference count to manage the shared bias pad for all UTMI PHYs. However, during system suspension with connected USB devices, multiple power-down requests for the UTMI pad result in a mismatch in the reference count, which in turn produces warnings such as: [ 237.762967] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 1618 at tegra186_utmi_pad_power_down+0x160/0x170 [ 237.763103] Call trace: [ 237.763104] tegra186_utmi_pad_power_down+0x160/0x170 [ 237.763107] tegra186_utmi_phy_power_off+0x10/0x30 [ 237.763110] phy_power_off+0x48/0x100 [ 237.763113] tegra_xusb_enter_elpg+0x204/0x500 [ 237.763119] tegra_xusb_suspend+0x48/0x140 [ 237.763122] platform_pm_suspend+0x2c/0xb0 [ 237.763125] dpm_run_callback.isra.0+0x20/0xa0 [ 237.763127] __device_suspend+0x118/0x330 [ 237.763129] dpm_suspend+0x10c/0x1f0 [ 237.763130] dpm_suspend_start+0x88/0xb0 [ 237.763132] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x120/0x500 [ 237.763135] pm_suspend+0x1ec/0x270 The root cause was traced back to the dynamic power-down changes introduced in commit a30951d31b25 ("xhci: tegra: USB2 pad power controls"), where the UTMI pad was being powered down without verifying its current state. This unbalanced behavior led to discrepancies in the reference count. To rectify this issue, this patch replaces the single reference counter with a bitmask, renamed to utmi_pad_enabled. Each bit in the mask corresponds to one of the four USB2 PHYs, allowing us to track each pad's enablement status individually. With this change: - The bias pad is powered on only when the mask is clear. - Each UTMI pad is powered on or down based on its corresponding bit in the mask, preventing redundant operations. - The overall power state of the shared bias pad is maintained correctly during suspend/resume cycles. The mutex used to prevent race conditions during UTMI pad enable/disable operations has been moved from the tegra186_utmi_bias_pad_power_on/off functions to the parent functions tegra186_utmi_pad_power_on/down. This change ensures that there are no race conditions when updating the bitmask.CVE Informations
Metrics
| Metrics | Score | Severity | CVSS Vector | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V3.1 | 5.5 | MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. None There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
nvd@nist.gov |
EPSS
EPSS Score
EPSS Percentile
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.3 To (excluding) 6.6.92
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.7 To (excluding) 6.12.30
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.13 To (excluding) 6.14.8
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
