CVE-2025-38052
CVE Descriptions
net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free with the following call trace: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807a733000 by task kworker/1:0/25 Call Trace: kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840 crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266 aead_request_complete include/crypto/internal/aead.h:85 cryptd_aead_crypt+0x3b8/0x750 crypto/cryptd.c:772 crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266 cryptd_queue_worker+0x131/0x200 crypto/cryptd.c:181 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 Allocated by task 8355: kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:778 tipc_crypto_start+0xcc/0x9e0 net/tipc/crypto.c:1466 tipc_init_net+0x2dd/0x430 net/tipc/core.c:72 ops_init+0xb9/0x650 net/core/net_namespace.c:139 setup_net+0x435/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:343 copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508 create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc0/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:228 ksys_unshare+0x419/0x970 kernel/fork.c:3323 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3394 Freed by task 63: kfree+0x12a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4557 tipc_crypto_stop+0x23c/0x500 net/tipc/crypto.c:1539 tipc_exit_net+0x8c/0x110 net/tipc/core.c:119 ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:173 cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 After freed the tipc_crypto tx by delete namespace, tipc_aead_encrypt_done may still visit it in cryptd_queue_worker workqueue. I reproduce this issue by: ip netns add ns1 ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns ns1 ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer enable media eth dev veth1 ip netns exec ns1 tipc node set key this_is_a_master_key master ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer disable media eth dev veth1 ip netns del ns1 The key of reproduction is that, simd_aead_encrypt is interrupted, leading to crypto_simd_usable() return false. Thus, the cryptd_queue_worker is triggered, and the tipc_crypto tx will be visited. tipc_disc_timeout tipc_bearer_xmit_skb tipc_crypto_xmit tipc_aead_encrypt crypto_aead_encrypt // encrypt() simd_aead_encrypt // crypto_simd_usable() is false child = &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base; simd_aead_encrypt crypto_aead_encrypt // encrypt() cryptd_aead_encrypt_enqueue cryptd_aead_enqueue cryptd_enqueue_request // trigger cryptd_queue_worker queue_work_on(smp_processor_id(), cryptd_wq, &cpu_queue->work) Fix this by holding net reference count before encrypt.CVE Informations
Related Weaknesses
| Weakness Name | Source | |
|---|---|---|
| Use After Free The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Metrics
| Metrics | Score | Severity | CVSS Vector | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V3.1 | 8.8 | HIGH |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Network The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
|
| V3.1 | 7.8 | HIGH |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
nvd@nist.gov |
EPSS
EPSS Score
EPSS Percentile
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 5.5 To (excluding) 5.10.238
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 5.11 To (excluding) 5.15.185
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 5.16 To (excluding) 6.1.141
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.2 To (excluding) 6.6.93
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.7 To (excluding) 6.12.31
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.13 To (excluding) 6.14.9
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.15
Configuraton 0
Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 11.0
