CVE-2026-105944
CVE Descriptions
Apache Pulsar Manager: Missing authentication and authorization and disclosure of the Pulsar admin credential; end of life
Apache Pulsar Manager is a web console for administering Apache Pulsar clusters. It has its own user accounts and login, and it can be configured with an HTTP authentication credential, such as a token, that it uses to call the Pulsar admin API on behalf of its users. Pulsar Manager has the following security issues: - The operation for creating the initial administrator (superuser) account is available without authentication, and it remains available after the instance has been initialized. Anyone who can reach Pulsar Manager can create an additional administrator account at any time and log in with it. This issue affects versions 0.3.0 and later. - Requests to the Pulsar admin API that Pulsar Manager proxies to the configured Pulsar cluster are not subject to Pulsar Manager's authentication. Version 0.2.0 checks the caller's permissions for some of these requests, but not for all of them. An unauthenticated user can therefore use Pulsar Manager to send requests to the Pulsar admin API, which the cluster processes with the credential configured in Pulsar Manager. - The destination of a proxied request can be chosen by the requester, and Pulsar Manager attaches its configured Pulsar admin credential to the request. An unauthenticated user can make Pulsar Manager send this credential to a host of the user's choosing, and the credential can then be used directly against the Pulsar cluster. - In versions 0.3.0 and later, Pulsar Manager does not distinguish between privilege levels of its accounts. Every account, including one created through the first issue, effectively has full administrative privileges in Pulsar Manager. The impact depends on the version and the deployment. In versions 0.3.0 and later, any user who can reach Pulsar Manager over the network can take full control of Pulsar Manager. In all versions, when Pulsar Manager is configured with an HTTP authentication credential for a Pulsar cluster, any user who can reach Pulsar Manager can perform the Pulsar admin operations that this credential permits and can obtain the credential itself. When Pulsar Manager is configured with the token signing key of a Pulsar cluster, an administrator of Pulsar Manager can create tokens for the cluster. Apache Pulsar Manager is no longer maintained and is completely unsupported. The Apache Pulsar PMC has retired it. There are no supported versions, and no further releases, fixes or security updates will be made for any version. These issues will not be fixed. Using Pulsar Manager is not recommended. Users should stop using Pulsar Manager, remove existing deployments, and move to one of the alternatives described in the Administration UI documentation (https://pulsar.apache.org/docs/administration-ui). Users who have exposed Pulsar Manager configured with a Pulsar credential or token signing key should also consider replacing that credential or key. Until a deployment is removed, users should not expose Pulsar Manager to untrusted networks, and should restrict network access to it to trusted administrators.CVE Informations
Related Weaknesses
| Weakness Name | Source | |
|---|---|---|
| Missing Authentication for Critical Function The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources. |
Metrics
| Metrics | Score | Severity | CVSS Vector | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V4.0 | 10 | CRITICAL |
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the “thing that is vulnerable”, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable system. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Network The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. Low The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system. Attack Requirements This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. None The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. None The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the system due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all information within the Vulnerable System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Vulnerable System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted system resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the Vulnerable System; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Sub Confidentiality Impact High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the Subsequent System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Sub Integrity Impact High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Subsequent System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Subsequent System. Sub Availability Impact High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the Subsequent System; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the Subsequent System (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Threat MetricsThe Threat metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability for a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the consumer analyst to customize the resulting score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of complementary/alternative security controls in place, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. The metrics are the modified equivalent of Base metrics and are assigned values based on the system placement within organizational infrastructure. Supplemental MetricsSupplemental metric group provides new metrics that describe and measure additional extrinsic attributes of a vulnerability. While the assessment of Supplemental metrics is provisioned by the provider, the usage and response plan of each metric within the Supplemental metric group is determined by the consumer. |
