CVE-2026-53108 : Detail

CVE-2026-53108

4.7
/
Medium
Local
2026-06-24
17h17 +00:00
2026-07-23
21h30 +00:00
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CVE Descriptions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/64s: Fix unmap race with PMD migration entries The following race is possible with migration swap entries or device-private THP entries. e.g. when move_pages is called on a PMD THP page, then there maybe an intermediate state, where PMD entry acts as a migration swap entry (pmd_present() is true). Then if an munmap happens at the same time, then this VM_BUG_ON() can happen in pmdp_huge_get_and_clear_full(). This patch fixes that. Thread A: move_pages() syscall add_folio_for_migration() mmap_read_lock(mm) folio_isolate_lru(folio) mmap_read_unlock(mm) do_move_pages_to_node() migrate_pages() try_to_migrate_one() spin_lock(ptl) set_pmd_migration_entry() pmdp_invalidate() # PMD: _PAGE_INVALID | _PAGE_PTE | pfn set_pmd_at() # PMD: migration swap entry (pmd_present=0) spin_unlock(ptl) [page copy phase] # <--- RACE WINDOW --> Thread B: munmap() mmap_write_downgrade(mm) unmap_vmas() -> zap_pmd_range() zap_huge_pmd() __pmd_trans_huge_lock() pmd_is_huge(): # !pmd_present && !pmd_none -> TRUE (swap entry) pmd_lock() -> # spin_lock(ptl), waits for Thread A to release ptl pmdp_huge_get_and_clear_full() VM_BUG_ON(!pmd_present(*pmdp)) # HITS! [ 287.738700][ T1867] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 287.743843][ T1867] kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c:187! cpu 0x0: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000044037f4f0] pc: c000000000094ca4: pmdp_huge_get_and_clear_full+0x6c/0x23c lr: c000000000645dec: zap_huge_pmd+0xb0/0x868 sp: c00000044037f790 msr: 800000000282b033 current = 0xc0000004032c1a00 paca = 0xc000000004fe0000 irqmask: 0x03 irq_happened: 0x09 pid = 1867, comm = a.out kernel BUG at :187! Linux version 6.19.0-12136-g14360d4f917c-dirty (powerpc64le-linux-gnu-gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40) #27 SMP PREEMPT Sun Feb 22 10:38:56 IST 2026 enter ? for help [link register ] c000000000645dec zap_huge_pmd+0xb0/0x868 [c00000044037f790] c00000044037f7d0 (unreliable) [c00000044037f7d0] c000000000645dcc zap_huge_pmd+0x90/0x868 [c00000044037f840] c0000000005724cc unmap_page_range+0x176c/0x1f40 [c00000044037fa00] c000000000572ea0 unmap_vmas+0xb0/0x1d8 [c00000044037fa90] c0000000005af254 unmap_region+0xb4/0x128 [c00000044037fb50] c0000000005af400 vms_complete_munmap_vmas+0x138/0x310 [c00000044037fbe0] c0000000005b0f1c do_vmi_align_munmap+0x1ec/0x238 [c00000044037fd30] c0000000005b3688 __vm_munmap+0x170/0x1f8 [c00000044037fdf0] c000000000587f74 sys_munmap+0x2c/0x40 [c00000044037fe10] c000000000032668 system_call_exception+0x128/0x350 [c00000044037fe50] c00000000000d05c system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ---- Exception: 3000 (System Call Vectored) at 0000000010064a2c SP (7fff9b1ee9c0) is in userspace 0:mon> zh commit a30b48bf1b24 ("mm/migrate_device: implement THP migration of zone device pages"), enabled migration for device-private PMD entries. Hence this is one other path where this warning could get trigger from. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_pgtable.c:199 at hash__pmd_hugepage_update+0x48/0x284, CPU#3: hmm-tests/1905 Modules linked in: test_hmm CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1905 Comm: hmm-tests Tainted: G B W L N 7.0.0-rc1-01438-g7e2f0ee7581c #21 PREEMPT Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP, [N]=TEST Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER10 (architected) 0x801200 0xf000006 of:SLOF,git-ee03ae pSeries NIP [c000000000096b70] hash__pmd_hugepage_update+0x48/0x284 LR [c000000000096e7c] hash__pmdp_huge_get_and_clear+0xd0/0xd4 Call Trace: [c000000604707670] [c000000004e102b8] 0xc000000004e102b8 (unreliable) [c000000604707700] [c00000000064ec3c] set_pmd_migration_entry+0x414/0x498 [c000000604707760] [c00000000063e5a4] migrate_vma_col ---truncated---

CVE Informations

Related Weaknesses

CWE-ID Weakness Name Source
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Metrics

Metrics Score Severity CVSS Vector Source
V3.1 4.7 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

High

successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

nvd@nist.gov

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 5.8 To (excluding) 7.0.10

References