Modes Of Introduction
Implementation
Manufacturing
Installation
System Configuration
Operation
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Operating Systems
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
| Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
| Confidentiality | Read Memory, Read Application Data, Unexpected State | Unknown |
Authorization Integrity | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity | |
| Other | Varies by Context
Note: The technical impact can vary widely based on how the resource is used in the product, and whether its contents affect security decisions. | |
Observed Examples
| References |
Description |
| Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus and does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319) which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419) causing the product to be in an unprotected state. |
| chain: a change in an underlying package causes the gettext function to use implicit initialization with a hard-coded path (CWE-1419) under the user-writable C:\ drive, introducing an untrusted search path element (CWE-427) that enables spoofing of messages. |
| WordPress module sets internal variables based on external inputs, allowing false reporting of the number of views |
| insecure default variable initialization in BIOS firmware for a hardware board allows DoS |
| distributed filesystem only initializes part of the variable-length padding for a packet, allowing attackers to read sensitive information from previously-sent packets in the same memory location |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Implementation
Choose the safest-possible initialization for security-related resources.
Phases : Implementation
Ensure that each resource (whether variable, memory buffer, register, etc.) is fully initialized.
Phases : Implementation
Pay close attention to complex conditionals or reset sources that affect initialization, since some paths might not perform the initialization.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design and architecture clearly identify what the initialization should be, and that the initialization does not have security implications.
Detection Methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Justification : This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Comment : Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
References
REF-1437
acct_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/65d0ffdab7426da4509c98d62e163bcce642f651/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/acct/acct_wrapper.sv#L39 REF-1438
Bad Code acct_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/65d0ffdab7426da4509c98d62e163bcce642f651/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/acct/acct_wrapper.sv#L79C1-L86C16 REF-1439
Good Code acct_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/062de4f25002d2dcbdb0a82af36b80a517592612/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/acct/acct_wrapper.sv#L84
Submission
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date release |
Version |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-11 +00:00 |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
4.13 |
Modifications
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-07-16 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities |