Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and Design : Array
Implementation : Array
System Configuration : Array
Architecture and Design : Array
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Operating Systems
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
| Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
| Confidentiality | Read Memory
Note: Array | Medium |
Observed Examples
| References |
Description |
| A fault may allow transient user-mode operations to
access kernel data cached in the L1D, potentially exposing the data
over a covert channel.
|
| A fault may allow transient non-enclave operations to
access SGX enclave data cached in the L1D, potentially exposing the
data over a covert channel.
|
| A TSX Asynchronous Abort may allow transient operations
to access architecturally restricted data, potentially exposing the
data over a covert channel.
|
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Build and Compilation
Phases : Build and Compilation
Phases : Implementation
Phases : System Configuration
Phases : System Configuration
Phases : Patching and Maintenance
Phases : Patching and Maintenance
Phases : Requirements
Detection Methods
Manual Analysis
Effectiveness : Moderate
Automated Analysis
Effectiveness : Moderate
Automated Analysis
Effectiveness : High
Fuzzing
Academic researchers have demonstrated that this
weakness can be detected in hardware using software fuzzing
tools that treat the underlying hardware as a black box
([REF-1406], [REF-1430])
Effectiveness : Opportunistic
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities
Comment : If a weakness can potentially be exploited to
infer data that is accessible inside or outside the current
processor context, then the weakness could map to CWE-1421 and
to another CWE such as CWE-1420.
References
REF-1404
Page Table Isolation (PTI)
The kernel development community.
https://kernel.org/doc/html/next/x86/pti.html REF-1405
RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load
Stephan van Schaik, Alyssa Milburn, Sebastian Österlund, Pietro Frigo, Giorgi Maisuradze, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida.
https://mdsattacks.com/files/ridl.pdf REF-1406
Downfall: Exploiting Speculative Data Gathering
Daniel Moghimi.
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-moghimi.pdf REF-1401
Hardware Security Leak Detection by Symbolic Simulation
Neta Bar Kama, Roope Kaivola.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9617727 REF-1408
Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Stefan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, Mike Hamburg.
https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf REF-1409
Microarchitectural Data Sampling
Intel Corporation.
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling.html REF-1410
Cache Speculation Side-channels
ARM.
https://armkeil.blob.core.windows.net/developer/Files/pdf/Cache_Speculation_Side-channels.pdf REF-1411
Rogue System Register Read/CVE-2018-3640/INTEL-SA-00115
Intel Corporation.
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/rogue-system-register-read.html REF-1400
Refined Speculative Execution Terminology
Intel Corporation.
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/best-practices/refined-speculative-execution-terminology.html REF-1389
You Cannot Always Win the Race: Analyzing the LFENCE/JMP Mitigation for Branch Target Injection
Alyssa Milburn, Ke Sun, Henrique Kawakami.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.04277 REF-1430
Medusa: Microarchitectural: Data Leakage via Automated Attack Synthesis
Daniel Moghimi, Moritz Lipp, Berk Sunar, Michael Schwarz.
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/moghimi-medusa REF-1417
InvisiSpec: making speculative execution invisible in the cache hierarchy.
Mengjia Yan, Jiho Choi, Dimitrios Skarlatos, Adam Morrison, Christopher W. Fletcher, Josep Torrella.
https://iacoma.cs.uiuc.edu/iacoma-papers/micro18.pdf REF-1418
Port Contention for Fun and Profit
Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Bob Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida García, Nicola Tuveri.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1060.pdf REF-1419
Speculative Interference Attacks: Breaking Invisible Speculation Schemes
Mohammad Behnia, Prateek Sahu, Riccardo Paccagnella, Jiyong Yu, Zirui Zhao, Xiang Zou, Thomas Unterluggauer, Josep Torrellas, Carlos Rozas, Adam Morrison, Frank Mckeen, Fangfei Liu, Ron Gabor, Christopher W. Fletcher, Abhishek Basak, Alaa Alameldeen.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11818 REF-1420
Spectre is here to stay: An analysis of side-channels and speculative execution
Ross Mcilroy, Jaroslav Sevcik, Tobias Tebbi, Ben L. Titzer, Toon Verwaest.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178
Submission
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date release |
Version |
| Scott D. Constable |
Intel Corporation |
2023-09-19 +00:00 |
2024-02-29 +00:00 |
4.14 |
Modifications
| Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated References, Weakness_Ordinalities |