Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|---|---|
Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism |
Reference | Description |
---|---|
Product allows remote attackers to view restricted files via an HTTP request containing a "*" (wildcard or asterisk) character. | |
Product modifies the first two letters of a filename extension after performing a security check, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication via a filename with a .ats extension instead of a .hts extension. | |
Database consumes an extra character when processing a character that cannot be converted, which could remove an escape character from the query and make the application subject to SQL injection attacks. | |
Overlaps "fakechild/../realchild" | |
Product checks URI for "<" and other literal characters, but does it before hex decoding the URI, so "%3E" and other sequences are allowed. |
CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
---|---|
CAPEC-267 | Leverage Alternate Encoding An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard. |
CAPEC-3 | Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API. |
CAPEC-71 | Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly. |
CAPEC-78 | Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack. |
CAPEC-79 | Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other. |
CAPEC-80 | Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters. |
Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
PLOVER | Draft 3 |
Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|
Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |
Veracode | Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | ||
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Type | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Type | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes |