Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality Integrity | Read Application Data, Modify Application Data |
Reference | Description |
---|---|
Executables installed world-writable. | |
Home directories installed world-readable. | |
World-writable log files allow information loss; world-readable file has cleartext passwords. | |
World-readable directory. | |
Windows product uses insecure permissions when installing on Solaris (genesis: port error). | |
Insecure permissions for a shared secret key file. Overlaps cryptographic problem. | |
Default permissions of a device allow IP spoofing. |
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
---|---|
CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to. |
CAPEC-127 | Directory Indexing An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks. |
CAPEC-81 | Web Server Logs Tampering Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application. |
Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
PLOVER | Draft 3 |
Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|
Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Time_of_Introduction | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Name | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Type | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Detection_Factors, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships |