Modes Of Introduction
Implementation
Applicable Platforms
Language
Name: C (Undetermined)
Name: C++ (Undetermined)
Name: Java (Undetermined)
Name: C# (Undetermined)
Common Consequences
Scope |
Impact |
Likelihood |
Integrity Other | Alter Execution Logic, Unexpected State
Note: The main problem is that -- if a lock is overcome -- data could be altered in a bad state. | |
Observed Examples
Reference |
Description |
CVE-2022-2621 | Chain: two threads in a web browser use the same resource (CWE-366), but one of those threads can destroy the resource before the other has completed (CWE-416). |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : Architecture and Design
Use locking functionality. This is the recommended solution. Implement some form of locking mechanism around code which alters or reads persistent data in a multithreaded environment.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Create resource-locking validation checks. If no inherent locking mechanisms exist, use flags and signals to enforce your own blocking scheme when resources are being used by other threads of execution.
Detection Methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness : High
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Rationale : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Related Attack Patterns
CAPEC-ID |
Attack Pattern Name |
CAPEC-26 |
Leveraging Race Conditions The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file. |
CAPEC-29 |
Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. A typical example is file access. The adversary can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that they would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the adversary could replace or modify the file, causing the application to behave unexpectedly. |
References
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
REF-62
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.
Submission
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Date Release |
Version |
CLASP |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
Name |
Organization |
Date |
Comment |
Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-11-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-09-27 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-27 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-09-13 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-01-03 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-08-20 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-03-15 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |