CVE-2025-38505
Descriptions du CVE
wifi: mwifiex: discard erroneous disassoc frames on STA interface
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: discard erroneous disassoc frames on STA interface When operating in concurrent STA/AP mode with host MLME enabled, the firmware incorrectly sends disassociation frames to the STA interface when clients disconnect from the AP interface. This causes kernel warnings as the STA interface processes disconnect events that don't apply to it: [ 1303.240540] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 513 at net/wireless/mlme.c:141 cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x78/0xec [cfg80211] [ 1303.250861] Modules linked in: 8021q garp stp mrp llc rfcomm bnep btnxpuart nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 onboard_us [ 1303.327651] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 513 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1+ #3 PREEMPT [ 1303.335937] Hardware name: Toradex Verdin AM62 WB on Verdin Development Board (DT) [ 1303.343588] Workqueue: MWIFIEX_RX_WORK_QUEUE mwifiex_rx_work_queue [mwifiex] [ 1303.350856] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1303.357904] pc : cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x78/0xec [cfg80211] [ 1303.364065] lr : cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x70/0xec [cfg80211] [ 1303.370221] sp : ffff800083053be0 [ 1303.373590] x29: ffff800083053be0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 1303.380855] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffff x24: ffff000002c5b8ae [ 1303.388120] x23: ffff000002c5b884 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000000000008 [ 1303.395382] x20: ffff000002c5b8ae x19: ffff0000064dd408 x18: 0000000000000006 [ 1303.402646] x17: 3a36333a61623a30 x16: 32206d6f72662063 x15: ffff800080bfe048 [ 1303.409910] x14: ffff000003625300 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 1303.417173] x11: 0000000000000002 x10: ffff000003958600 x9 : ffff000003625300 [ 1303.424434] x8 : ffff00003fd9ef40 x7 : ffff0000039fc280 x6 : 0000000000000002 [ 1303.431695] x5 : ffff0000038976d4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000003186 [ 1303.438956] x2 : 000000004836ba20 x1 : 0000000000006986 x0 : 00000000d00479de [ 1303.446221] Call trace: [ 1303.448722] cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x78/0xec [cfg80211] (P) [ 1303.454894] cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt+0x64/0xf8 [cfg80211] [ 1303.460362] mwifiex_process_mgmt_packet+0x1ec/0x460 [mwifiex] [ 1303.466380] mwifiex_process_sta_rx_packet+0x1bc/0x2a0 [mwifiex] [ 1303.472573] mwifiex_handle_rx_packet+0xb4/0x13c [mwifiex] [ 1303.478243] mwifiex_rx_work_queue+0x158/0x198 [mwifiex] [ 1303.483734] process_one_work+0x14c/0x28c [ 1303.487845] worker_thread+0x2cc/0x3d4 [ 1303.491680] kthread+0x12c/0x208 [ 1303.495014] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Add validation in the STA receive path to verify that disassoc/deauth frames originate from the connected AP. Frames that fail this check are discarded early, preventing them from reaching the MLME layer and triggering WARN_ON(). This filtering logic is similar with that used in the ieee80211_rx_mgmt_disassoc() function in mac80211, which drops disassoc frames that don't match the current BSSID (!ether_addr_equal(mgmt->bssid, sdata->vif.cfg.ap_addr)), ensuring only relevant frames are processed. Tested on: - 8997 with FW 16.68.1.p197Informations du CVE
Faiblesses connexes
| Nom de la faiblesse | Source | |
|---|---|---|
| No informations. |
Métriques
| Métriques | Score | Gravité | CVSS Vecteur | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V3.1 | 7.1 | HIGH |
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Adjacent The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. None The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Low Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
|
| V3.1 | 5.5 | MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. None There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
nvd@nist.gov |
EPSS
Score EPSS
Percentile EPSS
Products Mentioned
Configuraton 0
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.12 To (excluding) 6.12.39
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version From (including) 6.13 To (excluding) 6.15.7
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.16
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.16
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.16
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.16
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.16
