CVE-2011-0041 : Détail

Le modèle EPSS produit un score de probabilité compris entre 0 et 1 (0 et 100 %). Plus la note est élevée, plus la probabilité qu'une vulnérabilité soit exploitée est grande.

Date	EPSS V0	EPSS V1	EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)	EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)	EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2022-02-06	–	–	49.37%	–	–
2022-03-20	–	–	43.38%	–	–
2023-03-12	–	–	–	95.82%	–
2023-05-07	–	–	–	95.99%	–
2023-08-20	–	–	–	95.75%	–
2023-10-15	–	–	–	95.57%	–
2023-12-03	–	–	–	95.82%	–
2024-01-21	–	–	–	96.14%	–
2024-06-02	–	–	–	95%	–
2024-06-16	–	–	–	95.24%	–
2024-07-28	–	–	–	94.78%	–
2024-09-08	–	–	–	94.8%	–
2024-10-27	–	–	–	94.21%	–
2024-12-08	–	–	–	93.84%	–
2024-12-22	–	–	–	92.85%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	93.61%	–
2025-01-19	–	–	–	93.61%	–
2025-03-18	–	–	–	–	75.73%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	76.26%
2025-03-30	–	–	–	–	76.26,%

Le percentile est utilisé pour classer les CVE en fonction de leur score EPSS. Par exemple, une CVE dans le 95e percentile selon son score EPSS est plus susceptible d'être exploitée que 95 % des autres CVE. Ainsi, le percentile sert à comparer le score EPSS d'une CVE par rapport à d'autres CVE.

Date	Percentile
2022-02-06	98%
2022-03-20	98%
2023-03-12	99%
2023-05-07	99%
2023-08-20	99%
2023-10-15	99%
2023-12-03	99%
2024-01-21	99%
2024-06-02	99%
2024-06-16	99%
2024-07-28	99%
2024-09-08	99%
2024-10-27	99%
2024-12-08	99%
2024-12-22	99%
2025-01-19	99%
2025-01-19	99%
2025-03-18	99%
2025-03-30	99%
2025-03-30	99%

Abysssec Research 1) Advisory information Title : GDI+ CreateDashedPath Integer overflow in gdiplus.dll Discovery : Nicolas july from vupen Analysis : Abysssec.com Vendor : http://www.microsoft.com Impact : High Contact : info [at] abysssec.com Twitter : @abysssec CVE : CVE-2011-0041 2) Vulnerable version Gdiplus.dll 5.2.6001.22319 3) Vulnerability information Class 1-Integer overflow Impact Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of vulnerable application or cause denial-of-service conditions. Remotely Exploitable Yes Locally Exploitable Yes 4) Vulnerabilities detail The vulnerability exists in gdiplus!GpPath::CreateDashedPath function of gdiplus.dll that is responsible for bitmap drawing and other 2d graphic rendering. EMF+ file is one of the image file format that is rendered by the library. And the vulnerability is based on some floating point calculation of an EMF+ path object. We made the following proof of concept to trigger the issues and it will be explained more: A little taste of file format we simply put a EMF_COMMENT record (id = 0x00000046) and embed and emf+ geraphic object ( id = 0x00004008 ) . For simplicity we ripped out a valid graphic object from another file and started to play with it. The record have two important area that we highlighted them in the above picture. Here is the faulty code: .text:4ECFCBAD loc_4ECFCBAD: .text:4ECFCBAD mov eax, esi .text:4ECFCBAF shl eax, 3 .text:4ECFCBB2 cmp [ebp+lpMem], 0 .text:4ECFCBB6 push eax ; dwBytes .text:4ECFCBB7 jz short loc_4ECFCBCE .text:4ECFCBB9 push [ebp+lpMem] ; lpMem .text:4ECFCBBC call GpRealloc(x,x) .text:4ECFCBC1 test eax, eax .text:4ECFCBC3 jz loc_4ECFCCDB .text:4ECFCBC9 mov [ebp+lpMem], eax .text:4ECFCBCC jmp short loc_4ECFCBDE .text:4ECFCBCE ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------- .text:4ECFCBCE .text:4ECFCBCE loc_4ECFCBCE: .text:4ECFCBCE call GpMalloc(x) .text:4ECFCBD3 test eax, eax .text:4ECFCBD5 mov [ebp+lpMem], eax .text:4ECFCBD8 jz loc_4ECFCCDB The above code uses the eax register as arguments to the GpMalloc function. GpMalloc is simply a gdi version of heapAlloc function. The value of eax register is based on various floating point calculation that is not simple to examine at first look.But I traced the value of eax register and it seems the calculations are based on our values mentioned earlear in the file. And it doesn�t bound checked well, by changing the path value tricky it is possible when the �shr eax, 3� instruction multiply the value by 8 we get an integer overflow and in turn a faulty heap allocation. I dynamically traced the values with my proof of concept file. Eax register is equall to eax + [ebp-38] * 10 and as there are a lot of values and calculations before that, for better consideration I made the following diagram: It took a lot of time explanation of all of the variables above but, the important one is the GpPath object that is in the code a clone of the object is made to later be manipulated for drawings. .text:4ECFC9D9 loc_4ECFC9D9: ; CODE XREF: GpPath::CreateDashedPath(DpPen const *,GpMatrix const *,float,float,float,int)+1AAj .text:4ECFC9D9 fld dword ptr [esi+eax*4] .text:4ECFC9DC fmul [ebp+arg_0] .text:4ECFC9DF fstp dword ptr [esi+eax*4] .text:4ECFC9E2 inc eax .text:4ECFC9E3 cmp eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:4ECFC9E6 jl short loc_4ECFC9D9 .text:4ECFC9E8 .text:4ECFC9E8 loc_4ECFC9E8: .text:4ECFC9E8 mov ecx, [ebp+var_18] ; Src .text:4ECFC9EB call GpPath::Clone(void) .text:4ECFC9F0 mov edi, eax .text:4ECFC9F2 test edi, edi .text:4ECFC9F4 jz loc_4ECFCDBA .text:4ECFC9FA mov eax, [edi] .text:4ECFC9FC mov ecx, edi .text:4ECFC9FE call dword ptr [eax+4] After calling the clone, it checks whether it is a valid clone or not at address 4ECFC9FE. The offset +34h of the object contains a pointer to our 4byte path object values. 0:000> dd ecx 0e03ca50 4ec67e58 68745031 00000000 00000000 0e03ca60 0e03ca74 0e03ca74 00000010 00000010 0e03ca70 00000002 00000100 00000000 00000000 0e03ca80 00000000 0e03ca98 0e03ca98 00000010 0e03ca90 00000010 00000002 449a8eab 458ac500 0e03caa0 449a8eab 4e0000fe 00000000 00000000 0e03cab0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0e03cac0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Our floating point values in the file format: 0e03ca98 449a8eab 458ac500 449a8eab 4e0000fe 0e03caa8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 But there are some modifications on our values before we get the faulty code. First after the clone is performed GpPath::Flatten function made some changes to our values based on a transform matrix in the file. So this is cause of the highlighted 6 DWORDs in the file.��� .text:4ECFC9FE call dword ptr [eax+4] .text:4ECFCA01 test eax, eax .text:4ECFCA03 jz loc_4ECFCDBA .text:4ECFCA09 fld ds:flt_4ECB80FC .text:4ECFCA0F push ecx ; float .text:4ECFCA10 lea eax, [ebp+var_F8] .text:4ECFCA16 fstp [esp+108h+var_108] .text:4ECFCA19 push eax ; int .text:4ECFCA1A mov ecx, edi .text:4ECFCA1C call GpPath::Flatten(GpMatrix const *,float) .text:4ECFCA21 cmp [ebp+var_2C], 0 Flattened GpPath object values: 0:000> dd poi(edi+34) 0e03cd18 449a7eab 458ac100 449a7eab 4e0000fd 0e03cd28 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 And after that our changed GpPath object is sent to calculateGradiantArray and some array of floating point values are made based on its calculation. There are many other default floating point values has effects on the value of the overflowing size for GpMalloc that are not so interesting and I�ve just shown them on the diagram. After the calculation integer wrapped, the heap allocated by the gpMalloc function is not big enough to hold our data. So in next uses of the wrapped allocated heap the corruption occurs. But it seems there is not a straight way of exploiting such heap corruptions using a standalone file. . feel free to contact us at : info [at] abysssec.com PoC link : http://abysssec.com/files/GDI_PoC.zip PoC Mirror : https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/17544.zip (GDI_PoC.zip)