Modes d'introduction
Implementation : Developers often choose default values that leave the product as open and easy to use as possible out-of-the-box, under the assumption that the administrator can (or should) change the default value. However, this ease-of-use comes at a cost when the default is insecure and the administrator does not change it.
System Configuration
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
| Other | Varies by Context
Note: The impact of insecure defaults varies widely
depending on the functionality that the product
controls. | |
Exemples observés
| Références |
Description |
| insecure default variable initialization in BIOS firmware for a hardware board allows DoS |
| A generic database browser interface has a default mode that exposes a web server to the network, allowing queries to the database. |
Méthodes de détection
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Modèles d'attaque associés
| CAPEC-ID |
Nom du modèle d'attaque |
| CAPEC-665 |
Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
|
NotesNotes
This entry improves organization of concepts under initialization. The typical CWE model is to cover "Missing" and "Incorrect" behaviors. Arguably, this entry could be named as "Incorrect" instead of "Insecure." This might be changed in the near future.
Références
REF-1493
Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure By Design Software
US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, US National Security Agency, US FBI, Australian Signals Directorate, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, National Cyber Security Centre, OAS, NISC, CSA Singapore, CERT NZ, Norwegian Cyber Security Centre, Korea Internet & Security Agency, JPCERT/CC.
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-10/SecureByDesign_1025_508c.pdf
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-03-25 +00:00 |
2019-06-20 +00:00 |
3.3 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-07-20 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name, Observed_Examples, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction |