Informations de base
Modes d'introduction
Implementation
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often)
Name: C (Often)
Name: C++ (Often)
Technologies
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
| Availability | Modify Memory, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart, DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU), DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)
Note: Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop. | |
Integrity Confidentiality Availability Access Control | Modify Memory, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Bypass Protection Mechanism
Note: Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. | |
Integrity Confidentiality Availability Access Control Other | Modify Memory, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Other
Note: When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service. | |
Exemples observés
| Références |
Description |
| Stack-based buffer overflows in SFK for wifi chipset used for IoT/embedded devices, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV. |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation
Phases : Architecture and Design
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.
Phases : Implementation
Implement and perform bounds checking on input.
Phases : Implementation
Do not use dangerous functions such as gets. Use safer, equivalent functions which check for boundary errors.
Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation
Méthodes de détection
Fuzzing
Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.
Efficacité : High
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Efficacité : High
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Use tools that are integrated during
compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms
related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer
(ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].
Efficacité : Moderate
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Notes
There is significant inconsistency
regarding the "buffer overflow" term, which can have
multiple interpretations and uses. Many people mean
"writing past the end of a buffer." Others mean "writing
past the end of a buffer, or before the beginning of a
buffer." Still others might include "read" in the term.
Stack-based buffer overflows can instantiate in return address overwrites, stack pointer overwrites or frame pointer overwrites. They can also be considered function pointer overwrites, array index overwrites or write-what-where condition, etc.
Références
REF-1029
Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit
Aleph One.
https://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html REF-7
Writing Secure Code
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc.
https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223 REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
REF-62
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.
REF-62
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf REF-58
Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista
Michael Howard.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista REF-60
PaX
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX REF-64
Position Independent Executables (PIE)
Grant Murphy.
https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie REF-1332
Prelink and address space randomization
John Richard Moser.
https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/ REF-1333
Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh.
http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf REF-1334
Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/ REF-1335
Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/ REF-1337
Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years
Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd.
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf REF-1477
Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-eliminating-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities REF-1518
AddressSanitizer
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| CLASP |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction |
|
KDM Analytics |
2008-08-01 +00:00 |
added/updated white box definitions |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-01-12 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships |
| KDM Analytics |
|
2009-07-17 +00:00 |
Improved the White_Box_Definition |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-07-27 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, White_Box_Definitions |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-10-29 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-02-16 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2018-03-27 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-01-03 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-09-19 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-03-15 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-07-20 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-04-03 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Other_Notes, References, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-01-21 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |