Modes d'introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Systèmes d’exploitation
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Confidentiality Authorization | Bypass Protection Mechanism | |
Exemples observés
Références |
Description |
| Smartphone OS uses comparison functions that are not in constant time, allowing side channels |
| Java-oriented framework compares HMAC signatures using String.equals() instead of a constant-time algorithm, causing timing discrepancies |
| Password-checking function in router terminates validation of a password entry when it encounters the first incorrect character, which allows remote attackers to obtain passwords via a brute-force attack that relies on timing differences in responses to incorrect password guesses, aka a timing side-channel attack. |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Implementation
The hardware designer should ensure that comparison logic is implemented so as to compare in one operation instead in smaller chunks.
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Modèles d'attaque associés
CAPEC-ID |
Nom du modèle d'attaque |
CAPEC-26 |
Leveraging Race Conditions The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file. |
NotesNotes
CWE 4.16 removed a demonstrative example for a hardware module because it was inaccurate and unable to be adapted. The CWE team is developing an alternative.
Références
REF-1079
SCA4n00bz - Timing-based Sidechannel Attacks for Hardware N00bz workshop
Joe Fitzpatrick.
https://github.com/securelyfitz/SCA4n00bz
Soumission
Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi |
Intel Corporation |
2020-02-12 +00:00 |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
4.1 |
Modifications
Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-08-20 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-07-20 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples |
CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-11-19 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes |