Modes d'introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation : Such issues could be introduced during policy definition, hardware architecture, design, manufacturing, and/or provisioning. They can be identified later during testing or system configuration phases.
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Systèmes d’exploitation
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Name: Security Hardware (Undetermined)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Authentication Authorization | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Modify Memory | High |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Architecture and Design
When architecting the system, the RoT should be designated for storage in a memory that does not allow further programming/writes.
Phases : Implementation
During implementation and test, the RoT memory location should be demonstrated to not allow further programming/writes.
Méthodes de détection
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated testing can verify that RoT components are immutable.
Efficacité : High
Architecture or Design Review
Root of trust elements and memory should be part of architecture and design reviews.
Efficacité : High
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Modèles d'attaque associés
| CAPEC-ID |
Nom du modèle d'attaque |
| CAPEC-679 |
Exploitation of Improperly Configured or Implemented Memory Protections
|
| CAPEC-68 |
Subvert Code-signing Facilities
Many languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment. Subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege. Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing classifies for this style of attack. |
Références
REF-1152
TCG Roots of Trust Specification
Trusted Computing Group.
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_Roots_of_Trust_Specification_v0p20_PUBLIC_REVIEW.pdf REF-1153
Root of Trust Definitions and Requirements
GlobalPlatform Security Task Force.
https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GP_RoT_Definitions_and_Requirements_v1.0.1_PublicRelease_CC.pdf REF-1348
bootrom.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac19/blob/619e9fb0ef32ee1e01ad76b8732a156572c65700/bootrom/bootrom.sv#L263C19-L263C19 REF-1349
bootrom.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac19/blob/ba6abf58586b2bf4401e9f4d46e3f084c664ff88/bootrom/bootrom.sv#L259C9-L259C9
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna |
Intel Corporation |
2020-04-25 +00:00 |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
4.3 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Weakness_Ordinalities |