Modes d'introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: Web Based (Often)
Name: Web Server (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Non-Repudiation Access Control | Varies by Context, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Application Data, Modify Application Data, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
Note: The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could effectively perform any operations as the victim. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of the CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges. | |
Exemples observés
| Références |
Description |
| web console for SIEM product does not check Origin header, allowing Cross Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWH) |
| Chain: gaming client attempts to validate the Origin header, but only uses a substring, allowing Cross-Site WebSocket hijacking by forcing requests from an origin whose hostname is a substring of the valid origin. |
| WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1:3123/ connection. |
| WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1/ connection to a randomized port number. |
| WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1:8080/ connection. |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Implementation
Enable CORS-like access restrictions by verifying the 'Origin' header during the WebSocket handshake.
Phases : Implementation
Use a randomized CSRF token to verify requests.
Phases : Implementation
Use TLS to securely communicate using 'wss' (WebSocket Secure) instead of 'ws'.
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
Require user authentication prior to the WebSocket connection being established. For example, the WS library in Node has a 'verifyClient' function.
Phases : Implementation
Leverage rate limiting to prevent against DoS. Use of the leaky bucket algorithm can help with this.
Phases : Implementation
Use a library that provides restriction of the payload size. For example, WS library for Node includes 'maxPayloadoption' that can be set.
Phases : Implementation
Treat data/input as untrusted in both directions and apply the same data/input sanitization as XSS, SQLi, etc.
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Références
REF-1257
Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)
Christian Schneider.
https://christian-schneider.net/blog/cross-site-websocket-hijacking/ REF-1251
WebSockets not Bound by SOP and CORS? Does this mean...
Drew Branch.
https://blog.securityevaluators.com/websockets-not-bound-by-cors-does-this-mean-2e7819374acc REF-1252
How to secure your WebSocket connections
Mehul Mohan.
https://www.freecodecamp.org/news/how-to-secure-your-websocket-connections-d0be0996c556/ REF-1256
Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)
Vickie Li.
https://medium.com/swlh/hacking-websocket-25d3cba6a4b9 REF-1253
Testing for WebSockets security vulnerabilities
PortSwigger.
https://portswigger.net/web-security/websockets
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| Anonymous External Contributor |
|
2021-05-28 +00:00 |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
4.7 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Weakness_Ordinalities |