Modes d'introduction
Implementation
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Name: C (Undetermined)
Name: C++ (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Integrity Confidentiality | Modify Memory, Read Memory
Note: Can result in unintended modifications or exposure of sensitive memory. | |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Implementation // Architecture and Design
In flat address space situations, never allow computing memory addresses as offsets from another memory address.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Fully specify protocol layout unambiguously, providing a structured grammar (e.g., a compilable yacc grammar).
Phases : Testing
Testing: Test that the implementation properly handles each case in the protocol grammar.
Méthodes de détection
Fuzzing
Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.
Efficacité : High
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Use tools that are integrated during
compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms
related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer
(ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].
Efficacité : Moderate
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Références
REF-62
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf REF-1518
AddressSanitizer
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| CLASP |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-03-10 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-10-29 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-03-29 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-06-23 +00:00 |
updated Description, Other_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-01-03 +00:00 |
updated Description, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-03-15 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-02-29 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Weakness_Ordinalities |