Détail du CWE-301

Simple authentication protocols are subject to reflection attacks if a malicious user can use the target machine to impersonate a trusted user.

A mutual authentication protocol requires each party to respond to a random challenge by the other party by encrypting it with a pre-shared key. Often, however, such protocols employ the same pre-shared key for communication with a number of different entities. A malicious user or an attacker can easily compromise this protocol without possessing the correct key by employing a reflection attack on the protocol.

Reflection attacks capitalize on mutual authentication schemes in order to trick the target into revealing the secret shared between it and another valid user. In a basic mutual-authentication scheme, a secret is known to both the valid user and the server; this allows them to authenticate. In order that they may verify this shared secret without sending it plainly over the wire, they utilize a Diffie-Hellman-style scheme in which they each pick a value, then request the hash of that value as keyed by the shared secret. In a reflection attack, the attacker claims to be a valid user and requests the hash of a random value from the server. When the server returns this value and requests its own value to be hashed, the attacker opens another connection to the server. This time, the hash requested by the attacker is the value which the server requested in the first connection. When the server returns this hashed value, it is used in the first connection, authenticating the attacker successfully as the impersonated valid user.

Modes d'introduction

Architecture and Design : COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.

Plateformes applicables

Langue

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Conséquences courantes

Exemples observés

Mesures d’atténuation potentielles

Phases : Architecture and Design
Use different keys for the initiator and responder or of a different type of challenge for the initiator and responder.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Let the initiator prove its identity before proceeding.

Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Modèles d'attaque associés

NotesNotes

The term "reflection" is used in multiple ways within CWE and the community, so its usage should be reviewed.

Références

REF-18

The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf

REF-62

The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.

Soumission

Modifications