Modes d'introduction
Implementation
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Class: Web Based (Often)
Name: Web Server (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Confidentiality Integrity Availability | Read Application Data, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Note: An attacker could insert special characters that are processed client-side in the context of the user's session. | |
Exemples observés
| Références |
Description |
| XSS in parameter in a link. |
| XSS in web-based email product via attachment filenames. |
| HTML injection in posted message. |
| XSS not quoted in error page. |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Implementation
Carefully check each input parameter against a rigorous positive specification (allowlist) defining the specific characters and format allowed. All input should be neutralized, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. We often encounter data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
Phases : Implementation
Phases : Implementation
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Phases : Implementation
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XMLHTTPRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Méthodes de détection
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Efficacité : High
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Modèles d'attaque associés
| CAPEC-ID |
Nom du modèle d'attaque |
| CAPEC-18 |
XSS Targeting Non-Script Elements
This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious scripts are embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags ( ), comments in XML documents (< !-CDATA->), etc. These tags may not be subject to the same input validation, output validation, and other content filtering and checking routines, so this can create an opportunity for an adversary to tunnel through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through other elements. As with all remote attacks, it is important to differentiate the ability to launch an attack (such as probing an internal network for unpatched servers) and the ability of the remote adversary to collect and interpret the output of said attack. |
| CAPEC-193 |
PHP Remote File Inclusion
In this pattern the adversary is able to load and execute arbitrary code remotely available from the application. This is usually accomplished through an insecurely configured PHP runtime environment and an improperly sanitized "include" or "require" call, which the user can then control to point to any web-accessible file. This allows adversaries to hijack the targeted application and force it to execute their own instructions. |
| CAPEC-32 |
XSS Through HTTP Query Strings
An adversary embeds malicious script code in the parameters of an HTTP query string and convinces a victim to submit the HTTP request that contains the query string to a vulnerable web application. The web application then procedes to use the values parameters without properly validation them first and generates the HTML code that will be executed by the victim's browser. |
| CAPEC-86 |
XSS Through HTTP Headers
An adversary exploits web applications that generate web content, such as links in a HTML page, based on unvalidated or improperly validated data submitted by other actors. XSS in HTTP Headers attacks target the HTTP headers which are hidden from most users and may not be validated by web applications. |
Notes
Although this can be classified as an injection problem, the more pertinent issue is the improper conversion of such special characters to respective context-appropriate entities before displaying them to the user.
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| PLOVER |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| Sean Eidemiller |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
added/updated demonstrative examples |
| Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
|
KDM Analytics |
2008-08-01 +00:00 |
added/updated white box definitions |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-10-14 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-05-27 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name |
| KDM Analytics |
|
2009-07-17 +00:00 |
Improved the White_Box_Definition |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-07-27 +00:00 |
updated White_Box_Definitions |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-06-21 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-03-29 +00:00 |
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-05-03 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Relationships, White_Box_Definitions |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships |