Détail du CWE-806

The product uses the size of a source buffer when reading from or writing to a destination buffer, which may cause it to access memory that is outside of the bounds of the buffer.

When the size of the destination is smaller than the size of the source, a buffer overflow could occur.

Modes d'introduction

Implementation

Plateformes applicables

Langue

Name: C (Sometimes)
Name: C++ (Sometimes)

Conséquences courantes

Mesures d’atténuation potentielles

Phases : Architecture and Design
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Viega, and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft. This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Phases : Implementation
Programmers should adhere to the following rules when allocating and managing their applications memory: Double check that your buffer is as large as you specify. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if calling this function in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. Truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases : Operation // Build and Compilation

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Phases : Operation

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Phases : Build and Compilation // Operation
Most mitigating technologies at the compiler or OS level to date address only a subset of buffer overflow problems and rarely provide complete protection against even that subset. It is good practice to implement strategies to increase the workload of an attacker, such as leaving the attacker to guess an unknown value that changes every program execution.

Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités

Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Références

REF-56

Using the Strsafe.h Functions
Microsoft.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN

REF-57

Safe C String Library v1.0.3
Matt Messier, John Viega.
http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html

REF-58

Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista
Michael Howard.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista

REF-59

Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield
Arjan van de Ven.
https://archive.is/saAFo

REF-60

PaX
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX

REF-61

Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1
Microsoft.
https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/

REF-64

Position Independent Executables (PIE)
Grant Murphy.
https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie

REF-1332

Prelink and address space randomization
John Richard Moser.
https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/

REF-1333

Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh.
http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf

REF-1334

Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/

REF-1335

Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/

REF-1336

Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/

REF-1337

Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years
Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd.
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf

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