CAPEC-94
Adversary in the Middle (AiTM)
HIGH
Stable
2014-06-23 00:00 +00:00
2022-09-29 00:00 +00:00
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Description
An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components.
Informations
Execution Flow
1) Explore
[Determine Communication Mechanism] The adversary determines the nature and mechanism of communication between two components, looking for opportunities to exploit.
Technique
- Perform a sniffing attack and observe communication to determine a communication protocol.
- Look for application documentation that might describe a communication mechanism used by a target.
2) Experiment
[Position In Between Targets] The adversary inserts themself into the communication channel initially acting as a routing proxy between the two targeted components.
Technique
- Install spyware on a client that will intercept outgoing packets and route them to their destination as well as route incoming packets back to the client.
- Exploit a weakness in an encrypted communication mechanism to gain access to traffic. Look for outdated mechanisms such as SSL.
3) Exploit
[Use Intercepted Data Maliciously] The adversary observes, filters, or alters passed data of its choosing to gain access to sensitive information or to manipulate the actions of the two target components for their own purposes.
Technique
- Prevent some messages from reaching their destination, causing a denial of service.
Prerequisites
There are two components communicating with each other.An attacker is able to identify the nature and mechanism of communication between the two target components.
An attacker can eavesdrop on the communication between the target components.
Strong mutual authentication is not used between the two target components yielding opportunity for attacker interposition.
The communication occurs in clear (not encrypted) or with insufficient and spoofable encryption.
Skills Required
This attack can get sophisticated since the attack may use cryptography.Mitigations
Ensure Public Keys are signed by a Certificate AuthorityEncrypt communications using cryptography (e.g., SSL/TLS)
Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both ends of any communications channel.
Exchange public keys using a secure channel
Related Weaknesses
| Weakness Name | |
|---|---|
| Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint The product does not adequately verify the identity of actors at both ends of a communication channel, or does not adequately ensure the integrity of the channel, in a way that allows the channel to be accessed or influenced by an actor that is not an endpoint. |
|
| Authentication Bypass by Spoofing This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks. |
|
| Authentication Bypass: OpenSSL CTX Object Modified after SSL Objects are Created The product modifies the SSL context after connection creation has begun. |
|
| Improper Authentication When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. |
|
| Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay A capture-replay flaw exists when the design of the product makes it possible for a malicious user to sniff network traffic and bypass authentication by replaying it to the server in question to the same effect as the original message (or with minor changes). |
References
REF-553
Computer Security: Art and ScienceM. Bishop.
REF-633
Man-in-the-middle attackhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Man-in-the-middle_attack
REF-634
What is a man-in-the-middle attack?Kyle Chivers.
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-wifi-what-is-a-man-in-the-middle-attack.html
REF-635
Man in the middle (MITM) attackhttps://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/man-in-the-middle-attack-mitm/
REF-636
Settling the score: taking down the Equifax mobile applicationJerry Decime.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/settling-score-taking-down-equifax-mobile-application-jerry-decime/
Submission
| Name | Organization | Date | Date Release |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation |
Modifications
| Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Examples-Instances, Related_Vulnerabilities | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated References | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated @Abstraction, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated @Name, @Status, Alternate_Terms, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Taxonomy_Mappings |
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