Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control | Read Application Data, Modify Application Data, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Note: An attacker could pose as one of the entities and read or possibly modify the communication. |
Reference | Description |
---|---|
chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversry-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint). |
CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
---|---|
CAPEC-466 | Leveraging Active Adversary in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy An attacker leverages an adversary in the middle attack (CAPEC-94) in order to bypass the same origin policy protection in the victim's browser. This active adversary in the middle attack could be launched, for instance, when the victim is connected to a public WIFI hot spot. An attacker is able to intercept requests and responses between the victim's browser and some non-sensitive website that does not use TLS. |
CAPEC-57 | Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated. |
CAPEC-589 | DNS Blocking An adversary intercepts traffic and intentionally drops DNS requests based on content in the request. In this way, the adversary can deny the availability of specific services or content to the user even if the IP address is changed. |
CAPEC-590 | IP Address Blocking An adversary performing this type of attack drops packets destined for a target IP address. The aim is to prevent access to the service hosted at the target IP address. |
CAPEC-612 | WiFi MAC Address Tracking In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi messages and logs the associated Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. These addresses are intended to be unique to each wireless device (although they can be configured and changed by software). Once the attacker is able to associate a MAC address with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for that MAC address to track that user in the future. |
CAPEC-613 | WiFi SSID Tracking In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi management frame messages containing the Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the WiFi network. These messages are frequently transmitted by WiFi access points (e.g., the retransmission device) as well as by clients that are accessing the network (e.g., the handset/mobile device). Once the attacker is able to associate an SSID with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for this SSID to track that user in the future. |
CAPEC-615 | Evil Twin Wi-Fi Attack Adversaries install Wi-Fi equipment that acts as a legitimate Wi-Fi network access point. When a device connects to this access point, Wi-Fi data traffic is intercepted, captured, and analyzed. This also allows the adversary to use "adversary-in-the-middle" (CAPEC-94) for all communications. |
CAPEC-662 | Adversary in the Browser (AiTB) An adversary exploits security vulnerabilities or inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to manipulate traffic between two endpoints. |
CAPEC-94 | Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components. |
Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
---|---|---|---|---|
PLOVER | Draft 3 |
Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
---|---|---|---|
Sean Eidemiller | Cigital | added/updated demonstrative examples | |
Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Time_of_Introduction | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Name | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Taxonomy_Mappings | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Alternate_Terms, Name, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Alternate_Terms, Related_Attack_Patterns | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Relationships | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Alternate_Terms |