CWE-311
Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
HIGH
Draft
2006-07-19 00:00 +00:00
2024-02-29 00:00 +00:00
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Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission.
Extended Description
The lack of proper data encryption passes up the guarantees of confidentiality, integrity, and accountability that properly implemented encryption conveys.
Informations
Modes Of Introduction
Architecture and Design : OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.Operation
Applicable Platforms
Language
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)Common Consequences
| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Read Application Data Note: If the application does not use a secure channel, such as SSL, to exchange sensitive information, it is possible for an attacker with access to the network traffic to sniff packets from the connection and uncover the data. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. This access is usually somewhere near where the user is connected to the network (such as a colleague on the company network) but can be anywhere along the path from the user to the end server. | |
| Confidentiality Integrity | Modify Application Data Note: Omitting the use of encryption in any program which transfers data over a network of any kind should be considered on par with delivering the data sent to each user on the local networks of both the sender and receiver. Worse, this omission allows for the injection of data into a stream of communication between two parties -- with no means for the victims to separate valid data from invalid. In this day of widespread network attacks and password collection sniffers, it is an unnecessary risk to omit encryption from the design of any system which might benefit from it. |
Observed Examples
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
| password and username stored in cleartext in a cookie | |
| password stored in cleartext in a file with insecure permissions | |
| chat program disables SSL in some circumstances even when the user says to use SSL. | |
| Chain: product uses an incorrect public exponent when generating an RSA key, which effectively disables the encryption | |
| storage of unencrypted passwords in a database | |
| storage of unencrypted passwords in a database | |
| product stores a password in cleartext in memory | |
| storage of a secret key in cleartext in a temporary file | |
| SCADA product uses HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not encrypted | |
| login credentials stored unencrypted in a registry key | |
| Passwords transmitted in cleartext. | |
| Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP. | |
| Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy. | |
| Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext. | |
| Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email. | |
| Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext. | |
| Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext. | |
| Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294). | |
| Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server. | |
| Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes. |
Potential Mitigations
Phases : RequirementsClearly specify which data or resources are valuable enough that they should be protected by encryption. Require that any transmission or storage of this data/resource should use well-vetted encryption algorithms.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that encryption is properly integrated into the system design, including but not necessarily limited to:
- Encryption that is needed to store or transmit private data of the users of the system
- Encryption that is needed to protect the system itself from unauthorized disclosure or tampering
Identify the separate needs and contexts for encryption:
- One-way (i.e., only the user or recipient needs to have the key). This can be achieved using public key cryptography, or other techniques in which the encrypting party (i.e., the product) does not need to have access to a private key.
- Two-way (i.e., the encryption can be automatically performed on behalf of a user, but the key must be available so that the plaintext can be automatically recoverable by that user). This requires storage of the private key in a format that is recoverable only by the user (or perhaps by the operating system) in a way that cannot be recovered by others.
Using threat modeling or other techniques, assume that data can be compromised through a separate vulnerability or weakness, and determine where encryption will be most effective. Ensure that data that should be private is not being inadvertently exposed using weaknesses such as insecure permissions (CWE-732). [REF-7]
Phases : Architecture and Design
When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification.
Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Phases : Architecture and Design
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Phases : Implementation // Architecture and Design
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
Phases : Implementation
Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.
Detection Methods
Manual Analysis
The characterizaton of sensitive data often requires domain-specific understanding, so manual methods are useful. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. Black box methods may produce artifacts (e.g. stored data or unencrypted network transfer) that require manual evaluation.Effectiveness : High
Automated Analysis
Automated measurement of the entropy of an input/output source may indicate the use or lack of encryption, but human analysis is still required to distinguish intentionally-unencrypted data (e.g. metadata) from sensitive data.Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness : SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Web Application Scanner
- Web Services Scanner
- Database Scanners
Effectiveness : SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
- Network Sniffer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Fuzz Tester
- Framework-based Fuzzer
- Automated Monitored Execution
- Man-in-the-middle attack tool
Effectiveness : High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
- Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
- Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness : High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness : SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
- Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
- Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Attack Modeling
Effectiveness : High
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Rationale : CWE-311 is high-level with more precise children available. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).Comments : Consider children CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information or CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information.
Related Attack Patterns
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-157 | Sniffing Attacks In this attack pattern, the adversary intercepts information transmitted between two third parties. The adversary must be able to observe, read, and/or hear the communication traffic, but not necessarily block the communication or change its content. Any transmission medium can theoretically be sniffed if the adversary can examine the contents between the sender and recipient. Sniffing Attacks are similar to Adversary-In-The-Middle attacks (CAPEC-94), but are entirely passive. AiTM attacks are predominantly active and often alter the content of the communications themselves. |
| CAPEC-158 | Sniffing Network Traffic In this attack pattern, the adversary monitors network traffic between nodes of a public or multicast network in an attempt to capture sensitive information at the protocol level. Network sniffing applications can reveal TCP/IP, DNS, Ethernet, and other low-level network communication information. The adversary takes a passive role in this attack pattern and simply observes and analyzes the traffic. The adversary may precipitate or indirectly influence the content of the observed transaction, but is never the intended recipient of the target information. |
| CAPEC-204 | Lifting Sensitive Data Embedded in Cache An adversary examines a target application's cache, or a browser cache, for sensitive information. Many applications that communicate with remote entities or which perform intensive calculations utilize caches to improve efficiency. However, if the application computes or receives sensitive information and the cache is not appropriately protected, an attacker can browse the cache and retrieve this information. This can result in the disclosure of sensitive information. |
| CAPEC-31 | Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state information and other critical data on client systems. There are several different forms of this attack. The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data contained therein. The second form involves intercepting this data as it is transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then used by the adversary to impersonate the remote user/session. The third form is when the cookie's content is modified by the adversary before it is sent back to the server. Here the adversary seeks to convince the target server to operate on this falsified information. |
| CAPEC-37 | Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data An attacker examines a target system to find sensitive data that has been embedded within it. This information can reveal confidential contents, such as account numbers or individual keys/credentials that can be used as an intermediate step in a larger attack. |
| CAPEC-383 | Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring An adversary hosts an event within an application framework and then monitors the data exchanged during the course of the event for the purpose of harvesting any important data leaked during the transactions. One example could be harvesting lists of usernames or userIDs for the purpose of sending spam messages to those users. One example of this type of attack involves the adversary creating an event within the sub-application. Assume the adversary hosts a "virtual sale" of rare items. As other users enter the event, the attacker records via AiTM (CAPEC-94) proxy the user_ids and usernames of everyone who attends. The adversary would then be able to spam those users within the application using an automated script. |
| CAPEC-384 | Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client. |
| CAPEC-385 | Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process. |
| CAPEC-386 | Application API Navigation Remapping An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud. |
| CAPEC-387 | Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic. |
| CAPEC-388 | Application API Button Hijacking An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. |
| CAPEC-477 | Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data. |
| CAPEC-609 | Cellular Traffic Intercept Cellular traffic for voice and data from mobile devices and retransmission devices can be intercepted via numerous methods. Malicious actors can deploy their own cellular tower equipment and intercept cellular traffic surreptitiously. Additionally, government agencies of adversaries and malicious actors can intercept cellular traffic via the telecommunications backbone over which mobile traffic is transmitted. |
| CAPEC-65 | Sniff Application Code An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server. |
Notes
There is an overlapping relationship between insecure storage of sensitive information (CWE-922) and missing encryption of sensitive information (CWE-311). Encryption is often used to prevent an attacker from reading the sensitive data. However, encryption does not prevent the attacker from erasing or overwriting the data.References
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security ProcessSecure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf
REF-7
Writing Secure CodeMichael Howard, David LeBlanc.
https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223
REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software SecurityMichael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
REF-265
Top 25 Series - Rank 10 - Missing Encryption of Sensitive DataFrank Kim.
https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-10-missing-encryption-of-sensitive-data/
REF-62
The Art of Software Security AssessmentMark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.
REF-267
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULESInformation Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf
Submission
| Name | Organization | Date | Date Release | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLASP | Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Name | Organization | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Time_of_Introduction | |
| Veracode | Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | ||
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, References | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationship_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Potential_Mitigations | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Taxonomy_Mappings |
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