Modos de Introdução
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Plataformas Aplicáveis
Linguagem
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Sistemas Operacionais
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Arquiteturas
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Tecnologias
Name: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Consequências Comuns
| Escopo |
Impacto |
Probabilidade |
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control Availability | DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Memory, Modify Memory | Medium |
Exemplos Observados
| Referências |
Descrição |
| Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) device implements Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) bridges that do not require authentication for arbitrary read and write access to the BMC's physical address space from the host, and possibly the network [REF-1138]. |
Mitigações Potenciais
Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design includes provisions for access-control checks in the bridge for both upstream and downstream transactions.
Phases : Implementation
Implement access-control checks in the bridge for both upstream and downstream transactions.
Métodos de Detecção
Simulation / Emulation
RTL simulation to ensure that bridge-access controls are implemented properly.
Eficácia : High
Formal Verification
Formal verification of bridge RTL to ensure that access control cannot be bypassed.
Eficácia : High
Notas de Mapeamento de Vulnerabilidade
Justificativa : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comentário : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Padrões de Ataque Relacionados
| CAPEC-ID |
Nome do Padrão de Ataque |
| CAPEC-122 |
Privilege Abuse
An adversary is able to exploit features of the target that should be reserved for privileged users or administrators but are exposed to use by lower or non-privileged accounts. Access to sensitive information and functionality must be controlled to ensure that only authorized users are able to access these resources. |
Referências
REF-1138
CVE-2019-6260: Gaining control of BMC from the host processor
Stewart Smith.
https://www.flamingspork.com/blog/2019/01/23/cve-2019-6260:-gaining-control-of-bmc-from-the-host-processor/ REF-1381
aes0_wrapper.sv lines 72 - 78
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/aes0/aes0_wrapper.sv#L72-L78 REF-1382
clint.sv line 71
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/clint/clint.sv#L71C2-L71C36 REF-1383
Fix for clint.sv line 78
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/45a004368b5a31857008834d9780536f0764f055/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/clint/clint.sv#L78
Submissão
| Nome |
Organização |
Data |
Data de lançamento |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna |
Intel Corporation |
2020-05-19 +00:00 |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
4.3 |
Modificações
| Nome |
Organização |
Data |
Comentário |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-02-29 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Weakness_Ordinalities |