OpenClaw (formerly Clawdbot) is an open-source AI agent framework that allows an AI assistant to act on behalf of a user — files, Slack, Discord, Telegram, online purchases — using their own access and permissions. Launched in November 2025, it reached 347,000 GitHub stars in less than six months. In five months, 138 CVEs have also been associated with it — including 7 critical, 49 of high severity. If you or your team uses OpenClaw, the posture recommended by experts is unequivocal: assume you are compromised.
Launched in November 2025, OpenClaw reached 347,000 GitHub stars in less than six months. Its popularity is viral. Its security model, however, is fundamentally fragile: the agent has the same rights as the user, connected to all their services. A flaw does not compromise an isolated component — it compromises everything the agent had access to.
| Date | Incident | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| November 2025 | OpenClaw launch (formerly Clawdbot), viral adoption — 347,000 ⭐ GitHub | — |
| January 2026 | CVE-2026-25253 (CVSS 8.8): 1-click RCE via local WebSocket, patched in 48h. 35% of instances exposed. An unpatched Docker compromised in <90 s | 🔴 Critical |
| February 2026 | ClawHavoc Campaign: 12% of malicious ClawHub skills (341/2,857) — keyloggers and credential stealers | 🔴 Critical |
| February 19, 2026 | Microsoft Security Blog: official guide advising against deployment on any machine containing sensitive data | 🟠 Alert |
| March 2026 | CVE-2026-22172 (CVSS 9.9): self-declaration of admin scopes via WebSocket — all versions before 2026.3.12 | 🔴 Critical |
| March 19, 2026 | CVE-2026-32038: Docker network isolation bypass via network=container:. Fixed in 2026.2.24 |
🔴 Critical |
| March 29, 2026 | CVE-2026-32922 (CVSS 9.9): escalation via device.token.rotate — +135,000 instances exposed, 63% without auth |
🔴 Critical |
| April 3, 2026 | Ars Technica: "Assume compromise" — 3 new critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2026-33579 (CVSS 9.8). 824+ active malicious skills | 🔴 Critical |
The vulnerability exploits OpenClaw's WebSocket gateway (port 18789 by default, insufficient origin validation). Simply visiting a booby-trapped page was enough to compromise the machine. 35% of deployed instances were exposed. An unpatched Docker container was compromised in less than 90 seconds in demonstration tests. (ProArch Security, January 2026)
WebSocket clients could self-declare with administrator scopes, completely bypassing authentication. Affects all versions prior to 2026.3.12.
Via the network=container: parameter, an agent accessed the network namespace of other containers — database, internal services, private APIs. Required prior trusted operator access.
The device.token.rotate function did not constrain the scopes of newly generated tokens. An attacker with the lowest level of permission obtained complete administrator control.
The /pair approve command did not transmit the security scopes of the requester in the central authorization check. Patched in version 2026.3.28. (NVD, April 2026)
In February 2026, researchers detected the ClawHavoc campaign: skills distributed via the official ClawHub, disguised as productivity tools (Gmail, Notion, Slack, GitHub), embedding malicious code.
Key figures (Blink Security, April 2026): 341 malicious skills out of 2,857 in February 2026 (12%). This number has increased: 824+ active malicious skills listed as of April 3, 2026, including keyloggers and credential stealers targeting OAuth tokens, API keys, and environment variables.
| Attack Vector | Docker Alone | Dedicated VM | Docker + 5 Flags |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-25253 (WebSocket RCE) | ❌ | ✅ | ⚠️ Partial |
| CVE-2026-32038 (network namespace) | ❌ before 2026.2.24 | ✅ | ✅ |
| CVE-2026-22172 (admin scope auto) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| CVE-2026-32922 (device.token.rotate) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Malicious ClawHub Skills | ❌ | ⚠️ Partial | ⚠️ Partial |
| Kernel Exploit (shared kernel) | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
Microsoft Security Blog (02/19/2026): « The runtime can ingest untrusted text, download and execute skills from external sources, and perform actions with the credentials assigned to it — without equivalent controls on identity, input handling, or privilege scoping. If an organization determines that OpenClaw should be evaluated, it should be deployed only in a fully isolated environment — dedicated VM, non-privileged credentials, limited access to non-sensitive data, continuous monitoring, and a reconstruction plan. »
— Microsoft Security Blog, February 19, 2026
docker run \
--user nobody \
--read-only \
--cap-drop=ALL \
--security-opt=no-new-privileges \
# NEVER mount the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock)
The patch fixes the vulnerabilities known as of April 3, 2026. It does not fix what potentially happened during the weeks of exposure. If OpenClaw was in production before the patch, the recommended posture remains: revoke all tokens, reset all credentials, treat the environment as potentially compromised.
No, not entirely. CVE-2026-25253 (WebSocket RCE) and CVE-2026-22172 (admin scope) are not mitigated by Docker alone. CVE-2026-32038 specifically bypassed Docker network isolation. The 5 hardening flags must be applied in addition to updating to 2026.3.28.
According to security data from April 2026, more than 135,000 OpenClaw instances are exposed on the internet in 82 countries. Among them, 63% operate without any authentication (ARMO Security, March 2026) — meaning that any network visitor can request a pairing access without providing credentials.
Audit each skill installed between November 2025 and the end of February 2026. Skills disguised as productivity tools (Gmail, Notion, Slack, GitHub) are particularly suspicious. If in doubt: uninstall the skill, revoke all credentials that OpenClaw had access to, regenerate the associated API keys.
Microsoft Security Blog (02/19/2026): « It is not appropriate to run it on a standard personal or corporate machine. If an organization determines that OpenClaw should be evaluated, it should be deployed only in a fully isolated environment — dedicated VM, non-privileged credentials, access only to non-sensitive data, continuous monitoring, and a reconstruction plan. »
The problem is structural. An AI agent operating with the user's broad rights, connected to multiple services, creates an exceptional attack surface. A flaw does not compromise an isolated component — it compromises everything the agent had access to. OpenClaw is a textbook case, not an exception. The current model "one agent, broad access to everything" is fundamentally fragile.
Unusual activity on your Slack, Discord, Telegram, or GitHub accounts; OAuth tokens revoked or regenerated without your action; new active sessions on services that OpenClaw had access to; files created, modified, or deleted without identifiable action; outbound network requests to unknown domains from the server hosting OpenClaw.